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 This dissertation discusses the topics of judicial independence and judicial 
accountability using the federal and state court systems of the United States as major 
examples since much of the work on judicial independence derives from the American 
experience.  I define judicial independence by addressing the inquiries of independence 
for whom, independence from whom, independence from what, and independence for 
what purpose.  Conditions that foster or supplant judicial independence are then 
summarized to facilitate their application to the case of Nazi Germany and its judicial 
system. 
 It is next proffered and considered that upon Adolf Hitler’s usurpation of power 
within Nazi Germany judicial independence was abruptly and purposefully dispatched 
through the passage on March 23, 1933, of the Enabling Act, or The Law for the 
Recovery of People and Reich from Suffering.
1
  In his speech to the Reichstag 
advocating the acceptance of this law, Hitler was forthright, honest, and provided an 
omen of what was to subsequently transpire relative to judicial independence in the Third 
Reich when he stated, “The security of tenure of the judges on the one side must 
correspond on the other with an elasticity for the benefit of the community when reaching 
judgments.  The centre of legal concern is not the individual but the Volk.”
2
 
 Hitler had obtained unlimited power in a constitutional manner and therefore 
whatever he did was legal in the juridical sense, but the rule of law was completely 
preempted and no longer prevailed within Germany.  No judicial system could resist and 
continue to function in a constitutional manner once Hitler had been granted dictatorial 
                                                 
1
 Koch, H.W. (1989).  In the name of the Volk:  Political justice in Hitler’s Germany. (London, GB:  I.B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd.), 35. 
2
 Id. at 35. 
 ii 
powers.  The creation of the Volksgerichtshof or People’s Court on April 24, 1934,
3
 and 
its ensuing operation epitomized a belief in the law to the detriment of justice, 
sanctioning the National Socialist regime to pervert justice to accommodate their 
particular purposes.   
 This paper concludes with a discussion of some individuals who chose to resist 
the barbarism and inhumanity of Nazi tyranny and how they were dealt with by the 
judicial system in Germany.  These individuals were convinced that Hitler and his 
minions were ruining Germany, once known as the land of “thinkers and poets,” and had 
to be stopped before total destruction occurred, recognizing they were being ruled by 
criminals who had no regard for human life.  The individual in the resistance attempted to 
show that there was indeed “another Germany,” that not all inhabitants of Germany were 
hateful, arrogant, and uncultured.
 4
  However, their actions culminated in “show trials” 
before the wholly dependent People’s Court, resulting in clear demonstrations of how 
Germany’s judiciary had lost all semblance of independence, and were therefore 
complacent in what transpired during that dark period of German history.  
                                                 
3
 Koch, H.W. (1989).  In the name of the Volk:  Political justice in Hitler’s Germany. (London, GB:  I.B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd.), 45. 
4
 Holmes, B.R. & Keele, A.F. (1995).  When truth was treason: German youth against Hitler, the story of 
the Helmuth Hübener group, based on the narrative of Karl-Heinz Schnibbe.  (Chicago, IL:  University of 
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Chapter I:  Introduction 
 
 As individuals in American society, we have been extremely privileged to reside 
within a country that has aspired to emphasize a fundamental principle, the rule of law.  
Unfortunately, the citizens of the Weimar Republic of Germany began to experience the 
disintegration of this proposition on January 30, 1933, with the usurpation of power by 
Adolf Hitler and his tyrannical regime.  Judicial independence and autonomy were 
expeditiously dispatched and completely terminated through the subsequent functioning 
of the Volksgerichtshof (“VGH”), or People’s Court, in Nazi Germany.  The People’s 
Court was a tribunal designed to judicially implement the dictates of Nazi Party elites 
without any semblance or pretext of judicial independence or autonomy.   
 In this dissertation, a comprehensive analysis of judicial independence and 
judicial accountability will be proffered on both the federal and informative state court 
levels within the United States, so as to provide a paradigm of the components necessary 
for their existence within a democracy.  It is then asserted and discussed that judicial 
independence was intentionally arrogated and deliberately absent within Nazi Germany.  
In addition, it is contended that most members of the German judiciary who presided 
under this tyranny did so voluntarily under Hitler’s dictatorship, and were fully cognizant 
that they had to comply with the “general line” prescribed by the regime when 
effectuating their juristic functions. 
   2




 teaches that all law emanates from the state and demands from 
judges absolute loyalty to the letter of the law even if they consider the law unjust.
6
  As a 
theory, it equates law with the behavioral norms determined by the state and society, and 
which therefore require no further justification, rejecting natural law, describing it as 
mere unproven speculation.  In essence, legal positivism is marked with doubt as it 




 Virtually no professional group emerged from the Nazi era with such a clear 
conscience as that of the jurists.  They categorically denied that German judges had 
participated in the injustices of the Hitler dictatorship.
8
  On the contrary, judges ascribed 
all guilt to the lawmakers, asserting that they were simply following the existing 
legislation as a result of their “positivistic training.”  It was true that legal positivism, 
with its demand that judges be strictly bound to the law, had been the unchallenged 
doctrine of the authoritarian state under the Kaiser.  During the fourteen years of the 
Weimar Republic, however, the judicial system and legal scholars assumed a position 
against the democratic government.  Only a minority of legal theorists had implored the 
judiciary to obey the laws of the democracy.  The courts of the Weimar Republic rarely 
announced that a particular law could not be applied or was unconstitutional, but with 
“interpretations” that had little to do with its actual wording, they could achieve the same 
                                                 
5
 Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, defines “legal positivism” as, “The theory that legal rules are 
valid only because they are enacted by an existing legal authority or accepted as binding in a given society, 
not because they are grounded in morality or in natural law.”   
6
 Koch, H.W. (1989).  In the name of the Volk:  Political justice in Hitler’s Germany. (London, GB:  I.B. 




 Müller, I. (1991).  Hitler’s justice: the courts of the Third Reich.  (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press), 219. 
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effect.  Apart from a small minority of supporters of the Republic, no one in the German 
legal profession endorsed positivism any longer.
9
 
 Placing the judiciary under a strict obligation to follow the letter of the law would 
have been an impediment to the “legal order” of the Nazi regime and would have limited 
its power.  For this reason, judges were required to declare their loyalty to the Führer 
rather than to the law itself.  Any appeal to the letter of the law was dismissed as “moral 
and legal thinking typical of Jewish liberals.”
10
  The Grand Criminal Panel of the 
Supreme Court exhorted German judges to recall that “the judiciary…can fulfill the task 
imposed on it by the Third Reich only if it does not remain glued to the letter of the law, 
but rather penetrates to its innermost spirit; the judiciary must do its part to see that the 
goals of the lawmakers are achieved.”
11
 
 Some National Socialist legal doctrines were the exact opposite of legal 
positivism, the claim that judges and prosecutors were merely following the laws and that 
this was how they had been trained by their democratic professors during the Weimar 
Republic became an excuse for the whole profession.  The view became that laws passed 
in a proper procedure could not be questioned by the courts or administrators on either 
constitutional or ethical grounds.  According to this doctrine, there were allegedly no 
obstacles in Hitler’s accession,
12
 “He was legibus solutus, free from all laws.”
13
 
 This explanation for the downfall of the rule of law under National Socialism 
soon became established.  The fallacy of legal positivism exonerated the entire judiciary; 
                                                 
9
 Müller, I. (1991).  Hitler’s justice: the courts of the Third Reich.  (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press), 219. 
10
 Id. at 220. 
11
 Id.  
12
 Id. at 220-221. 
13
 Id. at 221. 
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it was seized upon by those who should have been held responsible for the crimes they 




 A select few German citizens nurtured upon the rule of law refused to accept the 
dictatorial mandates of National Socialism and instituted individual and collective 
resistance in defiance of this totalitarian system.  This opposition was exhibited in 
manners that individuals, living in a society based upon fundamental freedoms, would 
presuppose as personal rights and liberties.  These individuals initiated activities 
conceived to arouse the consciousness of their nation against Nazism.  With full 
awareness that their actions were treasonous, they failed to disclose information of 
contemplated unlawful conduct,
15
 listened to foreign radio broadcasts,
16
 discussed 
possible alternative forms of government in the post-Nazi era,
17
 and exercised freedoms 
of speech and press.
18
  However, residing in a country with a fascist government in place, 
these activities represented the pinnacle of criminal culpability.   
 Johannes Georg Klamroth, Helmuth Hübener, Helmuth James von Moltke and the 
Kreisau Circle, along with the members of the White Rose, engaged in these prohibited 
enterprises, leading to their arrests, Gestapo interrogations, “show trials” before the 
People’s Court, and subsequently ordered annihilations.   Even though history has since 
                                                 
14
 Müller, I. (1991).  Hitler’s justice: the courts of the Third Reich.  (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press), 221-222. 
15
 Bruhns, W. (2009).  My father’s country: The story of a German family.  New York, NY:  Vintage 
Books. 
16
 Dewey, R. L. (2003).  Hübener vs. Hitler: A biography of Helmuth Hübener, Mormon teenage resistance 
leader (2
nd
 ed.).  Provo, UT:  Academic Research Foundation. 
17
 Van Roon, G. (1971).  German resistance to Hitler: Count von Moltke and the Kreisau circle.  London, 
GB:  Van Nostrand Reinhold Company Ltd. 
18
 Hanser, R. (1979).  A noble treason: The revolt of the Munich students against Hitler.  New York, NY:  
G.P. Putnam’s Sons. 
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vindicated these resistance groups, at that time, they were desperately alone, reviled by 
the general public, and forced to defy the laws, their oaths of national allegiance, and 
public opinion.  Through their decisions to make an honorable choice to physically 
confront barbarism, they exhibited to the world the existence of the “other Germany.”  
Each possessed the ethical and personal courage to become pariahs within their own 
country, knowing that they were living outside the law, and prepared to accept the deadly 
consequences of their struggle. 
 Although silenced by the People’s Court, an instrumentality of death within Nazi 
Germany, those involved in the resistance movements to Hitler are now viewed as 
virtuously principled human beings.  While their actions failed to overthrow the Nazi 
regime or to shorten the war, and had little influence on the form of the post-war 
Germanies, their resistance may certainly be said to have redeemed the honor of the 
German people.  This dissertation is directed not only to the judiciary, but to those 
individuals who desire a greater understanding of the legal ramifications that arise when 
the rule of law is abrogated through a loss of judicial independence or autonomy, using 
the Nazi experience as exemplification thereof.  These manifestations of judicial action 
resulted when members of the judiciary relinquished their independence to despotic and 
corrupt political authorities and ignored the directives of the First Commandment.  It also 
serves as attestation to the world that a tyrannical government is something which must 
be prevented rather than cured because ousting such a reign of terror, once it has gained 
power, is profoundly catastrophic in terms of both human lives and material resources, 
and that these sacrifices will affect future generations of humankind in perpetuum.   
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Chapter II:  Literature Review 
The subject matter of judicial independence and judicial accountability, and the 
requisite principles therefore, within the United States, have produced much literature.  
Writings approach the topics from both theoretical and analytical perspectives in federal 
and state court jurisdictions.  Most of the practical discussions however, focus on state 
court judges and balancing the judicial function between independence and 
accountability. 
Scholars examining Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime have generated a plethora of 
printed materials in the eighty years since his assumption of power on January 30, 1933, 
and the resulting tyrannical despotism that quickly precipitated with the assistance of his 
compliant minions.  I will not discuss each book in this Literature Review, but feel it 
imperative to mention and emphasize some of these published works and their 
importance in this project. 
 Judges Under Fire – Human Rights, Independent Judges, and the Rule of Law
19
 
presents seven practical analyses of the ramifications to societies and the rule of law 
when there is a threat to or an absence of judicial independence.  One of the illustrations 
that the author, Harold Baer, Jr., a judge of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, provides is of the People’s Court in Nazi Germany. 
 Justice Accused – Antislavery and the Judicial Process
20
 written by Robert M. 
Cover was interesting, albeit idiosyncratic to the Civil War period.  However, Cover does 
                                                 
19
 Baer, H., Jr. (2011).  Judges under fire: Human rights, independent judges, and the rule of law.  Chicago, 
IL:  ABA Publishing. 
20
 Cover, R.M. (1975).  Justice accused: Antislavery and the judicial process.  New Haven, CT:  Yale 
University Press. 
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accentuate that antislavery judges did deny personal responsibility for their actions, as 
Nazi judges would subsequently.  Judges from both periods condemned the positive law 
that had been enacted for the restrictions placed upon them when rendering their judicial 
decisions. 
 The most comprehensive and detailed investigation of judicial independence and 
judicial accountability of any of the readings on these subjects was Without Fear or 
Favor – Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in the States.
21
  It also 
provided an invaluable practical application of these principles for the benefit of those 
individuals functioning within the judicial branch. 
 Hitler’s Hitmen
22
 was especially enlightening as it considered in detail six 
individuals:  Adolf Eichmann, Baldur von Schirach, Martin Bormann, Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, Roland Freisler, and Josef Mengele.  The information provided on Freisler 
was the most definitive my research disclosed, but even then, paucity exists beyond the 
most basic of information, relative to Freisler, which is repeated from one source to 
another. 
 Hitler’s Justice:  The Courts of the Third Reich
23
 and In the Name of the Volk:  
Political Justice in Hitler’s Germany
24
 were very interesting and provided useful 
material.  I felt the latter supplied the most beneficial insight into the People’s Court, its 
                                                 
21
 Tarr, G.A. (2012).  Without fear or favor: Judicial independence and judicial accountability in the states.  
Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press. 
22
 Knopp, G. (2002).  Hitler’s hitmen.  Sparkford, GB:  J.H. Haynes & Co. Ltd. 
23
 Müller, I. (1991).  Hitler’s justice: the courts of the Third Reich.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press. 
24
 Koch, H.W. (1989).  In the name of the Volk:  Political justice in Hitler’s Germany.  London, GB:  I.B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd. 
   8
   
 
background and functioning.  Likewise, The Law under the Swastika
25
 proved to be a 
beneficial source of information for this endeavor. 
 The only publication available on Johannes (Hans) Georg Klamroth is, My 
Father’s Country: The Story of a German Family.
26
  It was written by his youngest 
daughter, Wibke Bruhns, who felt compelled to compose this genealogical portrait after 
happening to view a video segment of her father’s trial before Roland Freisler and the 
People’s Court.  I have also seen this much abbreviated film and can only feel the deepest 
empathy for Ms. Bruhns after observing the berating of her father and the lack of respect 
exhibited by Freisler during the proceedings. 
 The trilogy associated with the Helmuth Hübener Group was interesting as each 
book was either a biography or autobiography of or by the members.  In addition to 
Hübener vs. Hitler: A Biography of Helmuth Hübener, Mormon Teenage Resistance 
Leader,
27
 Three against Hitler
28
 was the autobiography of Rudolf Wobbe, while the 
autobiography of Karl-Heinz Schnibbe was presented in When Truth Was Treason:  
German Youth against Hitler, the Story of the Helmuth Hübener Group, Based on the 
Narrative of Karl-Heinz Schnibbe.
29
   
                                                 
25
 Stolleis, M. (1998).  The law under the swastika:  Studies on legal history in Nazi Germany.  Chicago, 
IL:  The University of Chicago Press. 
26
 Bruhns, W. (2009).  My father’s country: The story of a German family.  New York, NY:  Vintage 
Books. 
27
 Dewey, R. L. (2003).  Hübener vs. Hitler: A biography of Helmuth Hübener, Mormon teenage resistance 
leader (2
nd
 ed.).  Provo, UT:  Academic Research Foundation. 
28
 Wobbe, R. & Borrowman, J. (2002).  Three against Hitler.  American Fork, UT:  Covenant 
Communications, Inc. 
29
 Holmes, B.R. & Keele, A.F. (1995).  When truth was treason: German youth against Hitler, the story of 
the Helmuth Hübener group, based on the narrative of Karl-Heinz Schnibbe.  Chicago, IL:  University of 
Illinois Press. 
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Both German Resistance to Hitler: Count von Moltke and the Kreisau Circle
30
 
and Helmuth von Moltke: A Leader against Hitler
31
 provide in-depth and detailed 
descriptions of the resistance activities of Moltke and the Kreisau Circle.  The personal 
friendship between Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby, co-authors of Helmuth von 
Moltke:  A Leader against Hitler,
32
 with Helmuth James von Moltke, allowed them to 
provide enlightening intimate knowledge in this volume, connecting exact dates with the 
actions of Moltke and the Circle. 
 Letters to Freya: 1939-1945
33
 is the first person account of Freya von Moltke, 
wife of Helmuth James von Moltke, and presents the actual correspondence written by 
Helmuth to Freya between August 22, 1939, and January 11, 1945.  At times the letters 
are a little difficult to comprehend as they had to be written in somewhat of a cryptic 
style to avoid detection by the Gestapo censors, when posted by Helmuth.  Likewise, 
Freya prevented the Gestapo from discovering the letters she received from Helmuth by 
concealing them in the beehives on the Kreisau estate, until the conclusion of the war. 
 Memories of Kreisau & the German Resistance
34
 is authored by Freya herself and 
presents a concise summary of the activities of the Kreisau Circle. 
 By far, the most published works relate to the resistance actions of the White 
Rose and its affiliated members.  A Noble Treason: The Revolt of the Munich Students 
                                                 
30
 Van Roon, G. (1971).  German resistance to Hitler: Count von Moltke and the Kreisau circle.  London, 
GB:  Van Nostrand Reinhold Company Ltd. 
31
 Balfour, M. & Frisby, J. (1972).  Helmuth von Moltke: A leader against Hitler.  London, GB:  




 Von Oppen, B.R. (Ed.) (1995).  Letters to Freya: 1939-1945.  (B.R. Von Oppen, Trans.).  New York, 
NY:  Vintage Books. 
34
 Winter, J.M. (Ed.) (2003).  Memories of Kreisau & the German resistance.  (F. Von Moltke, Trans.).  
Lincoln, NE:  University of Nebraska Press. 
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 furnishes a comprehensive account of the group and its members, 
without dwelling more than necessary on any particular member.  By necessity, Hans and 
Sophie Scholl and their actions receive a greater amount of Richard Hanser’s attention, 
but not inordinately so, while other authors focus primarily on the Scholl siblings. 
 It would appear that Annette E. Dumbach and Jud Newborn attempted to simply 
increase their royalties by publishing in 1986, Shattering the German Night: The Story of 
the White Rose,
36
 and then having the same book republished in 2006 under the title 
Sophie Scholl and the White Rose.
37
  I must say to their credit that they did include nine 
appendices in the second book that were not in the first work, but otherwise, the 
publications are exactly identical.  However, the additional information contained in the 
second printing is readily available elsewhere. 
 My research associated with judicial independence, judicial accountability, and 
Nazi Germany, produced numerous law review articles, including the following. 
 Stephen B. Burbank appears to be one of the most prolific theorists in the area of 
judicial independence and judicial accountability.  In addition to being the co-editor, 
along with Barry Friedman, of Judicial Independence at the Crossroads – An 
Interdisciplinary Approach,
38
 a collection of ten essays arising from a conference of the 
American Judicature Society, held on March 31-April 1, 2001, he has also authored 
several law review articles. 
                                                 
35
 Hanser, R. (1979).  A noble treason: The revolt of the Munich students against Hitler.  New York, NY:  
G.P. Putnam’s Sons. 
36
 Dumbach, A. & Newborn, J. (1986).  Shattering the German night: The story of the White Rose.  Boston, 
MA:  Little, Brown and Company. 
37
 Dumbach, A.E. & Newborn, J. (2006).  Sophie Scholl and the White Rose.  New York, NY:  Oneworld 
Publications. 
38
 Burbank, S.B. & Friedman, B. (Eds.) (2002).  Judicial independence at the crossroads: An 
interdisciplinary approach.  Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage Publications, Inc. 
   11
   
 
 In “The Architecture of Judicial Independence,”
39
 Burbank defines judicial 
independence in terms of what it was, is, and should be.  He also examines the balancing 
that is involved between judicial independence and judicial accountability, and the 
differences in individual and institutional judicial independence.  Through “What Do We 
Mean by ‘Judicial Independence’?”
40
 Burbank argues that judicial independence is not an 
end of government but a means to an end or ends, that judicial independence and judicial 
accountability are not discrete concepts at war with each other, but rather complementary 
concepts that can and should be regarded as allies, and that judicial independence is not a 
monolith between federal and state courts and trial and appellate courts.   
 V.G. Curran’s “Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period in France 
and Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law”
41
 examines the 
courts of France and Germany during the Vichy and Nazi periods to observe judicial 
methodology during periods of crisis.  Curran concludes that judicial positivism was not a 
significant basis for the courts’ injustice during these periods, but did, in conjunction with 
other fundamental causes, contribute to substantive outcomes that complied with the texts 
of enacted laws. 
 Once again, I will not review every article that I read for this project, but will 
delineate the following as utilized in this dissertation. 
                                                 
39
 Burbank, S.B. (1999).  The architecture of judicial independence.  Southern California Law Review, 72, 
315-351. 
40
 Burbank, S.B. (2003).  What do we mean by “judicial independence”?  Ohio State Law Journal, 64, 323-
339. 
41
 Curran, V.G. (2001-2002).  Fear of formalism:  Indications from the Fascist period in France and 
Germany of judicial methodology’s impact on substantive law.  Cornell International Law Journal, 35, 
101-168. 
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 David S. Law in his article “Judicial Independence”
42
 poses four questions:  
Independence for whom, from whom, from what, and for what purpose?  He responds 
with concise and insightful responses which are incorporated into my chapter on Judicial 
Independence and Judicial Accountability. 
 The Nizkor Project’s, “Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression, Volume I, Chapter VII, 
Means Used by the Nazi Conspiractors [sic] in Gaining Control of the German State,”
43
 
contains very brief quotations from Otto Georg Thierack, Nazi Minister of Justice, 
relative to judicial independence, or the lack thereof, in Nazi Germany. 
 The Chairman of this committee, Dr. James T. Richardson, graciously provided 
an article he wrote entitled, “The Sociology of Religious Freedom: A Structural and 
Socio-Legal Analysis,”
44
 that describes the autonomy or discretion that judges may 
exercise in different societies.   
The research that I conducted for this paper has failed to disclose any existing 
literature that collectively discusses judicial independence and judicial accountability in 
conjunction with the specific resistance movements presented, and the very unfortunate 
individual annihilations that resulted from the proceedings conducted before the People’s 
Court.  To reiterate, depending upon the particular resistance effort, a modicum of 
material may exist, as in the case of Johannes Georg Klamroth, with increasingly 
                                                 
42
 Law, D.S. (2010).  Judicial Independence.  In International Encyclopedia of Political Science, 5, 1369-
1372. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557348 
43
 Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression: Means used by the nazi conspirators in gaining control of the German 
state. (n.d.). In The Nizkor Project, 1(7), 227-229. Retrieved from  
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/nca/nca-01/nca-01-07-means-18.html 
44
 Richardson, J.T. (2006).  The Sociology of Religious Freedom: A Structural and Socio-Legal Analysis.  
Sociology of Religion, 67(3), 271-294. 
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available publications progressing from Helmuth Hübener, through Helmuth James von 
Moltke and the Kreisau Circle, and culminating with the White Rose.   
   14
   
 
Chapter III:  Methodology and Methodological Concerns 
My methodological approach was to utilize the information gleaned from the 
previously described materials, as well as, my personal interview with Dr. Traute 
LaFrenz-Page.  From this research, I discuss the essential elements needed to ensure 
judicial independence and judicial accountability, along with the specific individuals and 
their various activities as functionary instruments in the Nazi regime or as modes or 
members of the diverse resistance coteries.  However, I am compelled to add to my 
methodology these observations relative to the numerous inconsistencies that became 
readily and disconcertingly apparent as I progressed with the investigation and fact-
finding for this project.  The harsh reality and verity is that we can only speculate about 
history; we have at our disposal mere fragments of events that are verifiable, but there 
remain many obscure expanses where one perusing and analyzing the available literature 
rapidly discovers that the various researchers and authors on the topics have engaged in 
instinctive speculation, and that these suppositions have transpired and manifested 
themselves into their respective publications.  The most difficult issues to expose and 
retrieve from the past are these unspoken assumptions. 
Unfortunately, as in the witnessing of any current event, two people seeing the 
same occurrence may subsequently describe conflicting accounts of the incident.  The 
passage of time only serves to further exacerbate the unintentional discrepancies.  In 
addition, it is patently discernible that personal monetary gain is a motivating 
consideration and component for some writers.  As an illustration, I have read the same 
alleged quoted accounts of various correspondences by members of the resistance and 
found them to contain different contextual meanings.  The discrepancies were so 
   15
   
 
dissimilar that translation error is not conceivable, but intentional sensationalism provides 
possible monetary remuneration, and because of this, may impart an explanation for these 
inconsistencies.  I also discovered a “blogger” whose factual recitation contained blatant 
and flagrant misstatements, but should an individual be so inclined, they may purchase 
the author’s publications for rather exorbitant fees.  Included in these publications are the 
alleged “voices” of the members of a particular resistance movement.  This author also 
advertises the availability of a minimum of sixteen different publications associated with 
this group, including additional opportunities to acquire such items as photocopies of 
alleged leaflets and computer screensavers.  A different website presents the viewer with 
the possibility to “sign-up” for relevant E-mails discussing the movement and 
concurrently requests monetary donations to the organization.  As with all other societal 
opportunities presented in today’s computer age, a person must be vigilant in all aspects 
of their life, including when performing historical research, as individual profit 
motivations are omnipresent. 
 On August 25, 2012, it was my honor and privilege to meet and interview Dr. 
Traute LaFrenz-Page.  Traute LaFrenz, as she was then known in the early 1940s, was a 
member of the resistance group that subsequently became recognized as the White Rose.  
My prior readings pertaining to the White Rose disclosed that only three other 
individuals, who were directly associated with the group in addition to Dr. LaFrenz-Page, 
are surviving today.  When I questioned Dr. LaFrenz-Page relative to one of those 
survivors, her response was, “He’s kind of one of those guys that you don’t trust too 
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  However, he too, has been quoted in sundry publications as affording factual 
irrefutability.   
With the caveat that historical research and writing is susceptible to unintentional, 
as well as, intentionally flagrant and brazen perils, I will now commence my discussion 
of judicial independence and judicial accountability and the inevitable consequences 
ensuing from their absence within Nazi Germany on the individuals who were the 
impetus for this endeavor.  In doing so, I have made a concerted and predetermined 
attempt to confine myself to those historical facts that are corroborated by more than one 
source, and have, if at all possible, avoided including items that are available or 
obtainable from solely one author, so as to avert any unintentional misstatements of fact 
on my part as originator of this disquisition. 
  In an effort to comprehensively consider my research topic, Judicial 
Independence and the Tragic Consequences that Arose in Nazi Germany from a Lack 
Thereof, included are individual chapters covering the following subject areas: 
A) Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability; 
B) Judicial Independence, or a Lack Thereof, in Nazi Germany; 
C) How Could German Civilization Collapse So Completely?; 
D) The Rule of Law and the Führerprinzip; 
E) The German Court System and Its Applicable Laws under the Nazi Regime; 
F) The Volksgerichtshof (VGH), or People’s Court; 
G) Dr. Roland Freisler, President of the People’s Court; 
H) Johannes “Hans” Georg Klamroth; 
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I) Helmuth Guddat, Also Known as Kunkel, Subsequently Hübener; 
J) Count Helmuth James von Moltke and the Kreisau Circle;  
K) The White Rose; and, 
L) Conclusions and Recommendations. 
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Chapter IV:  Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability 
An abundance of research and discourse relative to judicial independence and 
judicial accountability has occurred in the United States.  Therefore, this chapter will 
focus on the fundamental principles essential for judicial independence and judicial 
accountability, emphasizing how judges are selected in this country so as to maintain the 
rule of law.  It is only through judicial independence and judicial accountability that the 
underlying guarantees of fairness and equality can be ensured for the benefit of the 
citizenry. 




Most Americans are far too busy to spend much time 
pondering the role of the United States Judiciary—they 
simply and understandably expect the court system to 
work.  But as we begin the New Year, I ask a moment’s 
reflection on how our country might look in the absence of 
a skilled and independent Judiciary.  We do not need to 
look far beyond our borders, or beyond the front page of 
any newspaper, to see what is at stake. 
More than two hundred years after the American 
Revolution, much of the world remains subject to judicial 
systems that provide doubtful opportunities for challenging 
government action as contrary to law, or receiving a fair 
adjudication of criminal charges, or securing a fair remedy 
for wrongful injury, or protecting rights in property, or 
obtaining an impartial resolution of a commercial dispute.  
Many foreign judges cannot exercise independent judgment 
on matters of law without fear of reprisal or removal. 
Americans should take enormous pride in our judicial 
system.  But there is no cause for complacency.  Our 
judicial system inspires the world because of the 
commitment of each new generation of judges who build 
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 Judges must embrace their roles as the primary advocates in the pursuit of judicial 
independence.  They must be constantly vigilant to ensure that we, as a country, never 
fall prey to a type of leadership that has caused inordinate damage to the rule of law in 
other sovereignties throughout the world.  A government’s continuity is within the 
control of its judiciary.  It requires committed, independent, and indomitable judges to 
guarantee the survival of not only human rights and fundamental individual liberties, but 
the rule of law.  Justice, prerogative, and freedom depend in large measure on an 
independent and effective judiciary.  Should a totalitarian government attempt to impose 
its will on the judiciary, no democracy, constitution, or rule of law can endure without 
tenacious and undaunted jurists.
48
 
 Judicial independence is a difficult concept to define.  In a literal sense, it refers to 
the ability of courts and judges to perform their duties free of influence or control by 
other actors.  However, the term is often used in a normative sense to refer to the kind of 
independence that is considered desirable for courts and judges to possess.  As a practical 
matter, the type of judicial independence that is considered both the most important and 
difficult to achieve is independence from other government actors.  This form of judicial 
independence is valued by those who impute to courts a responsibility for ensuring that 
individuals and minorities do not suffer illegal treatment at the hands of the government 
or a tyrannous majority.  Obtaining this character of independence is arduous because the 
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other branches of government may possess the power to disobey or thwart the 
enforcement of judicial decisions, if not also to retaliate against the courts for decisions 
that they oppose.  In Alexander Hamilton’s formulation, the judiciary is the “least 
dangerous” branch, having “no influence over either the sword or the purse” and is 




 Formal guarantees of judicial independence from government control date to at 
least England’s Act of Settlement of 1701, which gave judges explicit protections from 
unilateral removal by the Crown,
50
 by changing tenure of English judges from “the 
King’s pleasure” to “good behavior.”
51
  Today, two-thirds of the world’s current written 
constitutions contain some form of definitive protection for the independence of the 
judiciary.
52
  Empirical research suggests however, that the existence of formal 
constitutional guarantees of judicial independence is poorly correlated with substantive 
respect for its processes in actual practice.
53
 
 Any attempt at a coherent definition of judicial independence must address 
several inquiries.  Such questions are:  independence for whom; independence from 
whom; independence from what; and, independence for what purpose. 
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A) Independence for Whom? 
Judicial independence can be defined as a characteristic of an individual judge or 
of the judiciary as a whole.  If judicial independence is guaranteed at the institutional 
level but not at the individual level, individual judges can be forced to obey the dictates 
of the leadership of the judiciary; consequently, this may result in a diminution in the 
enforcement of the rule of law.  However, if judicial independence is ensured at the 
individual level, individual judges will find themselves at liberty to pursue their own 
preferences.  Not only does unbridled discretion of this nature invite abuse, it also 
increases the likelihood that judges will decide cases in an inconsistent manner, with the 
potential to thereby neutralize the predictability and stability of the law. 
B) Independence from Whom? 
The existence and adequacy of judicial independence become matters of concern 
when a court must decide a dispute involving the interests of an actor or institution with 
potential or actual power over the court.  As a general rule the more powerful the actor 
whose interests are at stake, the greater the need to protect the independence of the court 
from the functionary.  If both parties in the litigation are equally powerful, that symmetry 
of authority may, in and of itself, provide the requisite protection for the court. 
There are three scenarios that a jurist may encounter: 
1. Disputes between private parties; 
2. Disputes between government actors; or, 
3. Disputes between private parties and government actors. 
In the first conception, the court must strive to remain independent from the 
parties, who may attempt to undermine its independence by a variety of methods, such as 
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bribery or intimidation.  In this situation, the government is an ally of judicial 
independence as it usually can be expected to defend the autonomy of the court from the 
improper conduct of the parties. 
In the second postulate, the expectancy for judicial independence is again 
generally favorable.  The court is required to choose between two equally powerful actors 
in an impartial way.  Whichever side is determined by the court to be correct, the result 
will yield a dynamic of two-against-one that should provide the court with sufficient 
protection from retaliation from the unsuccessful litigant.  The government habitually 
does not pose a meaningful threat to judicial independence in such cases because it is in 
conflict with itself.  However, if one entity of the government is much more powerful 
than the other in the dispute, then the possibility for intimidation of the judiciary can 
arise. 
In the third possible scheme, the government poses a threat to judicial 
independence, as the court is asked to make a determination that is antagonistic to that of 
the government actor.  Here the prospects for judicial independence are at their 
minimum.  The judiciary is called upon to demonstrate independence from the 
government, but typically it lacks the help of a powerful assistant to withstand the 
pressures that may be exerted. 
There are mechanisms to protect judicial independence in the wake of such 
threats.  Strategies include limiting government discretion over judicial salaries, placing 
restrictions on the removal of judges from office, establishing the minimum jurisdiction 
that courts are to possess, and relieving judges of personal liability for acts performed in 
the course of their duties.  However, it is difficult to create a perfectly independent 
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judiciary that is completely insulated from all forms of political and popular influence.  
Even a highly independent court, such as the United States Supreme Court, is likely over 
time to be both reshaped by political forces and to accommodate the desires of a 
persistent political majority.  There are limits to what can be accomplished by adjusting 
the institutional characteristics of the judiciary or by extolling the inviolability of judicial 
independence.  The capability for attaining even moderate levels of judicial independence 
may depend on political and historical conditions that are external to the judiciary itself, 
such as the existence of a stable multiparty democracy. 
C) Independence from What? 
Not all forms of influence over judicial decision-making constitute threats to 
judicial independence.  While some activities are calculated to influence courts, such as 
bribery and physical intimidation, and are inappropriate under all plausible conceptions 
of judicial independence, others must be evaluated on the basis of normative judgments.  
Should a judge be shielded from public protests in front of the courthouse relating to a 
matter pending in their court, or is this action privileged as a form of political expression?  
One may assert that judges in a democracy are permitted to consider public opinion, but 
another perspective alleges that a judge’s deliberations are not to be tainted by 
contemplation upon irrelevant issues.  To define the requirements of judicial 
independence in such cases demands a regulating theory of what courts are to take into 
account when deciding cases, what judicial independence is to achieve, and to what 
extent it can and should be balanced against other objectives and considerations. 
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D) Independence for What Purpose? 
Judicial independence is considered a means to an end, rather than an end in and 
of itself.  The ultimate goal may be described as the fair and impartial adjudication of 
disputes in accordance with the law.  However, if that is the goal, then the pursuit of 
judicial independence is subject to objections. 
First, the goal may be unattainable because it rests upon a misconception of the 
nature of both law and adjudication.  Many legal theorists believe that the law is 
frequently indeterminate, and that it is therefore impossible for judges to decide disputes 
by applying preexisting law.  Rather, the act of adjudication requires judges to make the 
law that they are purporting to apply.  Consequently, if adjudication entails lawmaking, 
then judicial independence not only protects the ability of judges to decide disputes in 
accordance with the law but, likewise, endows them with the authority to make and 
impose whatever laws they deem fit.  This is a prospect that many consider incompatible 
with either the appropriate role of the judiciary in a democracy or the conception of 
separation of powers. 
Another challenge is that judicial independence is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to ensure impartial adjudication in accordance with the law.  It is possible for a judge 
who faces potential retaliation to nevertheless decide cases in an impartial manner.  
However, there is no guarantee that giving judges the freedom to decide cases as they 
wish will ensure that they choose to do so fairly and in conformity with the law.  Even if 
it were possible to create a judiciary that was free from both popular and political control, 
there is nothing to prevent judges from deciding cases on the basis of personal prejudice 
or self-interest.  It is on the basis of such concerns that many believe it is essential to 
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balance judicial independence against judicial accountability, and to distinguish 
appropriate forms of influence over the judiciary from inappropriate forms.
54
 
In this regard, judicial independence can be approached and understood in terms 
of relationships and interdependencies.  Much emphasis has been placed upon the critical 
associations between judicial independence and judicial accountability, individual 
judicial independence and institutional judicial independence, and the independence of 
federal courts and that of state courts.  Judicial independence is thus not an operative 
legal concept but a technique to describe the consequences of legal arrangements. 
 
Separation of Powers 
Most discussions of judicial independence in the United States begin with the 
autonomy of federal judges and of the federal judiciary.
55
  Pursuant to Article III, Section 
1 of the United States Constitution: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.  The 
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated 
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which 





The significance of this provision lies in a description of judicial independence as an 
essential aspect of the separation of powers central to confirming the judiciary as the third 
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branch of government, assuring that federal judges were to be free of legislative and 
executive control, and in a position to determine if the assertion of power against the 
citizens was consistent with law, including the Constitution. 
These constitutional guarantees have not frustrated all attempts to control the 
federal judiciary.  Office-stripping, impeachment, and executive court-packing have each 
been utilized throughout United States history as methods of control, although without 
much success.  Another instrument of executive control is the assertion that the judiciary 
is “the least dangerous” branch, lacking the power of the purse and the sword, reflecting 
that judicial independence, as essential for judicial review and judicial supremacy, is 
meaningless unless the executive branch is willing and able to effectuate and enforce the 
orders as issued by the federal courts. 
Removal through the impeachment process, office-stripping, court-packing, and 
executive defiance have not been found to be viable methods of control of the judiciary in 
the United States.  As a result, Congress has on numerous occasions turned to the 
jurisdiction and powers of the federal courts as more promising areas for exercising its 
control.  The executive branch has attempted to exert some control by using its selection 
of possible candidates for nomination to fill vacancies on all levels of the federal courts, 
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State Courts and State Judges 
Most of the judicial function in the United States is conducted in state courts, and 
it is here that perhaps the most serious threats to judicial independence are directed, at 
state court judges.  Initially, attention to methods of selecting state court judges places in 
question whether elections are adverse to the goal of insulating judicial decisions from 
control by a state’s executive and legislative branches.  Many accounts of state judiciaries 
have described the movement toward selection of jurists by election as a component of 
popular democracy, while others argue that such an analysis is not so simplistic.  An 
important goal of many of those who advocated the election of judges was,
58
 “to insulate 
the judiciary . . . from the branches that it was supposed to restrain.”
59
  These people were 
distressed by the level of partisanship in the existing selection systems and believed that 
an elective system would be less subject to partisan abuse.  However, numerous studies 
reveal that in many states with elective judicial systems, the majority of judges have been 
appointed to fill unexpired terms rather than elected.
60
  No matter how they originally 
came to the bench and regardless of the prescribed term between elections, judges in 




Elections are potentially a powerful mechanism for influencing judicial decisions 
at the state level.  Nonetheless, elections pose difficulty because of the risk that they 
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present to a possible compromise of the rule of law whenever a judge rules differently 
from the way they might have had electoral considerations not been taken into account. 
Historically, the period of actual tenure for state judges is no better guide to the 
quality of their independence than is the length of their terms between elections.  Also, 
the particulars of the arrangements a state makes for the election of judges can affect 
perceptions of judicial independence.  Even a retention election system designed to afford 
maximum breadth to judicial independence, while preserving the potential for popular 
accountability, can be manipulated.  Interest-group politics can have an adverse effect on 
tenure of office and hence judicial independence, as those parties promoting single issues 
can take advantage of retention elections to attempt to defeat judges whose rulings were 
not viewed as favorable. 
Judicial independence as previously defined is the freedom of courts to make 
decisions without control by the executive or legislative branches or by the people.  
Likewise, judicial independence enables judicial review, and is also instrumental in the 
resolution of ordinary cases according to law, thus, compelling evidence for the 
association between judicial independence and the rule of law.  This relationship requires 
that those responsible for judicial decisions interpreting laws or making law themselves 
be impartial, free of interests, prejudices, or incentives that could materially affect or 
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Individual and Institutional Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence also exists to protect individual judicial officers from 
attacks on their judicial decisions, as most contemporary criticisms focus not on the 
judiciary as an institution, but on individual judges.  The capacity of the judiciary, federal 
and state, to function independently of control by the executive and legislative branches 
thus requires the capability of individual jurists to enjoy independence beyond the 
institution of the judiciary itself.  It necessitates that the judiciary, as a system of courts, 
functions and be perceived to function according to law.  This demands that individual 
judges yield some intrainstitutional independence that they may otherwise choose to 
assert, other than through the text of a dissenting opinion, so as not to place a strain on 
the public’s perception of the rule of law.  Continuing disobedience to the rule of law by 
an individual jurist may result in public awareness of this recalcitrant behavior and 
precipitate queries as to the implications thereof with respect to the legal system 
generally. 
Federal and state judiciaries should protect themselves by ensuring fidelity to the 
rule of law. When doing so, claims of judicial independence ought not to be permitted to 
sacrifice the institution for the individual judge.  Judicial independence as a concept 
describes the consequences of legal arrangements that were designed to protect a branch 
of government.  Individual judicial independence is instrumental to that greater goal, and 
on occasion must be moderated, or subordinated to the interests of institutional 
independence, if institutional independence is to be preserved.
62
  To illustrate that judicial 
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independence and judicial accountability are not at odds with each other, the corrupt acts 
of an individual jurist may reduce the judicial branch’s independence through a loss of 
public respect for the judicial branch.  The independence, autonomy, and integrity of a 





Judicial Independence and Accountability in the States 
Currently the conflict in the states over judicial independence and accountability 
focuses on judicial selection and tenure.  Historically, the debate in the states has been 
much broader, encompassing the role of courts and judges and the character of the 
judicial function.  It has also addressed from whom judges must be independent and for 
what purpose, to whom they should be accountable, and how that may be accomplished 
without jeopardizing independence. 
 
Independent of Whom? 
Before the American Revolution, colonial governors, selected by the Crown, 
appointed judges, raising concerns that those selected might be biased in favor of royal 
interests.  Those receiving these patronage appointments served at the pleasure of the 
Crown rather than, like their counterparts in Britain, during good behavior.  Thus, the 
issue of judicial independence arose in America in reaction to excessive executive control 
over, and possible manipulation of, the administration of justice.  The Declaration of 
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Independence charges the king with
64
 “refusing his assent to laws for establishing 
judiciary powers,” with making “judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of 
their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries,” with “depriving us in many 




The Declaration’s indictment of the Crown is framed not through an expression of 
judicial independence, but in terms of popular access to justice, embracing both the 
availability of judicial forums, “refusing his assent to laws establishing judiciary 
powers,” and proper administration of justice within those forums.  Proper administration 
of justice required that trials be presided over by impartial magistrates, not “judges 
dependent on his will alone,” in venues subject to public scrutiny, not “beyond seas,” and 
with independent decision-makers who could be trusted to render impartial verdicts, not 
“depriving us in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury.”  Insofar as the Declaration 
addresses judicial independence, it emphasizes freeing judges from subservience to an 
unaccountable executive whose interests differed from those of the general public.  The 
Declaration left open whether making the judiciary accountable to the people, either 
directly or through their elected representatives, posed the same problems for the rule of 
law or for the impartial administration of justice.
66
 
State judges in the decades after Independence may have been appointed by the 
executive, the legislature, or by some combination of the two, but state legislatures 
                                                 
64
 Tarr, G.A. (2012).  Without fear or favor: Judicial independence and judicial accountability in the states.  
(Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press), 8-9. 
65
 Id. at 9. 
66
 Id. 
   32
   
 
generally dominated judicial selection.  Once selected, judges remained under legislative 
scrutiny, and judges who issued unpopular rulings may have been called before the 
legislature to explain their decisions.  A legislature could eliminate a judge by enacting 
“ripper bills” that abolished the judge’s position or the court, as the structure of a state 
court system was typically not established in a state’s constitution.  They did, however, 
customarily guarantee the people’s representatives control over a judge’s continuation in 
office, provided for short judicial terms or conversely, for tenure during “good behavior.” 
A legislature might act against a “misbehaving” judge through impeachment, with 
the grounds therefore under early state constitutions considerably broader than those 
under the federal Constitution.  States that defined impeachable offenses in their 
constitutions did so expansively.  Several states supplemented impeachment with 
provisions authorizing the governor to remove judges upon address by two-thirds of the 
state legislature.  Removal by address offered an additional, and potentially far more 
reaching, mechanism for legislative control.  The address did not have to allege willful or 
criminal misconduct, and it needed only a favorable vote by both houses of the 
legislature, not an investigation or trial.  Thus, judges were not guaranteed the basic 
elements of due process before they were removed.  Address allowed legislators to hold 
judges accountable not only in cases of clear wrongdoing, as might be reached by 
impeachment, but even in instances where their performance could not be characterized 
as criminal.  In rejecting removal of federal judges by address, the delegates to the 
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Constitutional Convention of 1787 indicated their understanding that removal by address 




Removal of Judges 
State legislatures did occasionally employ their removal powers to advance 
political objectives or punish courts for their rulings.  The use of impeachment for 
political purposes peaked at the state and federal levels during the first decade of the 
nineteenth century.  In the states, concern with respect to a disparity between popular 
sentiment and judicial ruling underlay the use of impeachment to punish judges for 
decisions striking down legislation.  At the federal level, the unsuccessful impeachment 
of Justice Samuel Chase established that judges would not be removed for honest 
mistakes. 
No one questioned that judges should be free from influence or manipulation by 
the executive, but whether they should likewise be immune from influence by the people, 
or their agents in the state legislature, was unclear.  Unchecked judicial power was as 
dangerous as any unrestrained authority.  The system of tenure during good behavior 
exacerbated concerns about a power not answerable to the people.  During the early 
decades of the Republic, state judges were deemed accountable for their rulings.  State 
legislatures punished judges whose rulings were perceived as exhibiting a partisan bias.  
Some state legislators believed that judges could be removed for mistaken rulings, even 
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though rendered in good faith.  State legislatures felt justified in exercising such oversight 
as they believed they were acting as the agents of the people.   
By the 1830s, the popular loss of confidence in the judgment and integrity of 
legislators led constitutional reformers to seek controls on state legislatures, rather than 
continuing to rely upon them to supervise the courts.  The objective thus shifted to 
judicial oversight of state legislatures, so states began the transition to judicial elections.  
Elected judges could claim just as compelling a connection to the people, the source of all 





Independent as to What? 
If judges were safeguarded against undue external pressures so they could 
exercise their judicial powers independently, their domain of authority needed to be 
determined.  The definition of the judicial realm changed over time, with judicial review 
of legislation receiving the most attention. 
An initial issue was whether there was a distinctly judicial function.  During the 
colonial period there was an established practice of legislative adjudication that paralleled 
dispute resolution on the basis of law by the courts, a practice that reflected a distrust of 
judges who owed their continuation in office to the favor of the Crown.  After 
Independence, safeguards were designed to prevent misuse of the legislature’s 
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adjudicative power, such as, state constitutions prohibiting bills of attainder and 
retrospective laws, but this did not preclude legislative adjudication. 
Once decided that the judicial branch alone should resolve disputes, judges did 
not exercise this sole authority, but shared decision-making responsibilities with juries, 
which ensured popular participation in the administration of justice.  This role of the jury 
necessarily diminished the function and task of the judge.  During the colonial period, the 
jury’s authority served to restrain abuses by judges who may be susceptible to the 
blandishments or threats of the Crown, and to block the enforcement of unjust laws by 
refusing to give them effect.  After the Revolution, the selection of judges changed, but 
the rationale for jury power did not.  There was an expectation that the people would 
control judicial behavior, not only indirectly through selection and removal of judges, but 
directly through their participation in judicial decisions via the jury process.  The jury’s 
authority also reflected an understanding of the character and sources of the law.  Most 
law was common law in comparison to statutory law, and the common law was viewed as 
arising out of and reflecting the community, rather than as a form of law elaborated by 
legally trained professionals.  The jury served as a shield for the local community against 
“outside interference.” 
Although the American judiciary’s role in dispute resolution may have been 
circumscribed during the colonial era, it also exercised powers beyond what today would 
be understood as judicial powers.  Judicial responsibilities included the obligation to 
furnish legal advice to other branches of government, enshrined in constitutional 
provisions requiring state supreme courts to issue advisory opinions upon request of the 
legislature or executive, similar to the abstract review exercised by constitutional courts 
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today.  State judges sporadically took upon themselves a political role, defending the 
judicial branch against perceived invasions of their prerogatives by issuing resolutions 
attacking the constitutionality of legislative enactments. 
These wide-ranging responsibilities of judges in excess of dispute resolution 
discouraged the development of discourse on judicial independence and accountability 
because the definition of judicial independence and the arguments in support thereof are 
premised on judges being engaged in the resolution of disputes.  The development of 
reasoning and contentions for judicial independence required a distinct judicial function 
that differentiated the tasks of courts from those of the other branches and confined the 
courts to those assignments. 
The eighteenth century produced a distinctive conception of the place of the 
judiciary in government.  The line distinguishing the judicial branch from the other 
branches and the judicial function from other provinces proved to be unclear and 
permeable.  In such a legal context, the contemporary debate about judicial independence 
and potential threats to the impartial administration of justice would have been 
incomprehensible.  For this debate to develop, changes had to occur in legal and political 
institutions.  Courts had to obtain from other governmental institutions exclusive control 
over the resolution of disputes.  Judges had to make an effective assertion that their legal 
expertise gave them a preeminent ability to enunciate and interpret the law and that a 
proper exercise of that responsibility required judicial independence.  The nineteenth 
century witnessed the beginning of these changes.
69
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The Changing Judicial Function and Judicial Independence 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the responsibilities of state judicial 
branches expanded, so that by the 1850s state courts were exercising essentially the same 
decisional power that they do today.  States moved to protect the judicial sphere by 
eliminating the participation of other institutions in matters that today are recognized as 
inherently judicial.  State legislatures ceased granting new trials to disappointed litigants, 
state courts expanded their authority, taking from juries the power to find the law and 
undertaking to shape the common law, and they extended and solidified their power to 
strike down statutes as unconstitutional. 
Judicial review emerged following independence as crucial in defining the scope 
of judicial supremacy.  By refusing to give effect to unconstitutional laws, courts were 
reaffirming the constitution as fundamental law and protecting the citizens against 
legislators who sought to transgress its safeguards.  The doctrine of judicial review 
attained general acceptance by 1820, as Marbury v. Madison had been decided on the 
federal level in 1803. 
Over time the task of constitutional interpretation came to be seen as no different 
in character than the uncontested judicial responsibility of applying and enforcing 
ordinary law.  Judicial review also became a judicial prerogative to choose among 
competing interpretations of the state’s constitution.  These shifts provided the foundation 
for the institutionalization of judicial review and with this acceptance, the debate 
switched from the issue of judicial review to the subject matter of judicial independence 
and judicial accountability. 
   38
   
 
After the revolution, some Americans opposed the continued reliance on common 
law, arguing that it was tainted through its association with the Crown.  They also 
distrusted the common law because it was inaccessible to ordinary citizens, empowering 
legal professionals, judges and lawyers, who understood the common law so as to 
manipulate it for their own self-interested purposes.  Despite these concerns, no state 
abolished the common law, instead receiving it with reservations.  Legal continuity was 
necessary because it would have been difficult to craft an entirely new body of law in the 
midst of a revolution. 
During the early nineteenth century the state judge’s role in the enunciation of the 
common law altered.  For a system of case law to operate, judges and attorneys had to 
have easy access to appellate rulings; therefore, a readily available body of American 
case law developed.  Judges also began to set aside jury verdicts as contrary to law, and 
they claimed broad authority to determine what was law.  Also, judges adapted common 
law principles when they no longer served the purposes for which they were created.  
Although precedent continued to exert considerable influence, judges came to believe it 
appropriate to depart from precedent if considerations of social policy justified a shift or 
to avoid manifestly unjust results.  This conception of the law encouraged legal 
innovation by state judges, involving them to choose among policy directions rather than 
merely elaborating unchangeable principles. 
The legal profession depicts judges as trained professionals, possessed of expert 
knowledge, dealing dispassionately with complex, technical and sometimes arcane 
subject matter.  This description helps justify judicial independence, by asserting that 
non-lawyers lack the legal expertise necessary to comprehend the responsibilities of 
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judges or to critique their rulings in an informed manner.  This conception of judicial 
independence had to be constructed and connected to the rule of law and to the 
conception of judges as experts in the law.  In the states, this did not occur until the 
nineteenth century as the emergence of this new understanding had to await 
developments in the law, courts, legal profession, and society.  Among the most 
important of these were the institutionalization of judicial review, the acceptance of the 
Constitution in maintaining the distinction between law and politics in the exercise of 
judicial review, and the proliferation of case law.  Developments in the courts included 
the changing role of the jury and the solidifying of a judicial monopoly over dispute 
resolution. 
In spite of these modifications, efforts to advance judicial independence met with 
claims that judges, like other officials in a democracy, should be responsive to popular 
concerns and accountable to the people or their representatives.  Critics questioned 
whether judicial independence would free more than professional judgment and if it 
might operate to disguise the pursuit of personal interests of the judiciary, the legal 
profession, or the class to which judges were a part.  The emergence of the modern 
conception of judicial independence coincided with the adoption of reforms that today are 
viewed to be in conflict with judicial independence, that is, the partisan election of judges 
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Judicial Tenure 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, most states abandoned tenure 
during good behavior in favor of limited judicial terms, preceding by decades judicial 
elections.  By 1860, judges in more than two-thirds of the states were serving limited 
terms of office.   
Initially, the movement to shorter judicial tenure was connected with the effort in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century to diminish judicial independence and 
discipline judges who issued unpopular rulings.  Limiting tenure along with 
impeachment, removal by address, and ripper bills, or abolishing courts or their positions, 
were utilized to restrain courts.  Underlying this movement to limit judicial terms were 
the assumptions that the judiciary posed a threat to popular government, that legislatures 
should, as the agents of the people, maintain oversight of judicial power and hold judges 
accountable, and by specific judicial rulings that suggested a disconnect between popular 
and judicial views. 
 
Judicial Elections 
In 1846, New York adopted a constitution under which voters would elect all 
judges.  Within a decade, fifteen of the twenty-nine states in the Union had repositioned 
to judicial elections.  Between 1846 and 1861, eighteen states held constitutional 
conventions, and sixteen of those states adopted judicial elections in the course of 
revising their exiting constitutions.  These reforms, reducing the number of offices 
subject to legislative appointment and control and expanding the number subject to 
popular election, not only increased public control over those officials, but enabled those 
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officials to claim that they had an equally viable connection to the people as the 
legislators.  Popular election of judges also indicated a loss of public confidence in the 




According to its proponents, popular election of judges would promote judicial 
independence by freeing judges from partisan control.  Less optimistic individuals 
acknowledged the potential for popular influence on judicial decisions, but concluded 
that the public threat to independence was not as detrimental as that posed by powerful 
interests or by the other branches of government.  The choice was framed as one between 
influence by the populace as a whole, which contributed to justice, versus influence by a 
segment of society that sought its own advantage.
72
 
Nineteenth-century proponents of popular elections believed that they would 
empower judges by granting them democratic legitimacy, liberate them from the control 
of political elites and special interests, and thereby embolden them to strike down 
legislative enactments that violated constitutional norms.  The available data on the 
exercise of judicial review are consistent with the notion that popular election freed 
judges to scrutinize legislative enactments more closely.
73
  Judges felt an increased 
freedom to interpret and apply the law without fear of political repercussions, an 
important element of the definition of judicial independence.  This is important because 
popular election of judges did not eliminate partisan politics from judicial selection.  
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Nominees for judicial office were, until the advent of primary elections in the early 
twentieth century, chosen by party conventions and they then had to run for election on 
party labels.  Those nominated were typically party stalwarts.  The prevalence of party 
voting reflected the significance of strong partisan allegiances and the usefulness of a 
party as a voting cue in the absence of other information that might have informed voter 
choice. 
Voters were also amenable to lengthening judicial tenure, beginning in the 1860s; 
several states extended terms of office so that by the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
the average term in office for a state judge was 8.9 years.  While acknowledging that 
longer periods in office reduced the frequency of public scrutiny, proponents insisted that 
they encouraged judicial independence, reduced the influence of party leaders, and the 




Judicial Independence and Accountability in the Progressive Era 
The issue of judicial independence and accountability once again arose in the late 
nineteenth century through the involvement of both federal and state courts in making 
public policy.  This led to proposals such as the recall of judges and legislative review of 
judicial decisions.  Recall suggests an expansion in the mechanisms to enforce judicial 
accountability and in the eyes of critics, to invade judicial independence.  By the end of 
the nineteenth century, many believed that judges were usurping legislative power, thus, 
judges went from being perceived as a solution for problems to being comprehended as 
                                                 
74
 Tarr, G.A. (2012).  Without fear or favor: Judicial independence and judicial accountability in the states.  
(Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press), 52-54. 
   43
   
 
the difficulty themselves.  Detractors surmised that via judicial review, judges maintain a 
veto power, and had become a political organ of government without corresponding 
political responsibility. 
 
Popular Recall of Judges 
Debate surfaced relative to consideration of methods, other than judicial selection 
and tenure, for constraining judicial power and enforcing accountability.  Primary among 
these was the recall, under which voters would be authorized to remove judges from 
office prior to the expiration of their terms.  Those individuals opposing recall 
conjectured that recall posed an even greater threat than elections because it promised 
immediate retribution for unpopular decisions.  Judges fearful of removal would weigh 
popular sentiment into their decisions, and this would undermine the rule of law.  Judges 
who were subject to impeachment had the opportunity to hear the charges against them 
and defend themselves, whereas, recall offered no such guarantee of due process.  
Additionally, because recall was involved when the populace disagreed with judicial 
rulings, it reflected popular willfulness, rather than a desire to uphold the law against 
judicial usurpations. 
 
Recall of Judicial Decisions 
As an alternative to the recall of judges, Theodore Roosevelt proposed in 1912, 
that voters have the power to recall judicial decisions in which judges ruled that a law 
violated either the federal Constitution or a state constitution.  Recall of decisions would 
enable the populace, through ballot question, to overturn judicial interpretations of a 
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constitution without constitutional amendment.  Roosevelt contended that his proposal 
safeguarded judicial independence more so than judicial recall because it permitted the 
correction of judicial decisions without intimidating judges by threatening their positions.  
Critics maintained that such a popular intrusion into the legal realm would politicize legal 
issues and threaten basic constitutional freedoms.  However, the recall of judicial 





Nonpartisan Judicial Elections 
A movement then commenced favoring replacing partisan election of judges with 
nonpartisan elections, in which candidates would run in nonpartisan primaries and the 
two candidates receiving the most votes would then run without party labels in the 
general election, in an effort to reduce the influence of political parties.  Proponents of 
nonpartisan elections believed that insulating judicial candidates from the influence of 
political parties throughout the selection process was of upmost importance.
76
 
Nonpartisan elections disappointed many reformers as they reduced voter 
participation in judicial races, and thus accountability.  It was avowed that without 
gatekeepers to exclude unqualified aspirants, nonpartisan elections attracted the wrong 
lawyers for the positions, that they did not eliminate the influence of party leaders, who 
discovered new contrivances to dominate the electoral process, and they failed to enhance 
the quality of the bench because voters purportedly lacked the knowledge to choose 
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among competing candidates.  Thus, as early as 1913, it was alleged that nonpartisan 





As an option, merit selection was proffered.  It was argued that the only effective 
way to insulate judges from external pressure was to eliminate the input of political 
parties and the populace in the selection of judges, substituting a system of professional 
appointment.  In 1940, Missouri became the first state to institute merit selection for all 





Few states adopted the recall of judges, recall of judicial decisions, or other 
reforms offered by proponents of judicial accountability, as judges were infrequently 
recalled, and court rulings denied the recall of judicial decisions of their effectiveness.  
By contrast, several states moved from partisan to nonpartisan judicial elections, and a 
large number transposed to merit selection later in the century.
79
 
These results reflect the differing perspectives of proponents of judicial 
accountability and advocates of judicial independence.  Those calling for greater 
accountability were interested in the substance of judicial rulings.  They espoused 
increased accountability in order to reorient court rulings, which they viewed as distorted 
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by political ideology and class loyalties.  Proponents of judicial independence were 
concerned with eliminating partisan and popular pressures on the courts.  They believed 
that making courts responsive to professional norms rather than external forces would 
contribute to the rule of law and enhance the standing of the courts.  As a result, they 
sought nonpartisan elections and subsequently, merit selection, enjoying considerable 
success in their endeavors. 
This past is an exemplar for the current debate over judicial selection and judicial 
performance.  Today, the complaint is expressed that judges frustrate popular government 
by reading their own ideological predilections into the law through judicial activism, and 
that merit selection places political power in the hands of judges.  These positions are 
criticized, stating, that unfair ideological attacks on the courts, combined with political 
efforts to influence judicial rulings, are subverting public respect for the courts and 
threatening the rule of law.  As in the past, those advocating merit selection and retention 
elections find themselves on one side of the ideological divide, viewing the problem less 
in terms of the substance of judicial rulings and more in terms of the quality of the bench 
and its insulation from political influences.  Having had the benefit of a half-century of 
experience with nonpartisan elections and merit selection, an assessment of their actual 
effectiveness in safeguarding judicial independence while ensuring appropriate judicial 
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The Changing Face of State Judicial Selection 
For most of the twentieth century, state judicial elections, whether partisan or 
nonpartisan, contested or retention, tended to be de-politicized and subdued events.  
Incumbents often ran unopposed and if contested, they rarely encountered serious 
challenges.  Candidates did not raise substantial campaign funds, advertise in the media, 
or commence sustained attacks on their opponents.  This was by design.  Rules 
promulgated in the states, guidelines established by the American Bar Association, and 
state bar associations, prohibited candidates for judicial office from stating anything 
controversial, as their statements may compromise judicial independence or vitiate 
impartiality.  Such low-spending, low-conflict campaigns attracted little attention.  In 
recent decades however, the situation has changed.  The progression for merit selection 
has halted, no state since 1994, has adopted it as a method of choice, although no state 
has yet replaced it with an alternate form of approbation.  Today, incumbents are far 
more likely to face electoral competition.  Judicial races have also become increasingly 
visible in the public’s consciousness.  This transformation extends to partisan and 
nonpartisan races, to contested and retention elections alike.  As of 2012, nine states 
selected their state supreme court justices in partisan elections, thirteen in nonpartisan 
elections, and fifteen through a system of merit selection in which justices run in 
retention elections after their initial appointments.  In addition, justices in California were 
appointed but ran in retention elections, and justices in New Mexico were appointed with 
the use of a nominating commission but ran for their initial reelection in partisan races.
81
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Seven states that employ merit selection do not use retention elections, either awarding 
tenure during good behavior or to a retirement age or providing for reappointment rather 




Campaign Spending for Judicial Offices 
Judicial election campaigns are more expensive than in the past, with the largest 
contributors being businesses, lawyers, and lobbyists.  Interest groups, political parties, 
and individuals also spend substantial sums to elect judges.  Open-seat races tend to be 
more expensive than incumbent-challenger contests.  Partisan races are likewise 
generally more costly than nonpartisan contests.
83
 
The threat need not emanate from an opposing candidate.  Although incumbents 
are nearly always retained in retention elections, the absence of opposing candidates is no 
guarantee that those elections will be uncontested.  Whereas opposing candidates must 
file for candidacy, making known their intention to contest a race, groups seeking to 
defeat a sitting judge need not state their intentions early in the process.  Thus uncertainty 
relative to opposition in a retention election may lead to the same fundraising and 
campaigning found in contested elections, even when incumbents are not challenged. 
Incumbents typically can raise and spend more than challengers.  The fact that 
incumbents can raise more money than their opponents does not guarantee electoral 
success; the adversaries only need raise sufficient funds to mount a competitive 
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campaign.  It is the level of challenger spending, not of incumbent spending, that most 
affects vote margins in incumbent-challenger races.
84
 
The escalating cost of judicial campaigns is a threat to judicial independence.  
Having to raise money may create a sense of obligation, and a concern not to alienate 
potential contributors to future campaigns may also influence judicial decisions.  
Expensive campaigns may undermine respect for the judiciary through the perception 
that contributors are manipulating court rulings.  Both poll and experimental data confirm 
that campaign contributions adversely affect public perception of judicial impartiality and 
the institutional legitimacy of courts.
85
  Conversely, others view the increased 
expenditures in judicial races as positive, bringing judicial elections into line with races 
for other political offices.  The belief asserted is that increased spending provides more 
voter information and correspondingly, higher voter participation.  Greater involvement 




Television and Campaign Advertisements 
Judicial campaigns have not only become more expensive, they have also 
changed in character.  Campaigns have not abolished traditional means of communicating 
with voters, such as public appearances, posters, and leaflets, but there is now a reliance 
on mass media, especially television.   
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Although judicial candidates are responsible for a majority of television 
advertisements in judicial elections, increasingly interest groups and political parties have 
purchased airtime to support their favored candidates or, more frequently, to attack their 
opponents.  Accompanying the increasing involvement of interest groups in political 
advertising has been a modification in tone, as television ads assail the character, 
integrity, and rulings of incumbent judges.  These advertisements encourage voters to 
cast their ballots based upon their agreement or disagreement with judges’ rulings on 
particular issues rather than on whether they adhered to the law, perhaps tempting judges 




Group Participation in Judicial Selection 
A significant development in judicial elections has been the increased 
involvement of interest groups in the selection process.  In recent years they have 
recognized that a mechanism to shape the development of the law is by affecting who sits 
on the bench, and these groups have increasingly sought to influence judicial composition 
irrespective of the selection system.  Interest group opposition to candidates has changed 
the intensity and character of the election process as they have the resources to increase 
the salience of judicial races, and because they are not bound by the ethical restrictions 
that may otherwise limit the campaign messages of judges and judicial candidates.  The 
increased involvement of interest groups in judicial elections is likely to continue 
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because, whereas a change in a single seat in the state legislature may have only a 




United States Supreme Court Involvement 
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2003), the United States Supreme 
Court upheld a challenge under the First Amendment prohibiting judicial candidates from 
announcing their views on contested issues that might come before the courts.  Before 
this ruling, state codes of judicial conduct restricted what those seeking or holding 
judicial office could say in judicial campaigns.  In the wake of White, groups can now 
more effectively press candidates to announce their attitudes on disputed legal and 
political issues and publicize those views to the electorate.
89
 
Those individuals defending judicial independence condemn the changes in the 
character of judicial elections, arguing that the movement to competitive and politicized 
elections promotes a false accountability, while threatening judicial independence, the 
rule of law, and the quality of the bench.  For others, the escalation in the costs of judicial 
campaigns is a positive development in that it signals that races for judicial office have 
become more competitive, and that this increased competition translates into additional 
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Reconsidering Judicial Elections 
In recent years, the literature condemning judicial elections has proliferated; 
however, no state since 1985 has abandoned contested judicial elections.  Public opinion 
polls continue to reveal strong popular support for electing judges, even as they disclose 
citizen concern relative to the influence of financial interests on judicial elections, 
approximately 89 percent of state judges face election at some time in their judicial 
careers.  Judicial elections now closely resemble races for other political offices with 
their increased spending, interest-group involvement, and acerbic political advertising.
91
 
Some individuals deny that judicial elections promote meaningful accountability 
to the public, as nearly 80 percent of the electorate does not vote in judicial elections with 
the same percentage unable to identify the candidates for judicial office.  In partisan 




For voters to hold judges accountable, elections must not be merely contested but 
competitive, there has to be an actual possibility that incumbents will lose.  There are also 
important differences among partisan, nonpartisan, and retention elections, where judges 
are rarely not retained.  Retention elections usually fail to provide meaningful 
accountability, but the same is not true for partisan and nonpartisan elections.  Partisan 
elections are almost always contested, and nonpartisan elections are increasingly 
contested.  Partisan races offer genuine opportunities for turnover and hence, the potential 
for significant accountability.  However, if a partisan or nonpartisan election is 
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uncontested, there is no way for voters to render a verdict on a candidate.  In such 
circumstances retention elections provide greater accountability because voters can vote 





Many scholars, including Burbank and Friedman, as editors of Judicial 
Independence at the Crossroads:  An Interdisciplinary Approach, have suggested that 
judicial independence and judicial accountability “are complementary concepts that can 
and should be regarded as allies.”
94
   Others suggest that these two hypotheses are 
opposed or at least in tension with each other, and that certain choices must be made as 
delineated herein. 
Ultimately, a broader perspective may be appropriate, one that focuses on the 
substance of the law rather than solely on the independence or accountability of its 
interpreters.  In a system of self-government the people should determine, either directly 
or through their elected representatives, the substance of the law.  Judges may say what 
the law is, but the people must say what it should be.  Provided this ability endures, so 
will our government and country based on the rule of law.   
This chapter has described the elements necessary for judicial independence and 
judicial accountability within a democracy.  The chapters that follow will concentrate 
upon and describe the ramifications to German society when judicial independence and 
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the rule of law were deliberately and willfully abrogated in accommodation to and 
countenance of a tyrannical authority.   
In Nazi Germany, judicial independence was abolished for both the individual 
judge and for the judiciary as a whole.  Members of the bench were expected to follow 
the “general line” dictated by the regime and to give deference to this ideology when 
rendering their judgments.  Separation of powers was considered to be an archaic 
doctrine and judicial elections were nonexistent.  Only jurists who would acquiesce to the 
dictates of Nazi tyranny were permitted to retain their judicial office or be subsequently 
appointed thereto by Adolf Hitler and his Nazi sycophants, with resulting consequences 
that will relentlessly endure in eternal infamy.  
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Chapter V:  Judicial Independence, or a Lack Thereof, in Nazi Germany 
 
 This dissertation asserts that a lack of judicial independence and autonomy were 
precipitating factors in the annihilation of individuals by malevolent judicial officers 
presiding within the Nazi regime.  Judges in Nazi Germany were not free to decide cases 
unfettered by the whims of the criminal Nazi organization, but received both general and 
specific instructions so as to administer predetermined judicial findings and judgments. 
Sharply contrasted with high degrees of autonomy are 
situations where the courts serve only at the pleasure of 
despotic rulers, with its functionaries appointed by such 
entities . . . Judges in those circumstances understand that 
they (have) little autonomy . . . Judges under such systems 





For the unfortunate people who are presented in the case studies contained hereinafter, it 
was the actualization and enforcement of Nazi dogma that was the provocation for their 
destruction. 
 The Nazi conspirators restricted and abrogated the independence of the judiciary 
and rendered it subservient to their ends.  Like all other public officials, German judges 
who failed to comply with the racial and political requirements of the Nazis were 
removed from office.  Nazi legal theorists admitted that there was no accommodation in 
their scheme for independent judges.  They controlled all judges through special 
directives and orders from the leadership.  The role of the judge was that of a political 
functionary and as an administrator in the National Socialist state. 
                                                 
95
 Richardson, J.T. (2006).  The Sociology of Religious Freedom: A Structural and Socio-Legal Analysis.  
Sociology of Religion, 67(3), 282. 
 
   56
   
 
 After the war began, Otto Georg Thierack, then Minister of Justice, revealed the 
state to which the judiciary had fallen under Nazi rule.  He stated that judges were not the 
“supervisor” but the “assistant” of the government.  He announced that the word 
“independent,” as applied to judges, was to be eliminated from the vocabulary and that 
although a judge could retain a certain freedom of decision in some cases, the 
government “can and must” give him the “general line” to follow.  For this purpose, 
Thierack decided in 1942 to send letters to German judges setting forth the political 
principles and directives that all judicial personnel were obligated to discharge.
96
 
 During the 1930s, the German rule of law began a precipitous decline that 
accompanied the rise of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, the Nazis.  In a 
1934 speech, Hitler provided his conception of judges and the law:
97
 
If anyone reproaches me and asks why we did not call upon 
the regular courts for sentencing, [those responsible for the 
actions that transpired during the Night of the Long 
Knives] my only answer is this: in that hour, I was 
responsible for the fate of the German nation and was thus 
the Supreme Judge of the German Volk . . . When people 
confront me with the view that only a trial in court would 
have been capable of accurately weighing the measure of 
guilt ad (and) expiation, I must lodge a solemn protest.  He 
who rises up against Germany commits treason.  He who 
commits treason is to be punished not according to the 
scope and proportions of his deed, but rather according to 
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Hitler essentially explained away the need for an independent judiciary; he knew 
treason when he saw it, and he could grasp by intuition a guilty mind, from the fact of the 
treasonous act itself.  In Hitler’s conception of justice, judges, without discretion of their 
own, were merely to be the administrators of the regime’s precepts. 
Based on these principles, Hitler established the Volksgerichtshof, or People’s 
Court, which, rather than serving the people, represented only the interests of Hitler and 
the National Socialists.  He then sought and received passage of the Enabling Act, which 
greatly expanded his plenary powers and allowed the executive to pass laws, budgets, and 
modify the constitution.  Articles Two and Three of the Act provided that the Chancellor 
could unilaterally enact laws, and that those laws could deviate from the Constitution.  
The Enabling Act allowed Hitler to promulgate any law he desired, and the judges of the 
People’s Court would ensure that his edicts and “justice” were swiftly carried out.  Hitler 
used the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service to further frustrate 
judicial independence, as this law required judges to approach cases with “a healthy 




Immediately after he enacted the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil 
Service, Hitler expelled from the judiciary Jewish judges, judges unsympathetic to the 
Nazi philosophy, and judges who refused to comply with executive directives.  He 
appointed partisan judges, who were, according to the Vice President of the People’s 
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Court, Karl Engert, “politicians first and judges second.”
100
  The resultant distorted entity 
was a justice system in name only; the People’s Court spewed injustice, inequity, and 
prejudice. 
After Hitler had solidified his power and dismantled the independent judiciary, 
which before the Nazi regime was guaranteed by the Weimar Constitution, he was free to 
begin his barbaric agenda of depopulation and social engineering.  By the time World 
War II had commenced, Hitler and the Nazi party had complete control over the legal 
system, both legislative and adjudicative. 
On April 26, 1942, Hitler informed the Reichstag that he would have exclusive 
control over the tenure of judges:
101
 
I do expect one thing: that the nation gives me the right to 
intervene immediately and to take action myself whenever 
a person has failed to render unqualified obedience . . . I 
therefore ask the German Reichstag to confirm expressly 
that I have the legal right to keep everybody to his duty and 
to cashier or remove from office or position without regard 
for his person or his established rights, whoever, in my 
view and according to my considered opinion, has failed to 
do his duty . . . . From now on, I shall intervene in these 
cases and remove from office those judges who evidently 




 The Reichstag confirmed Hitler’s request and resolved that: 
The Führer must have all the rights postulated by him 
which serve to further or achieve victory.  Therefore—
without being bound by existing legal regulations—in his 
capacity as leader of the nation, Supreme Commander of 
the Armed Forces, governmental chief and supreme 
executive chief, as supreme justice, and leader of the 
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Party—the Führer must be in a position to force with all 
means at his disposal every German, if necessary, whether 
he be common soldier or officer, low or high official or 
judge, leading or subordinate official of the Party, worker 
or employee, to fulfill his duties.  In case of violation of 
these duties, the Führer is entitled after conscientious 
examination, regardless of so-called well-deserved rights, 
to mete out due punishment, and to remove the offender 





Hitler had placed himself in such a position that he was released from the bounds of law, 
he was now above the law, and the judiciary was unreservedly merely a constituency of 
his sycophants. 
 It is averred that in the courts of the Third Reich, justice, customarily considered 
to be based on moral or ethical absolutes, was rendered an entirely relative concept.  It 
was based upon the caprice of a small clique of ruling elites.  When adjudicating cases, 
judges found no guiding principles to consult and no consistent rule of law to call upon.  
Rather, in any given case, they waited for the executive to determine the “law” to be 
applied.
104
  The actions of the People’s Court, as hereinafter described, exemplify that 
executive orders have no prerogative in the courts. 
 In the Third Reich, it is proffered that constant pressure on judicial officers to 
make their decisions conform to political objectives eroded the judiciary of its 
independence and autonomy until it became an undistinguished administrative body 
without discretion, capable of the most grievous violations of human rights.  If the 
ordinary citizens, as subsequently described, were willing to risk their lives to challenge 
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the transgressions that surrounded them, certainly judges, those specifically entrusted 
with maintaining and advancing justice, might have made a stand against Hitler’s regime 
of injustice.  Instead, the judges of the People’s Court conformed and reconciled their 
judicial conduct to Hitler’s will, forsaking their independence and autonomy.  Their 
motivation for abandoning their judicial independence is not of great significance.  Be it 
because of fear, greed, opportunism, or indifference, it made no difference; the result was 
wrongful imprisonment, torture, annihilation, genocide, and one of the darkest chapters in 
human history. 
 It was then and remains now a constant endeavor for judges to determine what the 
safeguards are that protect a structure of laws and thus a society.  It is postulated that if a 
judge waits until their only choice is to submit or resign their position, then judicial 
independence has already been abolished and overwhelmed.  Any meaningful 
opportunity for peaceful action to redeem the rule of law had heretofore been suppressed 
and extinguished.   
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 Chapter VI:  How Could German Civilization Collapse So Completely? 
 In order to embrace the lack of judicial independence and autonomy that came to 
exist in Nazi Germany, it is imperative for the reader to comprehend the societal milieu 
existing within Germany that validated the Nazi’s initial assumption of governmental 
authority.  This environmental chaos is discussed in “How Could German Civilization 
Collapse So Completely?” 
The National Socialist German Workers’ Party, abbreviated NSDAP, the 
members of which became known as Nazis, from the German word for National, i.e., 
Nazional,
105
 initially stated with complete candor what they desired.  On April 30, 1928, 
Joseph Goebbels pontificated: 
We’re entering the Reichstag to arm ourselves from 
democracy’s arsenal.  We will become Reichstag members 
in order to paralyze the Weimar mentality with its own 
support.  If democracy is so stupid as to give us free 
railway tickets and allowances for this disservice, then 
that’s their business.  According to the constitution we’re 
obliged only to observe the legality of the road, not the 
legality of the goal.  We want to conquer power legally, but 




 Germany in the decade of the 1930s was in extreme turmoil and deeply affected 
both financially and socially by the loss of the First World War.  Political chaos bordered 
on civil war, currency lost its value as a result of devastating inflation, and the rampant 
unemployment rancored the working class against the government’s failure to alleviate 
these collective afflictions in the years preceding Hitler.  All of this disorder enabled 
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Hitler to rise to power even though his party never held a majority in the Reichstag.  His 
was a coalition government arising from an environment in which a number of factions 
competed against one another, preventing any one party from obtaining an indomitable 
position with the electorate. 
 It was this divisiveness that provided Hitler with his opportunity.  The diverse 
political groups were unable to unite to solve Germany’s economic and social maladies.  
Hitler succeeded in creating a compromise based upon anti-Semitism as the uniting 
theme.  His views were not new as anti-Semitism had been expressed over a long period 
of time within Germany, and he was able to build upon this base, which had been 
tolerated and had a long-standing history of its own.  The Nazi goal of destroying the 
Jews in Europe was developed by appealing to those elements that embraced anti-
Semitism, by strengthening their position politically and by electing Nazi officials.  Hitler 
rose to power on the pretense that Jews were separate from Germans, and that mutual 
coexistence between these two groups was not possible.  Nazi philosophy rested upon the 
supposition that the existence of the Jewish “race” was a threat to the survival of the 
German “race.”  In order to affect this distinction, the Nazis had to invent racial terms for 
groups that were not racially distinct.  To effectuate this alleged difference, Hitler 
incorporated into German folklore the pretext of an “Aryan” race, and made Aryan a 
Nordic and racial concept, a pure Caucasian race of people whose racial purity required 
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 The Nazi regime placed into existence the theory that one race is superior to 
another.  This Aryan concept became state policy in Germany in 1933, when it was made 
legal and legitimate through the force of law.
108
 
 Anti-Semitism in Germany can be traced to Martin Luther, German founder of the 
Protestant Reformation, in addition to others.  Luther suggested that the proper treatment 
for Jews was to burn their synagogues, destroy their houses, take their books, forbid 
rabbis to teach, and deny them access to public roads.
109
  The ideas articulated by Luther 
were continued with tragic implementation by Hitler.
110
 
 Other declarations of the Nazis arose from the German nationalistic movement 
initiated in the late eighteenth century.  German philosopher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 
known as the father of German nationalism, saw Jews as a threat to the German state, and 
helped consolidate the idea of German nationalism as an ideal of racial purity.  In 1793, 
Fichte described Jews as a state within the state and advocated that permitting their 
presence to continue would destroy Germany.  Fichte’s theories became popular to 
Germans.  For Germans, the term Volk held a much greater meaning than simply “the 
people.”
111
  A derivative of the word “volkisch,” meaning “ethnic,” Volk implied a 
distinction that was racial in fervor and depth, and encompassed the entire fiber of the 
German way of life, “culture, territory, morality, attitudes, and the heritage, both 
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historical and racial, of Germany.”
112
  Elucidating upon this definition, Lucy S. 
Dawidowicz articulated that Volk: 
 . . . is a word that has come to mean more than simply ‘a 
people,’ more than the usual idea of a people united by 
common traditions and cultural heritage, language, 
territory, values, and morality . . . it signified the union of a 
group of people with a transcendental essence . . . 
sometimes called nature, cosmos, mythos.  This essence 
was fused to man’s innermost nature, and represented the 
source of his creativity, his depth of feeling, his 





Being German allowed an individual to have a sense of Volk, while being non-German or 
non-Aryan meant that one did not have Volk.  According to this rationale, Jews thus did 
not have validity as people, nor did they have character as individuals. 
 Publishing pamphlets and public oratory to convey anti-Semitic propaganda gave 
way to a more formal movement in 1878, with the first overtly anti-Semitic political 
party being formed in Germany, the Christian Social Worker’s Party.
114
  Its theme was 
that, “everything that was wrong in the world was a consequence of an international 
Jewish conspiracy.”
115
  The momentum of anti-Semitism continued to the turn of the 
century with politicians being more willing to express their desires for drastic measures 
against the Jews.  Jews were described as nonhuman, alien, not deserving of life, and 
certainly not entitled to the treatment of a native German.  Anti-Semitism diminished as 
the First World War approached, but once again, increased as the tide of war turned 
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against Germany.  Military setbacks and food shortages led to anti-Semitic forces 
blaming the Jews for the tribulations suffered by Germany. 
 The decade of the 1920s led not only to significant anti-Semitic literature being 
published, including, in 1925, Hitler’s Mein Kampf, or My Struggle, but elements within 
the scientific community became interested in the concept of racial purity.  By 1923, Fritz 
Lenz, a physician and geneticist, criticized the lack of laws designed to protect racial 
purity.  Lenz advocated forced sterilization to protect racial hygiene, reasoning that the 
state had the right and responsibility to decide who should be permitted to procreate.  The 




 The German tolerance of Nazi anti-Semitism developed through decades of 
justification for those beliefs.  Germany’s disintegration at the conclusion of World War I 
helped to accentuate the anti-Semitic attitude within the country.  These antagonistic 
feelings were also intensified by the Allies’ treatment of Germany in the peace 
negotiations.  President Wilson demanded the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II as a 
condition of signing the armistice along with the principles delineated in his Fourteen 
Points.  Subsequently, Wilson qualified his offer: peace terms were still to be formulated 
on the Fourteen Points, but with two exceptions.  First, the Allies were to be compensated 
for war damages through reparations, and second, Great Britain was to retain its right to 
control of the seas.  The onerous restrictions placed upon Germany by the terms of the 
Versailles Treaty were to become a uniting point for the German nation. 
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 For Germany, the most controversial clause contained in the peace treaty was 
Number 231, the War Guilt Clause, which read:
117
 
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and 
Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her 
allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the 
Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals 
have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed 




This clause became the foundation upon which the justification for charging Germany 
reparations for the costs associated with the First World War was then based.  Because 
Germany was not permitted to participate in the actual peace discussions, it was thus 
denied the ability to protest either the clause or the amount of required reparations it 
would have to remit.  For Hitler, the War Guilt Clause became one of his major political 
points.  He promised to rectify this clause and punish those responsible for its creation, 
this becoming one of the inducements for the Second World War. 
 Conditions within Germany had deteriorated prior to November 11, 1918, the day 
the Treaty of Versailles was executed.  When the Kaiser abdicated on November 9, 1918, 
as President Wilson had demanded, the German government was in chaos.  Civil unrest 
and discontent prevailed, with the Communists attempting to establish a new 
government.  Having witnessed the consequences of Communism in Russia, many 
Germans were fearful of this contemplated usurpation of power.  On December 23, 1918, 
an armed group, the Sparticists, endeavored to seize power and promulgate a socialist 
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republic.  To combat these conditions of virtual civil war, the Freikorps was organized 
and prevented Germany from becoming a Communist country in 1919.
119
 
 On February 11, 1919, a new government, the Weimar Republic, was formed.  
The new constitution that was passed and ratified by President Hindenburg on August 31, 
1919, contained a clause later employed by Hitler to seize total control of the 
government.  Article 48 gave the president dictatorial powers during an emergency.  It 
also granted Jews complete societal equality.  Despite this social guarantee, a recurring 
theme emerged with respect to the Jews in German temperament; the Jews were 
responsible for Germany’s defeat in World War I and for the punitive provisions 
embodied in the Versailles Treaty. 
 The creation of the new republic did not quell Germany’s problems.  The peace 
conference formally ending World War I included representatives from 27 countries, but 
Germany was excluded from participation.  By May of 1919, the terms of the German 
treaty had been confirmed and only then were German delegates asked to attend, 
explicitly for the purpose of signing the accord, not to negotiate its terms.
120
 
 Treaty terms included, “disbanding the Austria-Hungary empire, disposal of all of 
Germany’s colonies, a division of the state of Prussia by creating a Polish corridor, and 
punitive reparations.”
121
  Germany’s armed forces were limited to no more than 100,000 
members, they were not allowed any planes or tanks, and the navy was not to build any 
ships exceeding 10,000 tons.  In July of 1920, the Allies agreed to divide the reparations 
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among themselves, whereby France was to receive 52 percent of the total, Britain 22 
percent, and Italy 10 percent, with the remainder allocated to the other Allied powers.  
Total reparations demanded from Germany were set at 150 billion gold marks.  Although 
the terms of the treaty were unpopular with Germany, its leaders were required to execute 
the document on June 28, 1919. 
 Hitler pointed consistently to the Treaty of Versailles as a “stab in the back” of 
Germany; the Allied powers had made promises, but then failed to honor them.  
However, Germany had lost the war, its forces being unable to continue in battle nor to 
break the enemy blockade.  The treaty was punitive to Germany and the citizens were 
aware of this; Hitler made effective recourse of this knowledge in his assent to power.  
Widespread bitterness over the retribution extracted by the treaty added to the political 
and social turmoil within Germany.  Anti-Semitism became a focal point for the right 
wing, and those in the middle classes, longing to regain their lost pride and national 
identity, were also attracted to the Nazi Party. 
 This trend continued in the decade of the 1920s, when Nazi voting trends 
broadened to include a wider segment of the German voting public.  The Nazi rise to 
power was not sudden, nor did its deputies ever represent a majority in the Reichstag, but 
they were able to accumulate sufficient influence that the government was compelled to 
acknowledge the Party.  Nazi ascendancy occurred through the course of coalition, 
compromise, and eventually, capitulation of its opponents. 
 Hitler recognized a need for control on two levels.  First, he had to take control of 
the streets, recognizing that it was better to disrupt the opposition’s rallies with force than 
to have the opposition do the same to the Nazis.  Second, he would need to assume 
   69
   
 
control of the government.  Only by achieving both of these objectives could Hitler hope 
to gain the support of the military, essential to his ultimate intentions. 
 The oppressive unemployment experienced in Germany, approximately 40% in 
the early 1930s, along with the continuing societal chaos, contributed to Hitler’s appeal 
and rise to power.  He made it seem plausible that the Jews had “stabbed the country in 
the back” and were now personally profiting from the German misery.  This theme, 
repeated incessantly over time, became less ludicrous and more acceptable until it was an 
unchallenged and universally known truth in the minds of most of the German people. 
 The appeal of the Nazi movement grew from German society’s acceptance of 
anti-Semitism and its victimization of the Jews.  Anti-Semitic sentiment progressed to the 
enactment of formal laws through Nazi dictates, and purposely eroded civil rights leading 
to the loss of millions of lives, the near-total destruction of European Jewish culture and 
society, and the emergence of a German resistance based upon these atrocities.   
 Hitler put his crusade against the Jews into effect through the legal system.  He 
became Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933.
122
  
 On the evening of Monday, February 27, 1933, the Reichstag building was burned 
which precipitated, on February 28, 1933, the approval of a statute known as the “Decree 
of Reich President von Hindenburg for the Protection of People and State,” better known 
as the “Reichstag Fire Decree.”  The first paragraph suspended the civil liberties 
contained in the Weimar Constitution, permitted the imprisonment without trial of 
anyone the regime deemed to be a political threat, and read as follows: 
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Restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of free 
expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on 
the right of assembly and association, and violations of the 
privacy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic 
communications, and warrants for house searches, orders 
for confiscations as well as restrictions on property rights 





 June 22, 1933, saw the enactment of a sterilization law, granting to government 
the legal right to control the determination of whether a life was unworthy of living.  
Genocidal policies also arose in law, with the first of these mandates regulating the 
government’s right to control whether a person or class of people should be prohibited 
from procreating. 
 On March 23, 1933, the Enabling Act was passed, conferring upon government 
the authority to enact future laws without Reichstag approval, effectively granting to 
Hitler total control and simultaneously nullifying democratic rights, along with any 
checks and balances of the Reichstag.  Eight days later, Hitler dissolved the legislatures 
of all German states, with the exception of Prussia, and directed that Communist held 
seats not be filled.  Another law passed on April 7, 1933, appointed Reich/Nazi governors 
in all states, with broad powers including the ability to appoint and remove judges and 
other state officials.  Also on April 7, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional 
Civil Service was enacted, allowing for dismissal of non-Aryan civil servants.  On April 
9, the Law Regarding Admission to the Bar was passed, forbidding Jews the right to 
practice law in Germany, and on April 11, 1933, a law defining “non-Aryan” status was 
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authorized which required proof of genealogy in order to obtain civil service 
employment.  The Law Against the Overcrowding of German Schools and Institutions of 
Higher Learning was sanctioned, limiting non-Aryan school attendance to no more than 
1.5 percent of the total enrollment. 
 As a result of the Enabling Act, the legislative branch of government had ceded 
its powers to Hitler, Reichstag approval for legislation no longer being necessary.  The 
only political threat thus remaining to Hitler that could possibly arise would be from 
opposition parties, but on July 14, 1933, this risk was eliminated with the enactment of 
the Law Against the New Formation of Parties, forbidding all political parties in 
Germany other than the National Socialist Germany Workers’ Party. 
 Each of these laws systematically excluded Jews from mainstream society and 
placed the country on a path to the actual removal of Jews from mankind through 
expulsion, relocation, and finally, extermination.  It was important for Hitler to proceed 
through the color of law as he realized that broad-based support, from industrialists, the 
military, and the middle classes of the country was necessary.  In this regard, Hitler 
succeeded as these changes were viewed by the non-Jewish segments of German 
citizenry as positive and necessary.
124
 
 With President Paul von Hindenburg’s death on August 2, 1934, at the age of 
87,
125
 rather than call new elections as required by the constitution, Hitler’s cabinet 
passed a law proclaiming the presidency vacant and transferred the role and powers of the 
head of state to Hitler as Führer, or leader, and Chancellor.  This action effectively 
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removed the last legal remedy by which Hitler could be dismissed.
126
  Hitler no longer 
needed to be concerned with internal opposition to his plans.  As long as Hindenburg was 
alive, Hitler was forced to proceed slowly, as Hindenburg held the power to demand the 
resignation of the Chancellor; with Hitler’s new position, anti-Jewish legislation and 
other measures could be accelerated. 
 At the Nazi Party congress rally held in Nuremberg on September 15, 1935, the 
Reich Citizenship Law was passed declaring that only individuals of “German or kindred 
blood” could be citizens of Germany.  Additionally, the Law for the Protection of 
German Blood and German Honor was enacted, thereby forbidding marriages and sexual 
relations between Jews and German or kindred blood.  A decree of November 14, 1935,  
dealt with marriages between Jews and non-Jews, declaring it to be illegal to have such a 
marriage, regardless of when it was entered.
127
  Hitler had thus violated the principle of 
nulla poena sine lege, which forbids punishment for actions that had not previously been 
formulated into positive law, or the retroactivity of penal provisions for crimes for which 
there had been no precedent, an ex post facto law.
128
  Jews were also no longer allowed to 
hire German citizens under the age of 45 as domestic help or to display the German flag. 
 An ordinance arising on October 18, 1935, from the Nuremberg laws regulated 
sterilization and the issuance of marriage licenses, creating a system to track individuals 
with specific hereditary traits over a period of several generations.  Several laws were 
enacted furthering restrictions on the rights of Jews.  On March 26, 1938, the Decree 
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Regarding the Reporting of Jewish Property mandated all Jews to access and report the 
value of their property by June 30 of that year.  This law thus aided the Nazis when they 
subsequently appropriated Jewish-owned property.  Then, on August 17, 1938, the 
Second Decree for the Implementation of the Law Regarding Changes of Family Names 
and Given Names was instituted.  Jews were forbidden to take Aryan names, all Jewish 
men were required to add the name Israel to their name, and all Jewish women were 
compelled to add the name Sarah to their name.  This law being conceived to identify 
people of Jewish heritage who had taken Christian-sounding names in an effort to pass in 
German society without the restrictions that had been imposed on the Jews and to identify 
those individuals who had baptized their children in Christian churches, giving them 
Christian names for the same purpose.  Also beginning in 1938, Jews could be arrested 
without due process, their property seized, their children kept out of school, and their 
right to operate a business constrained and finally prohibited. 
 A final step in the complete removal of Jewish civil rights occurred on September 
1, 1941, with the sanctioning of the Police Decree Concerning the Marking of Jews.  This 
decree specified that Jews over the age of six were not permitted to appear in public 
without displaying the yellow Star of David, worn visibly with the word “Jew” in black 
letters.  Jews were also forbidden to leave their neighborhoods without carrying written 
permission from the local police. 
 Most importantly, Nazi endeavors to destroy the Jews in Europe culminated on 
January 20, 1942, at the Wannsee Conference through a “Plenipotentiary for the 
Preparation of the Final Solution of the European Jewish Question.”  Reinhard Heydrich, 
head of the SS Intelligence Service, described the process that had taken place since 1933 
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with respect to the Jews.
129
  It began by expelling Jews “from various spheres of life of 
the German people,” then “from the living space of the German people,” and as 
announced at the conference, the “evacuation of the Jews to the East.”
130
  The stage was 
thus set for the total destruction of European Jewry. 
 A major faction of the Nazi movement was based on the contrived conflict 
between Aryans and Jews.  Efforts had been expended by the Nazi regime into legalizing 




 It was from this societal confusion that Hitler and his minions assumed control in 
Germany.  With their seizure of administration, the judicial independence and autonomy 
that previously prevailed within Germany were soon eviscerated. 
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Chapter VII:  The Rule of Law and the Führerprinzip 
 On the basis of the Führerprinzip, the foundation of the methodology by which 
the Nazi legal scheme functioned, the aggregation of all governmental power, legislative, 
executive, and judicial, ultimately resided in the Führer.  As a consequence, individual 
and institutional judicial independence and autonomy were eradicated to accommodate 
the dictates and caprice of the Nazi regime. 
Professor Kurt Huber, executed on July 13, 1943, for his resistance activities as a 
member of the White Rose, stated, with respect to the rule of law under the Nazi regime: 
There is a point at which the law becomes immoral and 
unethical.  That point is reached when it becomes a cloak 
for the cowardice that dares not stand up against blatant 
violations of justice.  A state that suppresses all freedom of 
speech and which, by imposing the most terrible 
punishment, treats each and every attempt at criticism, 
however morally justified, and every suggestion for 
improvement as “plotting to high treason,” is a state that 




 Once in power, Hitler apperceived that it would not be possible to continue and 
rule without the force of law; he also was cognizant that principles of equity would not 
support his policies or his views.  His was a regime that not only destroyed civil rights, 
but used the law as a means for suppressing others.  Enacting new legislation would not 
change this reality:  an immoral regime that did not respect the rights of its citizens who 
dissented could never claim moral righteousness.  All Hitler could do was to silence the 
regime’s opponents or change the law to conform to his programs. 
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 Hitler had to silence any political opposition while concurrently operating within 
the law.  A legal environment was created, devoid of fairness and justice, yet with 
sufficient flexibility to allow his doctrines to succeed.  Hitler suppressed political 
opposition by altering the justice system.  He enacted laws in order to provide himself 
with the legal authority to do whatever he desired and that was expedient for the regime, 




 Göring expressed the Nazi legal philosophy on July 12, 1934, as, “The law and 
the will of the Führer are one.”
134
  In 1936, Commissioner of Justice, Dr. Hans Frank, 
expanded upon this idea declaring, “The National Socialist ideology is the foundation of 
all basic laws, especially as explained in the party programs and in the speeches of the 
Führer.
135
  The underlying principle of Nazi rule in all aspects of German life thus 
became the Führerprinzip, or the leadership principle. 
 Hitler had emphasized its importance in Mein Kampf, but the leadership principle 
did not originate with the Nazis; it was a characteristic of fascist societies generally.  Its 
establishment in Germany after 1933 had preceded the Weimar Republic with the idea of 
an authoritarian leader and had gained acceptance and popularization during this period. 
 Hitler never supported the leadership principle institutionally or legally.  It was 
not contained in the party program of 1920 or in any legislation subsequent to 1933.  
Instead the leadership principle was instilled mentally within the mind of the German 
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people.  By making reference to the leadership principle, the regime was relying upon a 
frame of reference that had previously been implanted within the psyche of the citizenry.  
The regime adapted the external adornments and the rituals associated with the leader, as 
exemplified in Nazi public ceremonies, with the individual, Hitler, who then became 
exalted and venerated by the German populace. 
 The leadership principle was vague, unlimited, and flexible.  The Führer’s power 
was without any legal constraint and absolute.  Not only did the Führer’s orders have to 
be interpreted, but the will of the Führer became the standard upon which all actions were 
to be established.  Existing German constitutional law was replaced by slogans, 
postulates, and general clauses.  The Führer’s puissance could be understood only 
“intuitively;” legal considerations were abrogated because they contradicted the 
leadership principle.  Legal systems of thought were dismissed and replaced with values 
of the community.  However, these ideals and conventions were never clearly defined.  
The regime spoke of the völkische Gesamtordnung, the racial all-embracing order, but the 
legal distinctiveness remained unexplained.  It also spoke of a völkische Verfassung, a 
constitution, but the constitution never became a reality.  Had a written constitution 
actually been formalized, it would have contained rights and duties, thereby erecting 
constraints on the exercise of the Führer’s powers.  In order to be free from such 
limitations and uniformity, Hitler sought and obtained passage of the Enabling Act.
136
 
 The leadership principle was to be unconditionally implemented by the judiciary.  
In the initial years of the Third Reich, the principle of judicial independence was not 
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formally abolished; instead its independence was to be transmuted in the Nazi spirit.  The 
approach adopted by the Third Reich was to reconcile the independence of judges with 
the leadership principle, but this was met with opposition even from regime judges, who 
insisted on the continuation of their independence, while linking it with the will of the 
Führer.
137
  “The Führer is the highest German judge, he is the German judge.”
138
 
 Article 1 of the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and State, of December 1, 
1933, stated, “Since the victory of the National Socialist revolution the National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party is the carrier of the idea of the German state and thus 
indissolubly united with the state.”
139
  As a consequence, Hitler and the Nazi Party 
claimed infallibility in all their actions and in all spheres of German life.  Institutionally, 
political leadership, administrative leadership, and judicial leadership were inextricably 
amalgamated, with the Führer and the merged positions of president and chancellor, 
which he occupied, at the pinnacle.  The Führer’s orders became the decisive instruments, 
with his minions being entrusted with the task of attending to their fulfillment. 
 The Nazi Party’s dominance over the state was effectuated by duplicating offices 
which already existed as institutions within the state.  The Party stated unequivocally that 
the German state was second to the Party and its ideology.  The Nazi Party was the 
primary element of all völkisch life, the example for the present undeveloped state, as the 
existing state was considered only temporary.
140
  Völkisch was understood to be those 
who sought to construct a new political system for Germany based upon racial, rather 
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than legal, similarities among the German people.
141
  Appointments and promotions 
within the bureaucracy and judiciary were subject to the agreement of the Party. 
 The Nazi Party and the regime perceived itself and themselves as the conclusive 
and utmost form of expression for the Volksgemeinschaft, the racial national community, 
which they claimed to lead.  Theirs was an unqualified rejection of the liberal legal 
system, its individual liberties, and of the rights contained in the Weimar Constitution.  
Until the outbreak of war, arguments persisted relative to the Weimar Constitution 
ceasing to be in force after January 30, 1933, or whether only portions thereof were 
suspended through Nazi legislation, tantamount to constitutional amendment.  An 
example was the legislation associated with the Reichstag fire, wherein the Nazis were 
unambiguous concerning their perspective:
142
 “The present legislation has only for the 
sake of order . . . used the formal procedures laid down in the Weimar Constitution, but 
does not derive its justification from it.”
143
 
 The Weimar Constitution and the legal principles educed from it had been 
overcome by the Volksgemeinschaft and the Nazi Party ideology.  Terms of the Weimar 
Constitution were negated by judges and declared irreconcilable with the Nazi concept of 
state if there was a conflict between the legal edict expressed in or through the 
Constitution and that espoused by the Party.  To transgress against this view or to change 
the Constitution by the judiciary was sanctioned.  Some judges considered the Nazi Party 
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program as the legal basis for their decisions,
144
 and in 1934, it was stated that the 
constitutional structure must begin with the sentence:  “The Weimar Reich Constitution is 
no longer valid.”
145
  The Nazi Party leadership principle superseded and replaced any 
legal constraints and allowances that may have been imposed by the Weimar 
Constitution. 
 Ernst Huber, a Nazi who became a law professor at the University of Kiel, in a 
1937 publication reduced all of law to the will of the Führer.  Although that will was 
defined as embodying the will of the people, the Volk, the equation of the Volk with the 
Führer’s will becomes assumed and axiomatic, nullifying any need to inquire into the will 
of the people.
146
  Huber stated that, “In the leader’s will [the] law achieves its external 
form; the will of the leader, emerging in statutes, can be nothing else but the conscious, 
molded form of the people’s justice (völkische Gerechtigkeit) . . . Where he has spoken, 
the content of the people’s law has been determined with conditional binding force.”
147
 
 As a result, Huber expressed a fundamental truth in Nazi Party law, the end of 
individual rights and “the principle of guarantees has been overcome in general . . . The 
people’s constitution (the “people’s constitution” is the name Huber gave to an allegedly 
unwritten constitution with which Hitler was said to have replaced the defunct Weimar 
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Constitution) . . . does not protect individuals and groups against the whole, but serves 
the unity and wholeness of the people against individualist and group subversion.”
148
 
 Officially, Nazi legal theory was that the Volk defined the Führer, but the 
practical hierarchies of authority comprehended by legal theorists writing after Hitler’s 
assent to power, presumed that the Führer defined the Volk.  In practice, Nazi legal 
theory repudiated any legal value or source of law other than the Führer and explicitly 
rejected the authority of enacted law if it did not comport with Hitler’s wishes and 
agenda.
149
  Thus, Hitler replaced and became the rule of law through the Führerprinzip, 
and thereafter, barbarism became the societal standard for Nazi Germany.  In the words 
of Eric Hobsbawm, barbarism is: 
“[T]he disruption and breakdown of the system of rules and 
moral behavior by which all societies regulate the relations 
among their members and, to a lesser extent, between their 
members and those of other societies.”  More particularly, 
barbarism means “the reversal of what we may call the 
project of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, namely 
the establishment of a universal system of such rules and 
standards of moral behavior, embodied in the institutions of 
states dedicated to the rational progress of humanity:  to 
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness, to Equality, 
Liberty and Fraternity.”  When “traditional controls 
disappear,” we have to get used “to living in a society that 
is uncivilized.”  It is a society that has “got used to killing,” 
a society where “ruthlessness and violence” are routine, 




This represents a very unfortunate, exact, and wretched characterization of Hitler’s Nazi 
Germany. 
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 The Führerprinzip was the absolute antithesis of United States’ style 
constitutional separation of powers, with its inherent system of checks and balances.  
Under the Führerprinzip, Hitler was, at once, the chief executive, chief legislator, and 
chief justice, and judicial independence and autonomy ceased to exist as an indubitable 
postulate within Nazi Germany.  
   83
   
 
Chapter VIII:  The German Court System and Its Applicable Laws under the Nazi 
Regime 
 This chapter provides an historical overview of the courts and law in Germany 
prior to the usurpation of power by the Nazis, as well as thereafter.  This perspective is 
necessary in order to effectively evaluate the loss of judicial independence and autonomy 
that ensued after Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933. 
The revolution of 1918 and the Constitution of 1919, the Weimar Constitution, 
transformed Germany from a monarchy into a republic.  Germany became a democratic 
state with a strong President and Chancellor at the head of a bicameral parliament, the 
Reichstag as the popularly elected lower house and the Reichsrat as the upper house 
representing the interests of the Länder, the states.
151
 
For the National Socialist courts to function as Hitler desired, a substantial 
minority, if not the majority, of judges had to embrace Nazi ideology as an appropriate 
doctrine in the courtroom.  These men, known for their integrity and strict adherence to 
the law, continued their careers under the Third Reich with little protest.  This 
transformation occurred even though prior to 1933 virtually no judges had been members 
of the Nazi Party.  Weimar forced the judiciary into a political position.  Being 
disenchanted with the Republic, the jurists accepted the Reichstag’s constitutional 
amendments which released them from their position as adjudicators of political cases.  
The changes that ensued under Weimar provided the judiciary with the motivation to 
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receive Hitler when he came to power.  It was then only a negligible maneuver from the 
politicized courts of the Republic to those of the Third Reich. 
Bismarck’s Second Empire had laid the foundation for a strong judiciary.  One of 
the problems brought about by the re-unification of Germany in 1871 had been that of 
producing unified codes of law; under Bismarck’s leadership, such codes began to take 
shape.  For the first time in Germany’s history, the courts essentially operated as a 
cohesive unit with both a consistent legal procedure and structure in the disposition of 
civil and criminal matters.  The judiciary became a conservative attribute of the state, 
while maintaining its independence throughout the life of the Empire.
152
 
 The structure of the legal system that had evolved between 1871 and 1918 was 
essentially retained.    After the revolution of 1919, these law codes remained in force:  
the Civil Code of 1900, the Penal Code of 1871, and the Laws of Procedure.  The 
function of the courts was to apply the rules laid down in the codes, the German legal 




 There is no doubt that the judiciary was shaken by the collapse of the Empire and 
that it never recovered from the impact of the Weimar Republic and its failure to attain 
real stability.  The judiciary was accustomed to a stable environment in which they could 
preside over routine civil and criminal cases, and in which they could retain their 
apolitical posture.  Weimar cast this relative tranquility into chaos. 
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 After 1920, it was increasingly impossible to form a government based on the 
majority support of the Reichstag.  Minority governments dominated.  The average 
duration of governments between 1919 and 1928 was seven months, as politically 
inspired violence developed.  Judges were thus called upon to adjudicate cases of crimes 
committed by revolutionaries who claimed their acts to be privileged, but for the justice 
system were crimes to be dealt with by the traditional norms as set forth in the German 
penal code.  It was a conflict in the interpretation of the law that neither side fully 
comprehended, with which the judiciary was unprepared to address, and correspondingly, 
added to the tension of the judiciary’s position relative to the government and the public. 
 From its inception, the Weimar Republic did not have the strength to mobilize 
support on its behalf, and this discontented majority included the judiciary.  However, 
this is not to say that the judges acted against the Republic.  They fulfilled their duty as 
their training had directed.  Some defended the Republic, although this was an unpopular 
position for which its proponents came under attack from monarchists, the extreme left 
and right, and those indifferent to the Republic.  Most judges continued to view with 




 Already unpaid, judicial salaries were reduced by approximately twenty percent, 
through inflation, the deflation of the Weimar period, and by government economic 
measures.  It is uncertain as to the extent to which judicial officers and those aspiring to 
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become judges became victims of National Socialist propaganda, but both groups were 
disillusioned with the Republic so as to entertain the prospects of a political alternative. 
 The early years of the Republic were confounded by a series of, mostly left-wing, 
disruptions.  As a result, court cases which these events engendered put the judiciary into 
turmoil.  Initially because the penal code held no solutions to the issue of how to 
administer political crimes, and second, there was an almost complete lack of self-
protective action on the part of the country’s elected representatives.  A great deficiency 
of the Weimar Constitution was that it contained no provision which directed itself 
against those forces whose explicit aim was to destroy the Republic.  It was not 
unconstitutional to overthrow the government, providing it was accomplished with the 
assent of the necessary two-thirds majority of the Reichstag as stipulated in the 
Constitution.  This constitutional omission transferred the problem of a conflict between 
ambitious revolutionaries to the judicial system.  If the government would not take 
preventative action, the judiciary was required to respond to these activities. 
 This judicial retort drew criticism from all sectors.  With left-wing insurgencies 
pre-dating and far outnumbering those of the right, the left suffered more victims than its 
right-wing opponents.  However, when those from the right were placed on trial, the 
judiciary was equally harsh as it had been with the Communists.  The judiciary was thus 
placed in the impossible position of pleasing neither the left nor the right, and certainly 
not the general public. 
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 In 1928, there appeared a series of the judiciary’s most politically infused cases.  




 After 1921, the army had encouraged the formation of various quasi-official 
military and intelligence units.  Under the direction of the counter-intelligence unit, the 
Abwehr, these units appeared throughout the country to defend the nation.  Pursuant to 
the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, these military and intelligence groups were illegal, 
as any German military refortification was forbidden.  The government had to purport to 
know nothing about these factions.  However, these clandestine units were subject to 
infiltration by members of the left, seeking to expose their operations and to publicize the 
creation of the illegal military in the press.  Because these groups operated outside the 
legal system, any interloper who was caught could not be referred to the authorities, but 
was summarily executed.  When the murders came to light in the late 1920s, the 
perpetrators were arraigned before the courts.  When a member of one of these covert 
organizations came to trial in late 1928, he was sentenced by the jury to three years hard 
labor.  Until this time, most political trials had been of left-wing activists.  The right 
perceived the judiciary to be persecuting patriots defending the country against traitors 
and foreign occupation. 
 The verdict illustrated that the urgency of the emergency situation had not 
overwhelmed the judiciary’s proper application of the law.  Legally, the provisions of the 
Treaty of Versailles had become part of the German law, but motivated German 
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nationalists were not prepared to accept this decision.  This strongly felt sentiment was an 
indication for the future of the Republic.
156
 
 There was a growing ambivalence among the legal order relative to strict 
adherence to the law in the face of a national security crisis.  The judiciary was subjected 
to public attack and their urge to escape this situation profoundly influenced it toward the 
end of the Weimar Republic. 
 An issue then ensued concerning the devaluation of the Mark.  In its ruling the 
judiciary departed for the first time with the formality of the law.  According to the law, 
judges were bound to the principle that one Mark equaled one Mark, regardless of 
whether it was tendered in gold or paper currency.  By 1923, paper currency had become 
worthless, and anyone receiving paper rather than gold Marks did so to their own 
detriment.  The judiciary overturned the law, requiring that debts of any kind could no 
longer be paid in paper currency. 
 This was a judicial encroachment into the legislative prerogative.  Never before 
had the judiciary sought to do more than interpret the law; now it had abolished 
legislation.  A general discussion proceeded concerning the function of the judiciary and 
the scope of its power.  The government castigated the assumption of such powers, but 
refrained from intervention. 
 Subsequently, the extension of the judiciary’s power into the legislative sphere 
was no longer questioned, and in practice judges began to apperceive the law with 
increased consideration for expediency than previously.  They were no longer servants of 
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the law, but formulated it themselves.  This tendency continued to accelerate the more the 
national and regional parliaments failed in their functions as legislators.  The judicial 
mandate associated with the treatment of the Mark set the judiciary on a course the 
results of which were only seen in the Third Reich. 
 The Reichstag set a similar precedent in legislative terms by applying the 
Constitutional provision which granted the President emergency powers.  It was argued 
that the use of this article would deprive the Weimar Republic of its liberty and permit 
tyranny.  Once dictatorship was sanctioned in a parliamentary and democratic manner, 
the general legal clauses established by the judiciary over the 1920s and early 1930s 
required only their infusion with new ideology in order for the existing law to be applied 
in accordance with National Socialist principles.  The legal codes developed during the 
Second Empire were becoming progressively obsolete.  The application of nationalist and 
Nazi doctrine met with little opposition. 
 The National Socialists may not have had such an effortless task if the judiciary 
had not been permitted to arrogate such extensive powers to itself.  The authority under 
which the judiciary acted remained vague and ill-defined, but the judges had become 
amenable to exercising political power.
157
 
 In 1922, the Reichstag passed the Law for the Protection of the Republic.  Its 
justification was the escalation of terrorism within Germany; however, it politicized penal 
laws to an unprecedented degree, and abrogated the basic rights of the individual as set 
forth in the Constitution.  For the first time in German legal history, the judiciary was 
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authorized to depart from the principle of nulla poena sine lege, no punishment without 
law.  The Nazis would later capitalize on this precedent in passing its emergency 
legislation of 1933, The Reichstag Fire Decree.  The law also heightened the judiciary’s 
political role and gave it greater autonomy in pursuing political cases. 
 The politicization of the penal law was decried with disgust by many judges as the 
government’s elected representatives had passed to the judiciary the burden of handling 
the political crisis.  It is debatable that the judiciary under the Republic was overburdened 
with political trials, that it dealt with them too leniently, and that in this sense it therefore 
failed. 
 Initially, the judiciary’s relationship with the Nazis was remote; until January 30, 
1933, the party claimed almost no judicial members.  For this reason it is remarkable that 
the transition from Republic to dictatorship was conducted without great changes in the 
personnel of the judiciary.  One explanation proffered is that the end of the Weimar 
Republic came about legally.  Weimar became a victim of its own constitutional law.
158
 
 At the pinnacle of the judiciary, continuity was preserved.  Franz Gürtner, the 
Reich Minister of Justice, retained his ministerial post until his death in 1941.  Erwin 
Bumke, the President of the Reichgericht, did the same.  Max Schlegelberger served as 
Permanent Secretary of State in the Ministry of Justice and after Gürtner’s death, became 
Minister of Justice.  Thus the judiciary, criticized from all aspects, largely politically 
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apathetic, and economically underprivileged, was disposed to put its confidence, however 
cautiously, in a new party and a new regime, the Nazis.
159160
 
 Not every judge conformed with the ideal expressed in 1943
161
 by Curt 
Rothenberger, Undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice that,
162
 “The apolitical, neutral 
judge of the liberal multiparty state, who stands on the sidelines, must become a National 
Socialist with sure instincts and a feeling for the great political aims of the movement.  
Politics, philosophy, and justice are one and the same.”
163
  Refusals to cooperate did 
occur in the judiciary; however, a judge had “no alternative but to apply the unjust laws, 
and risked . . . his own life if he objected.”
164
 
 Two prominent judges were executed for their resistance during the Third Reich.  
Dr. Karl Sack, a general staff judge, was arrested on September 8, 1944, and murdered on 
February 4, 1945, in the Flossenbürg concentration camp.  Dr. Johann von Dohnanyi, a 
Supreme Court judge, was killed in the camp at Sachseuhausen, presumably on April 8, 
1945.  Both individuals were executed for their participation in the July 20, 1944, 
assassination plot against Hitler.  Neither judge was persecuted for their professional 
conduct.  On the contrary, each had had successful judicial careers in the Third Reich. 
 In 1938, having just turned thirty-six, Dohnanyi became the youngest member of 
the Supreme Court, where the average age of appointment at that time was fifty-three.  
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After three years on the Third Criminal Panel, Dohnanyi left the court.  He had become 
an opponent of the regime, and had been keeping a record
165
 of the “crimes committed by 
party leaders.”
166
  In 1941, Admiral Walter Wilhelm Canaris recruited him for the 
Abwehr, where he became an important presence in the coterie around Canaris and Hans 
Oster.  He was arrested on April 5, 1943, for illegal currency transactions, since he had 
been assisting Jews transfer their assets to Switzerland. 
 Judge Sack was appointed to the Supreme Military Court Panel for Treason and 
High Treason in 1938; he was assigned to the Army High Command in 1942, and became 
a general staff judge in 1944. 
 There is one documented case of resistance in which a judge opposed the regime 
in the course of fulfilling his judicial duties:  Dr. Lothar Kreyssig, a Judge at the Court of 
Guardianship in the town of Brandenburg, on the Havel River.  Kreyssig, who was 
appointed to the County Court in 1928, had been considered a good judge by his 
superiors, until the President of his district Court of Appeals noted in his file that,
167
 
“since the spring of 1934 his conduct has given grounds for complaint, in that he has 




 Kreyssig had committed minor acts of insubordination, such as departing early 
from a ceremony in his court when a bust of Hitler was being unveiled, and publicly 
protesting against the suspension of three judges after the passage of the Law for 
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Restoration of the Professional Civil Service,
169
on April 7, 1933.  It was on this day that 
it became legal to dismiss civil servants, judges, and attorneys for being of non-Aryan 
descent.
170
  Kreyssig’s actions led to the filing of a demand for his dismissal with the 
Reich Ministry of Justice in March of 1936.  Subsequently, a formal investigation was 
begun, with the intent of removing him from office, after he referred to Nazi church 
policies as “injustice . . . masquerading in the form of law.”
171
  When Kreyssig publicly 
opposed the arrest of theologian Martin Niemöller in June of 1938, a criminal 
investigation was opened on suspicion of “misuse of the pulpit” and infringement of the 
1934 Law against Treacherous Attacks on the State and Party. 
 At his own request, Kreyssig was reassigned to the Petty Court in Brandenberg, 
where he functioned as a judge for the Court of Guardianship.  When he learned that 
inmates were being removed from a mental hospital and killed, he sent a letter about 
these occurrences to the President of the Prussian Supreme Court, asking for 
“clarification and advice.”  Kreyssig was summoned to the Reich Ministry of Justice, 
where Undersecretary Roland Freisler heard his complaints but failed to alter his thinking 
on the matter.  Kreyssig then issued injunctions to several hospitals in his capacity as 
judge of the Court of Guardianship, prohibiting the hospitals from transferring wards of 
his court without court permission.  In addition, he brought criminal charges against Nazi 
party leader Phillipp Bouhler before the public prosecutor in Potsdam, since Freisler had 
indicated to him that Bouhler was responsible for the euthanasia program. 
                                                 
169
 Müller, I. (1991).  Hitler’s justice: the courts of the Third Reich.  (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press), 194. 
170
 Id. at 94. 
171
 Id. at 194. 
   94
   
 
 Once again, Kreyssig was commanded to appear before the Ministry of Justice, 
where on this occasion Franz Gürtner attempted to persuade him that the program had 
been an “order of the Führer” and was therefore lawful.  Gürtner also informed Kreyssig 
that if he “did not recognize the will of the Führer as the fount of law,” then he would no 
longer be tolerated as a judge.  Soon thereafter, Kreyssig wrote Gürtner that since his 
conscience would not allow him to withdraw the injunctions against the hospitals, he was 
therefore requesting permission to retire ahead of schedule.  Kreyssig was granted 
temporary approval to retire on December 10, 1940; this was confirmed on March 4, 
1942, and included full pension benefits.  In April the criminal investigation against him 
was closed, and he was thereafter left in peace by the Third Reich.
172
 
 Kreyssig’s case is revealing, as it attests that if a judge refused to accept the 
injustices of the Nazi system, early retirement was the penalty imposed.  Judge Hermanns 
was also an example of someone who received early retirement.  Hermanns had joined 
the Nazi Party on February 1, 1932, and rose to the position of a Presiding Judge at a 
County Court.  He gradually withdrew his support for the dictatorship and sent a 130-
page report to the Reich Ministry of Justice in 1943, documenting cases in which local 




 Regardless of the diligence of the search for judges who refused to serve the Nazi 
regime from the bench, there remains a total of only one judge, Dr. Lothar Kreyssig, 
Judge of the Court of Guardianship in Brandenburg on the Havel.  The overwhelming 
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 The degree to which the judiciary became a readily functioning component of the 
National Socialists’ system of intimidation and corruption becomes clear upon an 
examination of the number of death sentences imposed.  There are no exact statistics, but 
it is estimated that the courts ordered “at least 40,000 to 50,000 death sentences,” not 
counting the verdicts in the summary proceedings of the military and the police, where 
approximately eighty percent of these were carried out.  Figures from the “Department of 
Military Losses” of the High Command document 11,500 death sentences passed by 
Courts-Martial through the middle of 1944, ninety percent of which were enforced.
175
  
The lower computation of the number of people condemned by the judicial system is 
based on official publications of the Third Reich, which ceased in mid-1944, and are also 
incomplete.  They contain neither the Nacht-und-Nebel, or Night and Fog prisoners nor 
the number of death sentences passed in the occupied territories.  Since it was the courts 
in the eastern regions that employed maximum use of the death penalty, and as the 
suppression of all opposition within Germany was entering its most deadly phase in the 
summer of 1944, an estimate of 80,000 victims may be the most accurate.
176
 
 German courts were comprised of three levels, the Reichsgericht, the highest 
appellate court for civil and criminal matters, and after 1927, also for labor law litigation.  
At the middle level were the Oberlandesgerichte in the federal states.  The lower courts 
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for civil and criminal cases were the Amtsgerichte and Landgerichte, the local and 
regional courts.  Specialized courts also existed for specific areas of the law, such as tax 




 The Amtsgericht was the lowest court in the judicial structure and dealt with 
criminal cases in which the sentence was not likely to exceed one year’s imprisonment.  
It was presided over by one judge who acted either individually or in cases where the 
penalty was presumptively not to surpass three years of imprisonment, with the assistance 
of lay judges. 
 The next highest court was the Landgericht.  It was a court of appeal from any 
sentence imposed by an Amtsgericht, but divided in cases of criminal law into two 
chambers, one the small penal chamber, the other the large penal chamber.  Both 
chambers dealt with cases that exceed the jurisdiction of the Amtsgericht.  In addition to 
the presiding judge, there were two professional judges who assisted. 
 Next in the hierarchy, and superior to both the Amtsgericht and the Landgericht 
was the Oberlandesgericht, a court of appeal from decisions made by the lower courts 
and one which had a small and large penal senate when adjudicating criminal matters.  
The small senate acts as a court of appeals from the Amtsgerichte and from the small and 
large penal chambers of the Landgerichte, while the large senate heard actions of alleged 
treason, both in first instance and as the court of final jurisdiction.  A court of final 
appeal, the Reichsgericht or Supreme Court, which dealt with particularly serious cases 
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of treason, continued throughout the Third Reich.  However, after 1934, the 





  Members of the armed forces or civilian employees of the Reichwehr, and 
later the Wehrmacht, accursed of treason could only be tried by the highest court of 
Germany’s armed forces, the Reichskriegsgericht.  After the July 20, 1944, bomb plot on 
the life of Adolf Hitler, members of the Wehrmacht were first expelled by a “Court of 




 The Nazi regime initially assumed traditional law, and the functioning of the 
courts and judges as they then existed.  However, during the first months of 1933, there 
were indications that the regime was abandoning the Rechtsstaat, the state based on the 
rule of law:  Jewish judges, notaries, and lawyers were dismissed; criminal sanctions 
increased; the principle of no punishment without law was abolished; and political 
enemies sent to concentration camps.  The mass killing of political rivals in June of 1934 
went unpunished.  Hitler proclaimed a law that declared these murders,
181
 “acts of 
national self-defense, and as such, lawful.”
182
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 During the war, the judicial system was curtailed, stages of appeal were shortened 
or abolished, and the entire structure was dominated by enhanced harsh penal justice.  
External and internal tensions transformed the scheme into an instrument of horror.  
Notwithstanding these modifications, the penal justice system failed to perform its tasks 
to the regime’s satisfaction, thus Sondergerichte, Special Courts, were organized to 
adjudicate lesser crimes and impose intense punishments.  Special Courts also existed in 
the military, Wehrmachtjustiz, to discipline troops with draconian penalties and 
thousands of death sentences.  Lastly, there were the Schutzstaffel (“SS”), or protective 




 Within the National Socialist state, there were areas of the law that remained 
unchanged and functioned just as they had during the Weimar Republic.  The regime 
strongly desired to preserve the impression of normalcy.  Nazi rule was based on its 
ability to gain the cooperation of the economic elites and the civil servants and judges 
who were dissatisfied with the Weimar Republic.  These groups were largely nationalistic 
and antiparliamentarian in their philosophy, but they also disliked open terror.  Before 
coming to terms with the Nazi regime, they required assurance that the Rechtsstaat, 
would be established, that society would function in accordance with the rule of law, and 
that excesses would not be tolerated.  Therefore, the initial strategy of the National 
Socialists relative to the legal system was to change only those elements that were 
indispensable to securing power and demarcating the primary ideological positions.  All 
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other aspirations for reform would be fulfilled after the “final victory.”  This was the 
approach assumed by the Nazis with respect to both civil and criminal law.  They 
preserved the façade of a state based on the rule of law to avoid alarming those from 
whom accordance was desired. 
 The statutory law that was in force during the Weimar Republic was, in principle, 
subsumed en bloc and continued to be valid unless superseded by new legislation.  As the 
regime continued in power, the ratio of traditional law to new law was progressively 
reversed and changed to the detriment of the old order.  The more secure the Nazis 
became, the more they discarded elements of the Rechtsstaat. 
 It was characteristic of National Socialist law that the modifications were only in 
part changes through legislation.  The developing positive law was expanded further on a 
continuing basis through individual decisions in the administration and judicial systems 
instead of through statutes.  What judges and administrative officials thought was right 
prevailed.  The legal system that operated between 1933 and 1945 and claimed validity 
was a combination involving the judiciary that reacted expeditiously and legislative 
activity that progressed slowly.  Additionally, the various fields of law and branches of 
the court system in which the regime took varying degrees of interest, manifested 
differing rates of change.  However, no area of the law remained entirely without 
intervention by the political assertions of the system. 
After January 30, 1933, Germany transitioned from a parliamentary system to a 
dictatorship within a few months.  Political parties were dissolved and the National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party was declared to be the state party.  Intermediary 
controls were abolished by the party staffing the most important executive posts with 
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party functionaries, creating a network of horizontal affiliations between the party and the 
state apparatus.  The professional civil service was reformed into one that was purged of 
political enemies and German Jewish victims of racial persecution, becoming duty-bound 
to serve the new state. 
 The principle of the separation of powers and the distinction between public and 
private law were abolished.  All forms of free social organization, unions, professional 
alliances, associations, and politically significant clubs were either outlawed or 
coordinated into Nazi ideology.  Freedom of the press was eliminated and artistic activity 
was placed under official supervision and control.  The result was a militarized and 
authoritarian centralized state.  A constitution in the usual sense no longer existed, even 
though the Weimar Constitution was not formally abrogated.  Rather, a lack of rules and 
a hostility to the law increasingly dominated society.  Along with the law there were 
Manahmen, arbitrary measures, and “Führer’s orders,” some of which were 
unpublished.  Areas in which the application of the law was maintained as usual stood 
alongside arbitrary terror.  Any remaining normative guarantees of the law were 
dependent on the concept of the “welfare of the national community,” which could be 
defined however the state wanted.  This tactic was deliberately used by the regime as a 
method of generating fear. 
 Fundamental violations of the principle of equality began when the regime 
disenfranchised minorities by revoking their citizenship.  Soon after came the first 
discriminatory and persecutory measures against German Jews, as well as other political, 
religious, or racial groups.  These discriminatory and circumscribing measures continued 
and were subsequently enacted into law. 
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 The judicial system was the arena for initial definitive action.  This activity was 
directed at personnel policy and at providing guidance for the “cleansed” judges by 
ideologically educating them through “governing principles.”  The precepts enunciated 




“The basis for the interpretation of all legal sources is the 
National Socialist ideology, particularly as expressed in the 
party program and the Führer’s statements.  When it comes 
to those decisions by the Führer that are couched in the 
form of a law or a decree, a judge has no right of judicial 
review.  A judge is also bound by other decisions of the 
Führer, insofar as they give unequivocal expression to the 




 During both the period of the seizure of power and lasting throughout the war, 
interpreting the existing law under the guidance of National Socialist ideology proved a 
superior approach to legislating new law.  Nazi avidity to transform the legal system into 
an instrument serving the goals of the leadership thus entailed both legislative activity 
and an unrestrained interpretation that changed the previous state of the law.  Disregard 
of the original legislative intent by ideologically guided judges became far more 
significant in the daily legal life of National Socialism than injustice directly commanded 
by legislation. 
 National Socialist administrative law was characterized by an end in the 
distinction developed by the Rechtsstaat between law, regulation, and individual acts, the 
displacement of the notion of legality with the ideological concept of “rightfulness,” the 
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diminution of judicial review concerning “acts of political leadership” and discretionary 
political decisions, and the elimination of personal rights in public law and its 
replacement by the obligation of duty that was subject to intervention and manipulation.  
The administrative courts remained intact until after the beginning of the war.  However, 
since they were considered as being part of the Rechtsstaat, these courts were 
progressively displaced from supervising administrative conduct.  The only exception 
was the Higher Administrative Courts in six states preserving their constitutional 
foundations in the areas of building, trade, employment, road, energy, and water law. 
 Civil law largely retained its normative core, but there was a shift in the 
administration of justice and jurisprudence to communal thinking, and a curtailment of 
rights in favor of duties.  However, marriage law and family law underwent legislative 
modification.  The National Socialist state enacted changes in the law of adoption and in 
the procedures for contesting legitimacy.  On September 15, 1935, the Blood Protection 
Law was passed forbidding marriage and sexual relations between Jews and non-Jews 
under the pretext that this constituted “racial pollution,” outlawing the employment of 
non-Jewish domestic help by Jews, and barring Jews from flying the national colors.   
 Labor laws also departed from the existing Civil Code.  Following the dissolution 
of the unions, the establishment of the German Labor Front, and the abolition of 
collective bargaining, employees and employers were oriented toward the “common 
benefit of the people and the state,” and interpreting the employment relationship as a 
“communal relationship.”  Strikes were outlawed, wages frozen, and the right to freely 
choose one’s job during the war was prohibited. 
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 Nazi leadership broadened the powers of management in business law, while 
changes in social law limited public welfare as the regime tried to rid themselves of 
“useless” social welfare recipients through euthanasia and deportations to concentration 
camps.  The Tax Amending Law of October 16, 1934, prescribed that the norms of tax 
law be interpreted in accordance with National Socialist ideology, leading to 
impediments for organizations disliked by the Nazis.  Jewish clubs of all types, hospitals, 
old age homes, ecclesiastical foundations, religious orders, and other ideologically 
significant institutions, had their tax-exempt status revoked.  Tax evasion was considered 
to be “treason against the national community.” 
 From the beginning, the National Socialists recognized the political usefulness of 
the criminal law and acted correspondingly.  They used criminal law to intimidate 
opponents and suppress groups, to create fear among their own supporters, and to 
formulate an attachment to the “national community” by criminalizing visible victims, 
i.e. those murdered during the “night of the long knives,” communists and Jews.  The 
Nazis erected a system of penal controls and oppression in which traditional criminal and 
trial law, gradually reshaped, assumed an important role.  It was buttressed by expansive 
criminal statutes, the police, special powers granted to the party, and the Shutzstaffel.  
After 1933, a crime was no longer seen as the violation of a legally protected interest but 
as a breach of duty, while punishment was imposed not for an offense but for the 
perpetrator’s willingness to commit the act.  The range and severity of punishment was 
expanded, and the idea of deterrence and protection of the nation took precedence over 
rehabilitation.  The procedural position of the prosecutor was strengthened, the rights of 
defense counsel were curtailed, the appeal process shortened, and the powers of the 
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police and Gestapo were increased.  The Nazis implemented these changes by passing 
specific legislation, and by guiding the interpretation of existing laws. 
 A survey of the developments in the various areas of National Socialist law 
clearly indicate that just as there was no separate National Socialist history, there was 
also no National Socialist legal philosophy or theory.
186
  Point 19 of the Nazi party 
program, “We demand that Roman law, which serves a materialist world order, be 




The Parteigerichte or Nazi Party Courts 
 Prior to concluding this discussion on the German court system and its applicable 
laws under the Nazi regime, I feel it imperative to consider one additional court in 
existence during Hitler’s ascension and dictatorship, the Parteigerichte, or party courts.  
 The National Socialist German Workers’ Party was a mass political organization 
that possessed its own conflicts and disruptions, particularly during the party’s rise to 
power in the Weimar Republic.  Adolf Hitler, as the party’s leader, employed a variety of 
techniques for handling strife within the movement.  The official mechanism for 
confronting this internal turmoil, the party’s judiciary, was composed of the 
Parteigerichte, initially created by Hitler in July of 1921.  Although the Nazi party has 
been characterized as an absolutely totalitarian movement, within the party, it was 
democratic and liberal with respect to the system it established to afford its members an 
opportunity to defend themselves against accusations by other members and as a means 
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for recourse against unjust actions by party leaders.  These courts provided due process 
and appellate opportunities for all National Socialists, operating according to strict 
investigation and trial procedures.  Notwithstanding the presence of proper procedures 
there remained no guarantee that these courts would rule fairly or equitably.  They were 
instruments of control that were designed to manage or suppress conflict, where 
necessary, to the advantage of Hitler and the party’s leaders.  However, Hitler never 
hesitated to ignore the rulings of the Parteigerichte if they disagreed with his own 
predilections. 
 The party courts also offered advantages to the personal image of Hitler.  These 
tribunals were to stand above individual Nazis, even Hitler.  Nevertheless, these courts 
and their judges were not judicially independent; they were completely dominated by 
Hitler and his minions.  Under the authority of these judicial bodies, the Nazi leader was 
able to enforce decisions that were unpopular in the party while simultaneously 
maintaining anonymity.  The Parteigerichte enabled Hitler to avoid publically involving 
himself when he resolved differences among his subordinates or between party 
organizations.  Additionally, the Parteigerichte permitted Hitler to transform his own 
inclinations into binding party policy under the authority of institutions that appeared to 
transcend individuals.  This veiled power prevented his unpopular rulings from adversely 
affecting his greatest personal asset, his image as the unchallenged Führer of the Nazi 
party and subsequently, Germany.
188
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This chronicled overview has presented the status of the court system in 
Germany, as well as the applicable laws in advance of and subsequent to the Nazi seizure 
of prerogative in Germany.  It was from this posture that judicial independence and 
autonomy were completely and consciously abolished by Hitler and his henchmen. 
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Chapter IX:  The Volksgerichtshof (VGH), or People’s Court 
 The Volksgerichtshof, or People’s Court, was not constrained by statutes or 
precedent; it functioned as the arm of the Reich executive.  Law, as conceived by Hitler 
and his followers, was practiced in the People’s Court with the sole purpose of promoting 
the national and military aims of the Nazi government.  As a consequence, individual and 
institutional judicial independence and autonomy were concepts that could no longer be 
tolerated in Nazi Germany. 
The Third Reich used legal means to obstruct the course of justice and impose its 
own definitions of right and wrong within specific areas of the law.  In the hands of 
Hitler’s judiciary, the courts became a constructive weapon of the state and an instrument 
of terror.  The Volksgerichtshof or People’s Court was instituted by the Nazis as the court 
having exclusive jurisdiction in cases of treason, and this new judicial institution 
epitomized the use of the judicial branch by Hitler. 
 Reinforced with the German principle of Treu und Glauben, loyalty and good 
faith, the People’s Court attended to its treason cases with callousness and harshness.  It 
was the legal armament in Hitler’s struggle to cleanse the nation, performing this function 
through loyalty to country and its leader.
189
  “Those not with me are against me,”
190
 
became its motto.  In the People’s Court loyalty was defined whereby any doubting of 
authority became an act of treason, and pursuant to which it sentenced thousands of 
Germans and citizens of occupied countries to hard labor, imprisonment, and death.  The 
tenure of the People’s Court provides rebarbative documentation of the ease with which 
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an instrument of a state initially based upon the rule of law can be transformed into an 
apparatus of carnage and annihilation through its lack of judicial independence. 
 The People’s Court existed during the years of Nazi domination, from 1934 to 
1945, but was grounded in the Weimar Republic, when the judiciary became politicized 
and the precedent for denial of civil rights to an accused was established.  In 1922, The 
Law Protecting the Constitution broke for the first time the principle of nulla poena sine 
lege, no punishment without law.  The abrogation of this principle established the basis 
for a system of punishment without full legal protection which Hitler and his regime then 
extended to its ultimate conclusion. 
 Three main features in the country’s history determined the ascendancy of the 
People’s Court in German legal and political culture.  First, the conviction of a large 
portion of the German people, including Hitler and some of his opponents, that Germany 
had suffered defeat in World War I as a result of treason and revolution.  Front line 
soldiers had been betrayed by the rear echelon;
191
 Germany had been, “stabbed in the 
back.”
192
  This conviction, especially after 1939, that 1918 should not be replicated, 
shaped both the policy and the practice of the People’s Court.  Second, the Enabling Act 
of March 23, 1933, explicitly empowered the government to enact legislation deviating 
from the Weimar Constitution and to do so without the necessary sanction of the 
Reichstag.  The government was accordingly granting legislative power which Hitler 
expeditiously engrossed.  Third, the final formative element in the history of the People’s 
Court was the Führerprinzip, or leadership principle, the acceptance of the absolute 
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authority of the leader.  Unquestioned loyalty was demanded, presupposed, and applied 
with great rigor in the senates,
193
 or judicial panels,
194
 of the People’s Court.  Roland 
Freisler, the President of the People’s Court in its most fanatical years, applied the 
leadership principle with pernicious and lethal injustice.
195
 
 The most decisive event in the establishment of the People’s Court was the 
Reichstag fire of February 27, 1933.  As a consequence, basic rights contained in the 
Weimar Constitution were suspended, including,
196
 “the liberty of the person, the 
inviolability of one’s dwelling, the secrecy of the mail, the right of free opinion and 
assembly, the right to form associations and the inviolability of personal property.”
197
  
Additionally, the death sentence could now be imposed for offenses that were previously 
punishable only by imprisonment,
198
 notably in cases of high treason, Hochverrat, or 
planning to overthrow the government and Landesverrat, or treason to country, helping 
other countries to defeat the German government.
199
 
 In the trial of those accused of having set fire to the Reichstag, it was presumed 
that a young Dutch Communist, Marinus van der Lubbe, could not have set fire to the 
Reichstag alone, but must have had accomplices.  Along with van der Lubbe, Ernst 
Torgler, from the German Communist Party, Georgi Dimitroff, the head of the Western 
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European Office of the Comintern, and two of Dimitroff’s Bulgarian associates were 
indicted.  For Hitler and the Nazis, the trial proved to be very embarrassing.  On 
December 23, 1933, all defendants but van der Lubbe were acquitted.  These verdicts 
thus manifesting that the Supreme Court of the Reich, the Reichsgericht, still retained its 
integrity and judicial independence, and had not been influenced by Nazi propaganda and 
pressure. 
 Nazi criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision followed expeditiously, 
denouncing the judgment as plainly faulty.  At party and cabinet levels, thoughts 
precipitated regarding the need for a special court which would deal exclusively with 
cases of treason.  At a cabinet meeting on March 23, 1934, Hitler, Minister of the 
Interior, Dr. Wilhelm Frick, Reich Minister of Justice, Franz Gürtner, Göring and 
Minister Without Portfolio, Ernst Röhm, agreed that trials for Hochverrat and 
Landesverrat should be within the jurisdiction of a special People’s Court.  According to 
them, the court should consist of two professional and three lay judges.  It was also 
decided that the Reichsgericht, Germany’s final appellate court, should no longer have 
jurisdiction in matters of treason.  On April 24, 1934, the People’s Court was formally 
founded.  Subsequently, the editor-in-chief of the Völkischer Beobachter, the National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party newspaper, Wilhelm Weiss, commented:
200
 
For good reasons the National Socialist state, after the 
seizure of power, has created a special court for the trial of 
the most serious crimes that exist in political matters.  
Whoever is familiar with the sentencing policy of German 
courts especially before the NSDAP seizure of power can 
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fully appreciate the necessity for such a court of law.  One 
could object by saying that before 30 January 1933 high 
treason and Landesverrat were matters for the 
Reichsgericht in Leipzig.  The trials which were pending or 
dealt with there could not lead to a satisfactory solution in 
the National Socialist sense, because the Reichsgericht in 
its work and tendency was dependent on the general 
political and spiritual basic attitude which dominated in the 
democratic state of Weimar.  Any trial for treason in 
Leipzig was as a rule an affair which led to confrontations 
in parliament and produced a shameless agitation by the 
gutter press against all who made a modest attempt to 
protect the Reich at least from the most blatant acts of 
treason. 
 The legal uncertainty which dominated before the 
National Socialist seizure of power is furthermore evidence 
of the fact that a state cannot be protected solely by the 
letter of the law, if the law is not in accord with a clear 
political idea.  In this sense then the Volksgerichtshof for 
the German Reich is an organic creation of the National 
Socialist state.  It is a form of expression of National 





 Pursuant to the law founding the People’s Court, Berlin was specified as its seat.  
It was to have five judges; however, as stated, only the presiding judge and one assistant 
judge needed to be professional judges; the three lay judges were to be appointed on an 
honorary basis and were not required to have formal legal training.  All appointments 
were to be for a period of five years, with nominations offered by the Minister of Justice 
and subject to confirmation by the Chancellor.  No judge could reject his appointment to 
the People’s Court. 
 The president of the People’s Court was to divide the court into separate senates, 
distribute the cases between the senates, and staff them with professional and lay judges.  
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Later decrees empowered the president of the People’s Court to convene sessions in other 
parts of Germany, and to emphasize the importance and significance of the court; all 
judges were to wear red robes, a privilege previously accorded only to the judges of the 
Reichsgericht.   
 On July 14, 1934, the People’s Court was formally opened and the first sessions 
were held on August 1, 1934.  A new law enacted on April 16, 1936, amended the term 
of the professional judges from five years to life and required them to be at least 35 years 
of age; however, the term of the honorary lay judges was not modified. 
 Within the Ministry of Justice, Secretary of State, Roland Freisler repeatedly 
published the need to alter basic attitudes within the German judiciary.  He advocated 
replacing the then current legal perspectives with Nazi concepts of law, incorporating 
their defined principles and accentuating that the responsibility for decision-making 
should be derived from the leadership principle to inform every judicial decision.  
Freisler also illuminated the speed and efficiency with which the People’s Court was 
functioning, and stressed the benefits accruing from the imposed limitation that its 
sentences were non-appealable.  It was truly a court of first and last instance. 
 The first president of the People’s Court was Dr. Fritz Rehn, who died on 
September 18, 1934.  Until June 1, 1936, the office of president remained vacant, when 
Dr. Otto Georg Thierack was appointed president of the People’s Court.  Judicially, 
Thierack did not hesitate to abandon legal procedure and act with brutality in the pursuit 
of his own personal ambitions. 
 Lay judges were appointed from the higher officials within the Nazi Party and 
officers of the three services of the Wehrmacht.  It was thought desirable that these lay 
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judges should possess expert knowledge and experience in dealing with subversive 
attacks directed against the state or any of its various institutions.  The number of lay 
judges on the People’s Court considerably exceeded the number of professional judges. 
 Nazi criminal justice classified the political criminal among the lowest category 
of criminals.  Political criminality was a new concept in German criminal justice, but 
such an individual was the enemy whose political aims and ideological principles were in 
direct opposition to the Nazi philosophy, the regime, and by definition, to Germany as a 
whole.
202
  Freisler emphasized that it was the task of the judiciary to “secure formally and 
irrevocably the guarantee of the National Socialist revolution and evolution.”
203
  He 
placed importance on close cooperation between the prosecutor’s office and the agencies 
of the Nazi Party.  His aim, for which the People’s Court was to serve as a model, was to 
punish quickly and sharply.
204
  “Within 24 hours the indictment must be drawn up, within 
24 hours the sentence must be passed, to be carried out immediately . . . the time for 
extenuating circumstances is past.”
205
  In his Reichstag speech of March 23, 1933, Hitler 
stated, “Not the individual, but the Volk, should be the centre of legal concern.  Landes-
und Hochverrat must henceforth be expurgated ruthlessly.”
206
  The People’s Court took 
this admonishment fervently and zealously. 
 The legal basis upon which the People’s Court operated was the existing penal 
code, interpretations therefrom, laws enacted as a result of the Enabling Act, and further 
extensions of the penal code through Führerbefehle, or Führer’s orders.  Provisions 
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defining high treason were delineated in the penal code and defined as an action 
attempting to change the Constitution or territory of one of the federal states.  Also 
enumerated was the crime of conspiracy to commit high treason, denoted as cases in 
which individuals planned to commit high treason but did not have the opportunity to 
conduct the activity.  Preparation for high treason was also a punishable offense.  
Through 1933, the available sentences for these offenses were hard labor, imprisonment, 
and confiscation of property; after 1933, these crimes became punishable by death. 
 Landesverrat was committed when a German, acting in concert with a foreign 
power, tried to damage the interests of Germany through
207
 “the destruction or sabotage 
of war matériel, fortresses or means of communication, the recruitment of Germans for 
enemy powers, incitement to desertion, spying or supporting spies, betrayal of 
operational plans or the plans of fortresses and . . . incitement to mutiny in Germany’s 
armed forces.”
208
  These prohibitions applied to both Germans and to foreigners residing 
in Germany, and equally as well to actions by Germans against their country when 
abroad.  Threatening to commit treason was punished as gravely as having committed an 
act of treason, and admission of mitigating circumstances into evidence was proscribed.  
Treason was the lowest form of criminality and the alleged perpetrator of such a crime, if 
not sentenced to death, could be detained without time limitation. 
 Jurisdiction of the People’s Court was restricted to cases of treason and to those 
offenses listed in the Decree for the Protection of the German People and State of 
February 28, 1933.  However, the scope of the jurisdiction of the People’s Court was not 
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exclusive, and certain trials for treason, particularly for preparation of treason, could be 
heard by the next lower court, the Oberlandesgericht, in order to avoid overburdening the 
People’s Court.  In time, the jurisdiction of the People’s Court was expanded as the 
definition of treasonous activities was enlarged.  Germany’s territorial augmentation 
between 1936 and 1939 also extended the area of operation for the People’s Court, as 
averred treasonous actions committed by non-Germans were now within the purview of 
the People’s Court.   
 The People’s Court considered itself as a political court, and no attempt was made 
to conceal this bias or its lack of judicial independence.  Nevertheless, with Dr. Otto 
Georg Thierack’s appointment as President of the People’s Court on June 1, 1936, this 
political inclination of the court increased as he espoused the view that judges should take 
as their guidance the principles advanced by Nazi leadership, and only on that basis 
should justice be imposed.  Protecting the security of the Third Reich and of the Nazi 




In no other court as in the VGH is it so clearly apparent that 
the application of the law of the highest political court must 
be in accord with the leadership of the state.  Therefore it 
will, for the most part, fall to you to lead the judges into 
this direction.  You must therefore look at every indictment 
and recognize where it is necessary in confidential and 
convincing consultation to convince the judges concerned 
what is essential for the state.  I want to emphasise again, 
that this must take place in a manner which convinces and 
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 To elaborate on the political predisposition of the People’s Court, close 
collaboration was established between the Ministry of Justice, state prosecutors, and the 
Judges of the People’s Court on the one hand and the Gestapo on the other.  On June 13, 
1936, the principal officers of each organization met in Berlin to discuss issues associated 
with acts of treason.  Mutual agreement was reached regarding the necessity for 
cooperation between the judiciary and the Gestapo, with a regular exchange of treason 
files between the Gestapo, prosecutors, and the investigating judges of the People’s Court 
then being instituted. 
 The Nazi regime was determined to consolidate its position and not to permit its 
power and authority to be usurped.  Therefore, virtually any action against the state or the 
Nazi Party was defined as high treason.  Thus, any form of political organization or 
activity, other than the Nazis, was deemed to be committing high treason, as was an 
attempt to infiltrate the army and police forces.  Any production or publication of 
materials directed against the Nazi Party and state, or listening to illegal radio 
broadcasting stations were also treasonous actions.  Additionally, the penal code 
stipulated that anyone who knew of treasonable activities or their preparation and failed 
to report them was guilty of either high treason or Landesverrat. 
 Until 1936, the People’s Court was disposed to sentence individuals relatively 
mildly, while applying existing law broadly and with flexibility.  Upon Thierack’s 
appointment as president on June 1, 1936, sentences decidedly became more severe.  In 
contrast to the war years, during its early years, the sentences of the People’s Court were 
not widely publicized, and were confined to legal journals and Nazi Party leadership 
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personnel.  The population at large was not aware of the People’s Court,
211
 and Hitler 
was still reluctant to apply with full fervor and vigor his maxim of, “He who is not for 
me, is against me.”
212
 
 At no stage of the dictatorship did Nazi principles ever produce a fully coherent 
ideology; old concepts continued to exist, though in the course of twelve years many of 
them were eroded and deprived of their original essence.  The civil and criminal law 
codes remained intact although the penal laws were amended and penalties for violations 
increased to serve the regime’s objectives.  Freisler and other members of the judiciary 
persisted in believing in the fictions of the Rechtsstaat:  that Germany continued to be a 
state based on the rule of law. 
 Volk, race, and blood had become the foundations of the Nazi Rechtsstaat and the 
previously acknowledged principles of justice subordinated to Nazi postulations, 
whatever they may be.  From 1934, until his appointment as President of the People’s 
Court on August 20, 1942,
213
 Freisler profusely published articles and commentaries on 
the state of the law under the Nazi regime.  For Freisler there was no place in his concept 
of state and justice for the separation of powers.  He considered this as an obsolete legacy 
from the past, of a time of distrust between the people and their political leadership.  
Under Nazi leadership, this suspicion had been overcome; as such, there was no longer 
any need for the separation of powers. 
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 Freisler declared that what was specifically fundamental to the Nazi state was the 
premise that the judiciary and lawyers must not be constrained by any notion of a static 
natural law.  In order to secure Volk and state, law must always be organic and 
developing, adaptable to changing circumstances, and at all times maintaining the vitality 
of Volk and state, while protecting their interests.  Law was thus no longer a normative, 
but an instrument of political expediency.  Therefore, people residing in lands under 
German domination, particularly those in the east, may continue to live under their own 
laws provided they corresponded to Germany’s interests, so Freisler argued.  Special 
legislation would administer the law for
214
 “inferior races such as Jews and Poles,”
215
 
though not to dispense justice, but to assert Germany’s superior dominance and to ensure 
its racial purity.  Freisler’s concept of state was based upon force expressed and 
contained in political expediency, not on moral considerations. 
 Freisler placed prominence on the value of the Führerprinzip in the courtroom.  
At all times, it was the judge who should lead the trial, his leadership being more 
important than the files containing the evidence.  Likewise, Freisler demanded that judges 
give preference to the leading role of the judge rather than to the law.  For Freisler, the 
greatest national security threat was posed by acts of high treason and Landesverrat and 
should be prosecuted to the fullest extent.  To him, these acts were of such magnitude that 
any consideration of their motivation was irrelevant.  In his view, the will and the 
intention were as dangerous as the actual crime, and should be punished with equal force. 
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 Freisler’s writing career was focused upon establishing the People’s Court at the 
apex of the judiciary and thereby replace the Reichsgericht in the process.  Using the 
Führerprinzip, it was to be the judge’s task, along with the prosecution, to ensure that all 
trials would proceed quickly and thoroughly.  The presiding judge was to lead and 
decide; fellow professional and lay judges could advise but not decide, as responsibility 
rests with the presiding judge alone.  From the judges of the People’s Court to the most 
unpretentious lawyer, everyone was to be,
216
 “a Soldier of the Law.”
217
 
 According to Freisler, the judiciary’s role was not to be a supervisor of the 
executive, but a faithful follower of the leadership, as the principle of the separation of 
powers no longer existed, distrust having been overcome by the Führer and the Nazi 
Party and replaced,
218
 “by the healthy unity of the Volk.”
219
 
 The most consequential of all of Freisler’s missives was the implicit negation of 
the independence of the judiciary.  In Freisler’s view, within the context of the Nazi 
regime, the independence of the judiciary had become archaic.  Judicial independence 
had to be ignored as much as individual rights within the regime, as Nazism derived its 
strength and purpose from the Volk.  It was not the responsibility of the judges to make 
the law; this was the task of the Volk represented within the regime and led by the 
Führer.  The judiciary’s function was to apply the law in the interest of the Volk, not for 
the benefit of the individual.  Judicial officers were to subordinate themselves to the 
totalitarian will of the Nazi regime.  In territories returned to Germany by appeasement, 
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i.e., annexation, or occupation, the role of the judiciary was the same as that within 
Germany,
220
 “Harshness against the enemy of the Volk means the well-being of the 
Volk.”
221
   
 As a result of the previously discussed June 13, 1936, Berlin meeting, there 
existed already a large degree of cooperation between the judiciary and the Gestapo.  
During 1939, the number of cases increased in which individuals acquitted by the 
People’s Court, as hereinafter detailed, were then re-arrested by the Gestapo and interned 
in concentration camps.  On July 29, 1939, Ernst Lautz, one of the chief prosecutors of 
the People’s Court wrote to the Reich Minister of Justice, Franz Gürtner:
222
 
I have discussed with the president of the VGH the issue of 
whether people accused of activities hostile to the state 
should be handed over to the Gestapo when their arrest can 
no longer be maintained by the VGH.  Until further order I 
shall proceed in future as follows:  in agreement with the 
president of the VGH, when acquittal has occurred, or the 
sentence is already covered by the period which the 
accused has spent remanded in custody, I shall in principle 
hand over such persons to the Gestapo except when the 
Gestapo has expressly stated it is unnecessary to do so.  If 
an acquittal, because of proven innocence, is likely to 
occur, I shall ask the Gestapo whether a transfer is required 
or not.  Should the Gestapo declare that it would be 





Not only was this action illegal, it was also a complete capitulation of the judiciary to the 
Nazi regime. 
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 By the end of 1941, the People’s Court consisted of six senates, the first of which 
was presided over by the president of the Court, Dr. Otto Georg Thierack.  In total, these 
six senates were comprised of 78 professional judges and 74 prosecutors.  All but three 
judges and two prosecutors were members of the Nazi Party.  In addition, there were 81 
lay judges, 71 of which were officials within the Nazi Party, the remainder being 
Wehrmacht officers of the rank of colonel and above in the three services.  None of the 
Wehrmacht lay judges were Party members.
224
 
 Hitler had an inherent mistrust and expressed contempt of the legal profession,
225
 
which placed the judiciary in a position of constant criticism.  On May 31, 1942, Hitler 
opined that the relevant criteria in the selection of judges required fundamental change.  
In the future, only people who were at least 35 years of age, and had already proven 
themselves with extensive experience in practical life, who identified with Nazi Party 
views, and were aware of the problems associated with leadership, would be considered 
for judicial positions.  He also stated in a speech before the Reichstag’s last session on 
April 26, 1942, that he expected certain things:
226
 
That the nation gave me the right, wherever service 
is rendered less than unconditionally in the task which 
involves the question of to be or not to be, to intervene 
immediately and effectively.  Fighting forces and home 
front, transport administration and judiciary must 
subordinate themselves to one aim only, namely the 
obtaining of victory . . .  
 I therefore ask the German Reichstag for its express 
confirmation that I possess the legal right to force everyone 
to do his duty, or to punish anyone who in my view does 
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not fulfill his task conscientiously, by demotion or removal 
from office, without regard to who he is and what well-
earned rights he may possess . . . 
 Equally, I expect the German judiciary to 
understand that the nation does not exist for the judiciary 
but the judiciary for the nation, that is to say that the whole 
world, including Germany, is not to be blown to 
smithereens just in order that a formal law can exist, but 
that Germany must live on, however much the formalities 
of the judiciary may be in contradiction with this . . . This 
means that . . . from now on I shall intervene in . . . cases 
and remove judges who are obviously not aware of the 




 Hermann Göring, as President of the Reichstag, moved that such powers be 
granted.  These were prerogatives that Hitler already possessed, but with enactment 
became legal.  Hitler had thus formally preempted and supplanted the supreme judicial 
authority in Germany.  No Führerbefehle before, no matter the area, was any longer 
subject to question.  The Führerprinzip was preeminent and omnipotent.  As Goebbels 
stated on April 27, 1942,
228
 “. . . the Führer demanded absolute plenary powers during 
wartime for himself to do whatever he considered necessary, even with reference to 
individuals without having to take into consideration any so-called well-earned rights.  
This demand was approved enthusiastically and noisily by the Reichstag . . .”
229
 
 On August 20, 1942, it was agreed that Thierack was to become Minister of 
Justice and upon Hitler’s suggestion, Freisler was appointed President of the People’s 
Court.  As a result of these measures and actions, Hitler himself had now replaced the 
Rechtsstaat.  The German judiciary had ethically succumbed to the power of corruption 
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by allowing their independence to be appropriated, and had become completely 
subjugated to Hitler and the Nazi regime.  From 1942 until the war’s final conclusion, it 
was Hitler who controlled and administered what he considered to be justice with 
implementation through judges who were ideologically convinced Nazis.
230
 
 Freisler wrote on May 9, 1942,
231
 shortly after his appointment to the presidency 
of the People’s Court, “Well, someone is going to have to be the bloodhound.”
232
  In a 
letter from Thierack, as new Minister of Justice, to Freisler dated September 9, 1942, 
Thierack stated: 
. . . in this instance it moves me personally to hand over the 
Volksgerichtshof and its judges, a court which I have built 
up and led with joy. 
 In no other court than the VGH does it emerge so 
clearly that the administration of the law in the highest 
political court must be in accord with the leadership of the 
state.  It will be your main task to guide the judges in this 
direction.  You will have every indictment submitted to you 
and will recognize where it is necessary to underline to the 
judge concerned in confidential and convincing discussion 
what is essential for the state.  I must emphasise again that 
this must take place in a manner which convinces rather 
than orders judges . . . 
 In general, the judge of the VGH must become 
accustomed to seeing primarily the ideas and intentions of 
the leadership of the state while the human fate which 
depends on it is only secondary.  The accused before the 
VGH are only little figures of a much greater circle 
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 As the war approached, commenced, and then proceeded, the number of 




Year Total Number of 
Indictments 
Number of Indictments for High Treason and 
Landesverrat 
1939 341 340 
1940 598 595 
1941 690 684 
1942 1,084 1,069 
1943 1,327 1,324 
1944 2,120 2,115 
 
According to Thierack’s and Freisler’s own reports between 1937 and 1944, the People’s 
Court issued the following number of death sentences:
235
 







1937 618 32 422 52 
1938 614 17 393 54 
1939 470 36 388 40 
1940 1,096 53 954 80 
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1941 1,237 102 1,058 70 
1942 2,572 1,192 1,266 107 
1943 3,338 1,662 1,477 181 
1944 4,379 2,079 1,744 489 
236
 
 Within the six senates of the People’s Court that existed in 1942, the First Senate, 
led by the president of the Court, first Thierack and then Freisler, had the highest number 
of death sentences, in part because they drew the most important cases into their senates.  
In 1942, prior to Freisler becoming president, the First Senate imposed 649 death 
sentences out of a total number of 1,192; in 1943, under Freisler, of the total 1,662 death 
sentences ordered, Freisler’s senate passed 769; and, in 1944, of the 2,079 death 
sentences, the First Senate ordered 866.  Freisler aspired to comport himself according to 
his self-proclaimed title, “Bloodhound.” 
 In the fall of 1942, Thierack began authoring periodic circulars to all judges 
providing Nazi Party guidelines for the administration of justice.  These bulletins were all 
under the theme that the judiciary was to be reformed in accordance with the demands of 
the Führer, that judges should return to the Germanic leadership principle whereby the 
Chief was also the Supreme Judge, and that there was no longer any room for 
independence within the judicial ranks.  Thierack also communicated in his epistles that 
questions of clemency were within the exclusive purview of the Führer, greater control of 
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defense lawyers was required, and that “inferior peoples,” such as Poles and Jews, had no 
right to a proper trial in court since they were by definition “lawless.”
237
 
 Wehrkraftzersetzung, or undermining national defense, was the charge with which 
the People’s Court was most often confronted.  Next came the Nacht-und-Nebel, or night-
and-fog, trials emanating out of the Nacht-und-Nebel decree personally introduced by 
Hitler in December of 1941.  Under this decree, according to Hitler, any participant in a 
public disturbance or demonstration outside of Germany should be either sentenced to 
death in the German occupied country or deported to Germany.  The relatives of those 
transported to Germany were not to be notified of their relocation.  Wilhelm Keitel, the 




It is the long considered will of the Führer that in occupied 
territories attacks against the Reich or the occupying power 
should be met with measures other than those used hitherto.  
The Führer’s view is the following:  all prison and hard 
labour punishments for any such actions will be considered 
a sign of weakness.  An effective and long-lasting 
deterrence can only be achieved by the death sentence or by 
measures which keep the dependents of the criminal in 
uncertainty about his fate.  This purpose is served by 
deporting them to Germany.  The guidelines attached for 
the prosecution of such punishable acts are in accordance 
with the thinking of the Führer.  They have been examined 




 Keitel went on to state that anyone sentenced in occupied territories should be 
executed within 24 hours.  Additionally, no death sentences were to be imposed against 
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women, except for acts of murder and terrorism, that the Nacht-und-Nebel decree was not 
to apply to Germans or racial Germans within occupied territories, and that Jews were 
excluded from the operation of the decree, since they had previously been excluded from 
the application of judicial procedures and were subject only to the Schutzstaffel 
(“SS”),
240
 or Protection Squads of the Nazi Party,
241
 and the police. 
 All trials were to be held secretly and in a speedy manner.  Priests and clergymen 
were refused admission to the accused and an acquittal may not result in liberty, but 
subsequent detention by the Gestapo with transfer to a concentration camp.  Secrecy even 
continued beyond death as final letters were withheld and destroyed, although the registry 
offices were informed of each case and the names of the deceased entered into a death 
register.  Any notice or information concerning the death of the individual was to be 
concealed, except in cases where the Minister of Justice had given approval for release.  
Also, the press was not to be apprised. 
 The first Nacht-und-Nebel trials began in late August of 1942, and through the 
end of that year, over 1,000 cases had been submitted to the People’s Court for 
disposition.  Freisler transferred approximately 800 of these to other courts, while 
retaining the balance for trial before the People’s Court, mostly before his own First 
Senate.  Some cases involved hundreds of accused, the largest encompassing 360 
defendants.  In light of these large numbers, the trials often had to be conducted in the 
local Berlin prisons and sentences carried out in prisons in other areas of the Reich, as the 
local prisons could not fulfill the number of executions imposed.  No reliable figures are 
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available relative to the total number of Nacht-und-Nebel cases tried before the People’s 
Court, but they involved mostly French, Belgian, Dutch and Norwegian nationals.  Only 
after the Allied invasion of France in June of 1944 did Hitler issue an order suspending 
all Nacht-und-Nebel prosecutions, with defendants awaiting trial being remanded to the 
Gestapo for transfer to concentration camps where those individuals who were 
considered dangerous were soon liquidated.  The particularly inhumane character of the 
Nacht-und-Nebel decree arose from the secrecy surrounding the cases.  Dependents never 
knew if the arrested family member had survived, and from the practice, already 
applicable to German citizens, if an acquitted defendant was remanded to the custody of 
the Gestapo and the concentration camp system. 
 In 1942, Josef Goebbels spoke to the members of the People’s Court, initially 
stating that his remarks had been previously approved by the Führer.  He insisted that 
when making a decision, the judge had to take as his frame of reference not the law, but 
the basic principle that the accused must be expelled from the Volks community.  In 
wartime, it was not important if a judgment was just or unjust; all that was necessary was 
that it fulfilled its purpose.  The state was required to defend itself in the most effective 
manner against its internal enemies through their extermination. 
 Goebbels then referenced the Jews, asserting that they should be denied from 
employing German legal remedies, from German law, and of any right to appeal official 
measures taken against them.  On April 21, 1943, it was formally decreed that the Penal 
Code for Poles and Jews no longer applied to Jews; they were now beyond the pale of the 
law and, therefore, outside the protection and assistance of any laws. 
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 In February of 1943, a ruling was issued that in cases before the People’s Court 
involving citizens of occupied states; it was within judicial discretion whether the 
defendant could be represented by defense counsel.  Cases also arose in which Heinrich 
Himmler did not consider it to be within the public interest to have the matter tried before 
any tribunal, including the People’s Court, and simply ordered that the individuals 
concerned be shot. 
 Freisler, like his predecessor Thierack, reserved all potentially important matters 
for himself, including the discretion to decide which cases of high treason and 
Landesverrat should be tried before the First Senate.  As a result of the July 20, 1944, 
bomb plot against the life of Adolf Hitler, the jurisdiction of the People’s Court was 
further expanded whereby all political crimes of all Germans, including members of the 
Wehrmacht, SS, and police, tending to damage confidence in the political and military 
leadership of the Reich were to be tried by the People’s Court or, if necessary, by special 
courts.  It was then within the discretion of the Ministry of Justice to decide whether the 
case should proceed before the People’s Court or a special court.  Once this 
determination was reached, the Führer resolved whether the accused would be “released” 
from the Wehrmacht, SS, police, or expelled from the party and transferred to the civil 
judiciary for trial.   
 On November 16, 1943, Melitta Wiedemann, editor of Die Aktion, Kampfblatt für 
das neue Europe, addressed a correspondence to Minister of Justice Thierack in which 
she criticized Freisler, referencing their former talks and then proceeding to say:
242
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 Our former talk has remained in my memory, and 
not only the part about which I had actually to report, 
because you provided logical and psychologically effective 
reasons which are suited to make the harshness of our laws 
understandable to the broadest circles of the population, 
and even abroad. 
 Unfortunately, by accident I have heard from a 
number of very superior witnesses comments which 
expressed great concern about the law and that at the VGH 
(First Senate) a series of trials is being conducted which 
shows no evidence of awareness of the necessity for 
psychological and propagandistic understanding . . .  
 Instead, the presiding judge was so hard, unjust and 
unfriendly towards the accused, that he was obviously 
endeavouring to obstruct the man in his defence, although 
he was as good as sentenced to death already, while he 
openly courted the witnesses. 
 As the propaganda campaign just started proves, the 
mood of the German people is considered particularly 
important.  Therefore it is important to reshape VGH 
trials...[so] that the public is confronted by matter-of-
factness, a humane treatment of the accused, so the 
conviction reigns supreme [and people will understand 
that] the subsequent harsh judgment has been necessary in 





 Freisler’s temperamental outbursts have been recorded on film.  His demeanor to 
those who appeared before him depended upon their attitude; attempts to belittle or deny 
what Freisler considered to be obvious crimes were met with his malevolence and 
maliciousness.  Those defendants who affirmed their actions received a more 
dispassionate jurist; however, nothing may have influenced the final resolution. 
 Freisler’s reputation began to suffer during the summer of 1944.  Lay judges in 
increasing numbers began producing medical certificates excusing them from attending 
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sessions of the People’s Court.  Freisler was also ridiculed due to his inability to 
adequately define “defeatism;” he could explain it only by reference to several practical 
examples, and concerning his view that a phrase in the Penal Code that the defendant 
“can” be punished mildly, means that he should “not” be punished mildly.  However, 
Freisler’s greatest personal forum was yet to come, that being provided through the series 
of trials of the July 20, 1944, conspirators,
244
 presided over by Freisler until his death on 
February 3, 1945. 
 Freisler’s objective in dealing with those individuals indicted in the July 20, 1944, 
plot on Hitler’s life was to keep strictly to the charges themselves, allowing the 
defendants and their defense counsel to speak only relative to the crimes alleged, and 
preventing them from making any statements in court regarding their objectives and 
personal moral motivations for acting.  Hitler had ordered trials that excluded the general  
public, only admitting to the gallery a selective but large group of spectators.  Most of the 
accused in the first trials were members of the armed forces and by law were subject to 
the military judiciary.  To circumvent this restriction, Hitler created a Military Court of 
Honour; this court then proceeded to expel all of the accused defendants of the armed 
services from the Wehrmacht and thereby subject them to the jurisdiction of the civil 
courts, in these instances, the People’s Court and Freisler. 
 On August 7, 1944, the first of the trials commenced before Freisler and the First 
Senate of the People’s Court.  As the original building housing the People’s Court had 
been damaged by bombs, the trials were held in the Berlin Chamber Court.  The public 
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gallery was always filled to capacity with its invited guests, including journalists and film 
crews; therefore, though closed to the general citizenry, the public nevertheless 
participated through press reports and community conversations. 
 Freisler conducted himself during the trials not only as a judge whose task, in 
German judicial procedure, was to obtain the truth, but as someone determined to destroy 
evil within the regime and society.  Particular mention is made of Defendants, Peter Graf 
Yorck von Wartenburg and Fritz-Dietlof Graf von Schulenberg, who, undeterred by 
Freisler’s acerbic and caustic comments, managed to present their deeply held 
motivations and acknowledged, without reservation, what each had undertaken in the 
conspiracy, desiring only to save Germany from utter misery. 
 During the trial on February 3, 1945, of one of the conspirators, Schlabrendorff, 
the proceedings were interrupted by an Allied air raid in the course of which Freisler was 
killed.  He was buried in a simple ceremony as Hitler had objected to a state funeral.  His 
service was attended only by his wife, a few colleagues from the People’s Court, a 
representative of the Ministry of Justice, and a few Nazi Party officials, with his obituary 
appearing in the last issue of German Justice on February 16, 1945. 
 The trials following the July 20, 1944, plot against Hitler constituted the climax in 
the development of the People’s Court.  From the latter half of 1944 onward, billboards 
throughout Germany contained new posters, pink in color, headed “Im Namen des 
Volkes,” announcing death sentences for defeatism, listening to foreign broadcasting 
stations, plundering after air raids, and for thefts of postal packages destined for soldiers 
at the front, but the trials associated with the July 20, 1944, plot were the culmination for 
the People’s Court. 
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 Between 1937 and 1941, the People’s Court imposed 240 death sentences, one-
sixth of all the death sentences ordered by the German judiciary during this period.  The 
trend toward the increased mandating of death sentences had been introduced by 
Thierack and heightened by Freisler upon his assumption of the Presidency.  This was at 
a time when the tide of war was turning against Germany; the radicalization of the 
judiciary kept pace with the negative progression of the German war effort, the latter 
being the driving force not only for the People’s Court, but also of the military judiciary. 
 Freisler was a fanatical Nazi and for him the judge was Führer; he led his 
professional and lay judges, discussing cases with them prior to the actual trials, in many 
instances thereby prejudging cases he was about to convene.  He had prejudices against 
Roman Catholic clergy and Jews and was asked to deliver judgments on practical 
political issues which the Third Reich expected and whose deterrent value would be 
comprehended by the German citizens. 
 During a trial the most egregious offense a defendant could commit was to 
attempt to extricate himself out of the charge, especially if the case and the accused’s 
guilt were incontrovertible.  Freisler had stated prior to his appointment, what he deemed 
paramount, i.e., the defendant’s frame of mind, to intend to commit a crime was 
tantamount to actual perpetration.  He believed in Hitler, the Nazi Party and Germany, 
defending them until his death. 
 Under pressure from Hitler, who had preempted the right to convert any sentence 
into a death sentence, the People’s Court decreed death sentences in greater numbers.  
Within Germany, the Court was considered an instrumentality to avoid defeat and 
achieve “final victory.”  It has been calculated that the People’s Court ordered 12,891 
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death sentences between 1934 and 1944; however, this figure can never be conclusively 
verified.  One can state that the number of death sentences passed by the Court before the 
war was low, that they increased with the outbreak of fighting, and accelerated rapidly as 
the war turned against Germany.
245
  Comparison of yearly percentage totals of death 
sentences imposed to acquittals granted substantiates this enhanced harshness:
246
 
Year Death Sentences Acquittals 
1940 4.8% 7.3% 
1941 8.2% 5.4% 
1942 46.3% 4.7% 
1943 49.8% 5.4% 
1944 47.4% 11.7% 
 
 The rise in death sentences from 1942 onward can be attributed to the Nacht-und-
Nebel cases and the July 20, 1944, plot.  Customarily, each sentence of death passed by 
the People’s Court required Hitler’s assent, but this practice changed during the war when 
Hitler, informed that over 900 individuals awaiting capital punishment were still in 
prison, empowered Thierack to order immediate executions in all cases that he 
considered to be without doubt. 
 After Freisler’s death, and as Allied air raids kept interrupting trials, on April 24, 
1945, the People’s Court was relocated once again, on this occasion from Potsdam to 
Bayreuth, but no further trials were conducted.  The Court was formally dissolved on 
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October 20, 1945, by Proclamation No. 3 of the Allied Control Council for Germany; 
thereby, this instrument of terror within the Nazi regime legally ceased to exist.  
However, Germany has retained the legacy of the People’s Court, in so much as the 
institution and its members were never fully indicted by the Nuremberg War Trials.  On 
January 25, 1985, the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany did, by unanimous 
vote, declare all judgments entered by the People’s Court to be null and void.
247
  
Subsequently, on Tuesday, September 8, 2009, a unified German parliament unanimously 
passed, once again, legislation overturning Nazi-era verdicts convicting people of 
treason, nearly 65 years after the end of the Second World War.  Justice Minister Brigitte 
Zypries stated, “By rehabilitating all so-called war traitors, we restore the honor and 
dignity of a long forgotten group of victims of the Nazi justice system.”  Some members 
of parliament had initially been opposed to the blanket measure overturning the 
convictions, contending that some of those sentenced may have harmed their comrades in 
arms, but acquiesced when it was concluded that it was impossible to determine if the 
acts for which people were sentenced actually harmed others.  Justice Minister Zypries 
asserted that, “Even if not all of those who were sentenced to death as war traitors were 
political resistance fighters, they definitely all were victims of a criminal justice system 
that killed in order to maintain the Nazi regime.”
248
  These acts constituted a potentially 
dangerous precedent relative to the separation of powers in a democracy.  
Constitutionally, the Bundestag and parliament were allowed only to request judicial 
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review of all judgments entered by the People’s Court and decide each separately, an 
extremely onerous request and task.
249
 
 Societies, governments, and countries cannot expunge themselves of their pasts.  
The record that evolved from 1934 to 1945 is historical, a chronicle of the barbarism of 
the Nazi regime, of the lack of judicial independence and autonomy that existed 
thereunder, and that will in infamy forever speak for itself, regardless of legislative or 
judicial activity, remorse, and contrition. 
 With the formal abrogation of the People’s Court, three components that marked 
its origin, development, and actions also came to their definitive resolution:  the stab in 
the back myth; the Enabling Act which empowered the regime to enact laws deviating 
from the Constitution and without legislative approval; and, the Führerprinzip.
250
  All 
that remains are the vestiges of its reprehensible ignominy in failing to take account of 
individual defendants and the collective identification of groups of “criminals,” such as 
Jews, gypsies, and other minorities, hopelessly caught in the machinery of what was then 
termed law and justice.  This legal apparatus brutalized human beings through ideology, 
turning functionaries into instruments of this dogma, thereby sacrificing their 
individuality and judicial independence and autonomy to the cause, identifying with the 
cause, and existing only for its ends without consideration of the means.  Subordinates 
within this political labyrinth had no reason for being other than to ruthlessly and 
remorselessly enslave, persecute, and exterminate people who did have other motives and 
justifications for their respective actions. 
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Chapter X:  Dr. Roland Freisler, President of the People’s Court 
 The President of the People’s Court, Roland Freisler, was an early zealot of the 
Nazi movement.  He deployed a keen intellect and an unshakable dedication to Hitler in 
the perversion of justice that was extreme even the by standards of the Third Reich.
251
  In 
Freisler, Hitler found an eager and implacable collaborator in his drive to subordinate the 
judiciary to his will.  Freisler readily abandoned his individual judicial independence and 
autonomy in his yearning to cooperate with the regime. 
Roland Freisler died on Saturday, February 3, 1945, at the scene of his misdeeds.  
He was killed during an Allied air raid while leaving his courtroom and seeking the 
safety of a bomb shelter.  Freisler died less than 24 hours after passing his last death 
sentence and only a few hours before he would have ordered his next execution.  On 
February 2, 1945, Freisler had imposed death sentences on Klaus Bonhoeffer, brother of 
Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and on Rüdinger Schleicher, a senior official in the Reich 
Aviation Ministry; both men had been found guilty of complicity in the attempted 
assassination plot of July 20, 1944, on the life of Adolf Hitler. 
 Roland Freisler’s sudden death received only a meager acknowledgment in the 
Nazi Party newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter, or National Observer, stating simply 
that the President of the People’s Court, Dr. Roland Freisler, had been killed during an air 
raid on Berlin.
252
  The Reich Ministry of Justice had issued a press notice reading, 
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“Newspapers are to refrain from commenting on or making their own additions to the 
foregoing report.”
253
   
 Freisler was not a popular man; he was feared and hated.  Hitler considered him to 
be an ignoble sycophant, yet it was only by serving the Führer that Freisler could achieve 
the authority he desired.  The Nazi regime afforded him the opportunity to act as lord 
over life and death.  His cruel and evil cunning lay in the humiliation of the accused; he 
sought to destroy the dignity of his victims. 
 By August 20, 1942, the date of Freisler’s appointment as President of the 
People’s Court, justice had already given way to openly arbitrary judicial decisions.
254
  
After his appointment, Freisler wrote to Hitler that, “the People’s Court will always 




 Freisler was born on October 30, 1893, and baptized in the reformed Protestant 
faith on December 13, 1893, in Celle, Lower Saxony, the city of his birth.  Two years 
later his brother, Oswald, was born.  Their father, Julius Freisler, who was originally 
from Moravia, moved to Germany where he married Charlotte Auguste Florentine 
Schwerdtfeger in Celle.  In December of 1893, the family moved to Hanover and then 
Hamelin, where Roland’s brother, Oswald, was born.
256
  In 1901, Julius Freisler, an 
engineer, was offered a professorship at the Royal College of Building in Aachen, which 
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 In 1903, at the age of ten, Roland Freisler entered Kaiser Wilhelm grammar 
school.  He subsequently established a reputation for academic exactitude and a 
willingness to engage in debate.  In the autumn of 1908, the family settled in Kassel, 
Hesse, where in 1912, Roland Freisler took his Abitur,
258
 the high school certificate for 
those planning to attend university,
259
 finishing first in his class.  He then matriculated to 
the University of Kiel to read law, but had his studies interrupted by the outbreak of 
World War I in 1914, entering the 167
th
 Infantry Regiment in Kassel as an ensign. 
 After a short period of training, on November 10, 1914, his regiment attacked 
Langemarck in Flanders, the graveyard of Germany’s youth.  Freisler was wounded and 
returned home for convalescence.  In the spring of 1915, he rejoined his regiment which 
was then transferred to the northern sector of the Russian front.  After being promoted to 
lieutenant and awarded the Iron Cross of both classes for bravery, he led a reconnaissance 
mission which fell into a Russian ambush resulting in his capture as a Russian prisoner of 
war.  Freisler spent the rest of the war as a prisoner in an officers’ camp north of 
Moscow.  With the Bolshevik Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, this camp was 
transferred to German administration; Freisler was appointed as its Commissar, managing 
the camp’s food supplies.
260
  While interned, Freisler learned Russian along with the 
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teachings of Marxism and although he later rejected all accusations that he had 




 Freisler returned from Russia on July 17, 1920, and once again devoted himself to 
his legal studies at the University of Jena where within one year he received his Doctor of 
Law degree, the subject of his thesis being, “Fundamental Factors in Industrial 
Organization.”  He then moved to Berlin where in 1923, he successfully took the final bar 
examination which permitted him to practice as a lawyer.  During the period between 
completing his doctorate and the bar examination, he served as a Referender and then as 
an Assessor,
262
 or a newly qualified lawyer,
263
 at the Celle local court. 
 Upon returning from Russia, Freisler became a member of the right-wing 
Völkisch-Sozialer Bund and within a few months of Hitler’s re-founding of the National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party in Munich,
264
 became in July of 1925,
265
 a Nazi Party 
member, having membership number 9,679.
266
  In 1924, he had returned to Kassel and 
together with his brother, Oswald, established a successful law practice.  Roland attained 
a reputation as a criminal defense lawyer and acquired the desire to become a politician, 
entering the city counsel of Kassel,
267
 the Prussian Diet and after 1932, a member of the 
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  Freisler also saw the Nazi Party as the impetus for his career, making his 
name as an advocate for the future Nazi Germany.
269
 
 On March 24, 1928, he married Marion Russegger (February 10, 1910 – January 
21, 1997),
270
 the daughter of a somewhat affluent merchant.  Together they had two sons, 
Harald, born on November 1, 1937, and Roland, date of birth, October 12, 1939; both 
were baptized as reformed Protestants in Berlin.  Neither Freisler nor his wife abandoned 
their religious affiliations at a time when many individuals considered it more expedient 
to leave the Protestant Church and become “German Christians” or nondenominational 
“believers in God” pursuant to Nazi phraseology. 
 Freisler emerged as one of the preeminent counsel of the Nazi Party.  Hesse was 
one of the main centers of Germany’s Social Democrats, and the city police, 
administration, and judiciary were all against the Nazi Party in general and Freisler in 
particular.  He was the subject of a number of press confrontations, with charges 
encompassing embezzlement and personal enrichment, but he was always exonerated.
271
 
 In February of 1933, Freisler received a letter from Berlin appointing him as a 
department head in the Prussian State Ministry of Justice.  Four months later, he was 
appointed permanent secretary at the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, and he gained a 
reputation as a jurist, but one who was emotional, unpredictable, domineering and 
terrifying to those who opposed his ideas.  Anyone who shared his Nazi ideology 
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received his goodwill and appreciation, but those opposed to Nazism met with contempt 
and castigation.  Freisler’s career became connectedly defined with the laws of the Nazi 
regime and the accompanying moral degradation of the German judiciary through its loss 
and abandonment of judicial independence. 
 From the outset, Freisler had set for himself the goal of interpreting existing 
legislation in conformity with Nazi ideology and wanted to create a “new system of 
justice.”  In his position papers he postulated himself as a “servant of the national 
community,” that anyone who did not abide by the laws was “a perpetrator, and every 
perpetrator an enemy of the state,” regardless of whether the act was criminal or political 
in nature.  The state was engaged in a war against crime, and criminals were subhuman, 
“traitors against the state.”  To Freisler, treason was the most egregious crime, and such 
criminals must not merely be condemned as enemies of the state; they must be 
eliminated.  In his writings, he aspired to subject every area of law and justice to total 
dictatorship,
272
 stating in 1934, that, “The Führer protects the law from the gravest abuse, 




 Scarcely anyone in the ministry could tolerate his personality; he was considered 
deceitful and untrustworthy, but his concern was the approbation of the Führer.  He laid 
personal claim to the Führerprinzip in two forms.  First, he wanted to effectuate the 
Führer’s commands without hesitancy; second, he behaved in a subordinate manner to 
the Führer so as to necessitate others to be submissive to him.  Freisler saw himself as the 
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Führer of the courtroom.  It was not the documents, testimony or other evidence that were 
crucial to his decision, but whatever he defined from his own personal perspective as 
wrong. 
 When Franz Gürtner, the Reich Minister of Justice, died in 1941, Freisler 
contemplated assuming his office, thus promoting him to a leading position within 
Hitler’s entourage.  Hitler denied this promotion to him; it was a disappointment from 
which Freisler would never recover.  The head of the Reich Security Main Office, 
Reinhard Heydrich, referred to him as the “slimy charlatan” and asked Heinrich Himmler 
to decline his request to join the SS.  Likewise, Martin Bormann, head of the Nazi Party, 
ascribed him as, “the madman.”
274
  Only Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, was 
favorably inclined toward him and upon his proposal of Freisler as Minister of Justice, 
Hitler’s dismissive reply was, “That old Bolshevik? No!”
275
 
 The odium associated with his time as a prisoner-of-war remained with Freisler, 
but ultimately it was his brother that impeded the professional advancement he desired.  
In the 1930s, Oswald Freisler had relocated his law practice from Kassel to Berlin.  
Although a member of the Nazi Party, he assumed the defense of some Catholic lay 
brothers.  Upon Hitler being informed of this representation, he ordered Oswald’s 
immediate expulsion from the Party.  Subsequently, Oswald undertook the defense of a 
bank director.  In order to have incriminating evidence destroyed, he bribed an employee 
of the state prosecution service.  A scandal ensued and on March 4, 1939, the police 
appeared at Oswald Freisler’s law office.  Officially, he had asked to use the restroom 
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facilities and then jumped out of a window to his death.  Privately, it was said that he had 
not acted voluntarily, but may have been assisted in his fall by the Gestapo.  In any event, 
Oswald Freisler, aged 43, died of unnatural causes on March 4, 1939. 
 The objectionable nature of Oswald Freisler’s law practice, from the perspective 
of the regime, along with his subsequent death, contributed to Roland Freisler’s failure to 
achieve the highest office in the Reich judiciary, Minister of Justice, as the Nazis had 
instituted the Sippenhaft principle, punishment of a family for the crime of a member.  As 
a result, Dr. Otto Georg Thierack, then President of the People’s Court, was appointed 
Minister of Justice with Freisler becoming President of the Court, on August 20, 1942. 
 Hitler chose Freisler to be President of the People’s Court because he needed a 
ruthless administrator and Freisler was obsessed with the belief that he needed to validate 
himself to his Führer.  He had never belonged to the confidential circle of Nazi Party 
members and had no right to express an opinion.  He was to simply listen, obey and 
implement his assigned responsibilities.  Freisler was a compliant instrumentality within 
the Third Reich,
276
 who publically illustrated this conformity and obedience in an address 
given in 1938: 
 We Germans march in columns.  As soldiers we 
look forward.  And there we see one person:  our leader.  
Wherever he points we march.  And wherever he points he 
always marches first, ahead of us.  That is in keeping with 
our German nature.  In the face of this all the 
“constitutional law” of the past has blown away like chaff 
in the wind: 
 The separation of powers; supervision of the 
leadership by the led; protection of personal rights by 
courts; a state based on the rule of law, which nobody 
wanted less than the organs of justice themselves, that is to 
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say, the review of true acts of leadership to determine 
whether they are in formal compliance with the law; 
constraints on the vanguard and limitations on their 
instruments of leadership; the rule of numbers over will, of 
anonymous numbers, that is, of irresponsibility. 
 All this – once carefully hedged about in 





 Prior to his appointment as President of the People’s Court and of note is that 
Freisler, in January of 1942, represented the Reich Ministry of Justice at Reinhard 
Heydrich’s Wannsee Conference.  At this meeting, the large scale deportation of Jews to 
the east was discussed
278
 and it was decided to make their extermination a systematically 
organized operation, known as the “Final Solution.”
279
 
 Freisler’s courtroom demeanor was such that he would not cease in his 
belittlement and humiliation of a defendant until the accused stood broken and weeping 
before him.  Initially, his preferred victims were communists, perhaps reasoning that by 
abusing them he would be distancing himself from his own past.  In the struggle for 
ultimate victory, Freisler’s philosophy was that no verdict was too harsh, even for those 
on the home front.  In some cases, the arbitrary draconian will of Freisler exceeded the 
tolerance of the Minister of Justice.
280
  A chance remark relative to the Führer, which the 
defendant had uttered to a friend, was declared public by Freisler, since “our National 
Socialist Reich requires every Volksgenosse (“national partner”) to concern himself with 
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politics and, for that reason, whatever political view is expressed forms part of the 
nation’s fund of political ideas.”
281
  Thierack wrote to Freisler in September of 1943, that 
with such reasoning, the “concept of what is public loses all meaning.”
282
  Even so, 
Freisler proceeded with the defendant’s ordered execution.  Freisler replied in October of 
1943, “I am fully aware of the fact that I administer justice in a one-sided way, but I do 
this for a political purpose.  I have to prevent, with all the strength at my disposal, a 
repetition of the events of 1918.”
283
 
 As time progressed, the proceedings of the Court became more inhumane and 
ineluctable.  Whether defense counsel would be allowed to speak was within Freisler’s 
discretion; the accused was therefore often wholly defenseless.
284
  It must be remembered 
that it is through the defense bar that popular opinions are brought into the courtroom and 
lead judges to make decisions that they may not have otherwise made.  The task of the 
criminal defense lawyer is to act in permanent opposition to the state prosecutor.  
Therefore, the degree of independence and power the defense enjoys in the courtroom is 
a reliable index of the broader degree of liberty, tolerance, and pluralism in the society as 
a whole.  All of these concepts and principles were completely and intentionally 
abrogated by Freisler as being incompatible and discordant with his conception of 
lawfulness and legitimacy.  “It is not a matter of dispensing justice but of destroying the 
opponents of National Socialism.”
285
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 With the attempted coup d’état of July 20, 1944, Colonel Stauffenberg planned to 
remove Hitler and put an end to the Nazi absurdity.  Having failed in their objective, they 
granted “Raving Roland” the spectacular show-trials he desired.  Freisler would no 
longer be trying anonymous defeatists, but publically known men that he could use as 
examples to the German citizens.  
 Freisler prepared to document the trials by having hidden cameras concealed 
under the swastika banner hanging behind his bench.  He subjected the defendants to 
contemptible bellowing, to capture on film their total humiliation for posterity and for the 
Führer.  However, what was intended as a propaganda spectacular was instead a failure.  
Because of Freisler’s ravings, the dignity exhibited by the vast majority of the defendants 
was consummately apparent.
286
  Erich Stoll, a cameraman at the trial of the plotters 
stated, “We had to tell Freisler that he was shouting too loudly at the defendants, so that 
the sound-engineer wasn’t able to get a good balance between his shrieking and the quiet 
voice of the defendant.”
287
  The newsreels were never shown in German cinemas as 
contemplated; the Ministry of Propaganda feared a “disagreeable discussion” concerning 
Freisler’s conduct and demeanor in the cases. 
 Opening the proceeding on August 7, 1944, Freisler took the opportunity to 
inform the defendants that nothing they might say would have any influence on the 
outcome of the trials.  Any attempts to escape their previously decided fates were 
destined for failure.  After having the allegations read against Field Marshal Erwin von 
Witzleben, Freisler proceeded to humiliate the one-time hero of the Wehrmacht.  
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Witzleben was forced to stand before the bench holding up his trousers as his belt had 
been taken away from him, prompting Freisler to state,
288
 “You dirty old man, why do 
you keep fumbling around in your trousers?”  He addressed General Erich Hoepner with 
the words, “In 1938 you were the general commanding the Panzer Corps.  What 
zoological characteristics would you consider appropriate to show the court what you 




With his frenzied and turbulent outbursts, Freisler revealed his inability to 
conform to his own ideal of dispassionate and calloused killing.  Additionally, he was 
contradicting Hitler’s address to the nation relative to this plot involving only a “small 
clique.”  By his conduct at the trials he educed a much more extensive plot, increasing the 
significance of the resistance movement against Hitler.
290
   
 Minister of Propaganda, Josef Goebbels, criticized Freisler, saying, “Freisler’s 
bellowing is not appropriate for propaganda.  It would tend to have an off-putting effect 
on the uncommitted.”  An attorney, Otto Gritschneder declared, “The impression we had 
of Freisler was of a power-crazed sadist, for it gave him an inordinate feeling of pleasure 
to see men trembling with fear and to condemn them to death.  It is impossible to identify 
with the motivation of a psychopath like that.”
291
 
 Hitler was decidedly satisfied with Freisler’s trial results; he had performed the 
tasks that Hitler had instructed.
292
  The initial sentences were carried out the same day, 
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with their hands tied behind their backs; the men who tried to assassinate Hitler were 
taken to the execution room in Berlin’s Plötzensee Prison and were hanged with piano 
wire suspended from meat hooks.  The executioners followed Hitler’s instructions that 
“they are to hang like slaughtered animals.”
293
  However, with the trials on September 7, 
1944, of Carl Goerdeler, the former Mayor of Leipzig, Wilhelm Leuschner, a union 
leader, and Ulrich von Hassell, the former German ambassador to Rome, Freisler’s 
intemperate conduct exceeded the imperturbability of the Minister of Justice, Thierack, 
who complained in a correspondence to Hitler’s secretary, Martin Bormann: 
The conduct of the trial by the president was, in the case of 
the defendant Goerdeler, unobjectionable and factual.  But 
he would not let Leuschner and von Hassell have their say.  
He shouted them down repeatedly.  This made a thoroughly 
bad impression, particularly as the president had allowed 
some 300 persons in to witness the proceedings.  Which 
persons received admission tickets is something still to be 
checked.  That kind of behaviour in such sessions is very 
questionable.  Otherwise, the political conduct of the trial 
did not give cause for complaint.  Unfortunately, however, 
Freisler addressed Goerdeler like a halfwit and spoke as 
though he were a complete nonentity.  The serious nature 
of this important gathering was gravely damaged by this.  
Frequent long speeches by the president, whose purpose 
was purely for propaganda, had a repugnant effect on this 
audience.  Equal damage was done to the seriousness and 





 As the German war effort succumbed and the Allied fronts moved closer to 
Berlin, Freisler refused to accept the inevitable conclusion to the war and retained his 
manic dedication to work, remaining the demoniac force of a ruthless and unbridled 
assailant on humanity.  With the deterioration of the military situation, Freisler 
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conjectured it was no longer “worth the trouble” to investigate cases of “subversion of the 
armed forces,” death sentences were imposed indiscriminately.  Freisler asserted that the 
exigent circumstances required trials to be expeditiously concluded and the sentences to 
be implemented with consistency.  He continued steadfast and uncompromisingly 
championing Hitler, writing on October 26, 1944:
295
 
In one’s innermost self one has to admit that it is no longer 
impossible that Germany might lose the war.  The reprisal 
weapons [the V1 and V2] have not brought the success so 
passionately hoped for.  But we must hold out, at whatever 
cost; the longer we hold our ground, the sooner this 
unnatural alliance between the Anglo-Americans and the 
Soviets will break down.  When I look at all that has 
happened over the last few years, I feel compelled to 
abandon my belief in a worldwide Jewish conspiracy.  That 
belief is too simple a view.  All Germans are now in the 
same boat; we must all row with the same stroke in order to 
achieve victory or, if the worst should happen, to guarantee 





Freisler’s allegiance and conviction to the Nazi regime persevered unremittingly. 
 On January 9, 1945, the trial of Helmuth James von Moltke began.  At one point 
in the proceedings, reference to the Criminal Code was made, but not a single copy of the 
manual could be located in the building.  Such was the administration of justice under Dr. 
Freisler. 
 While presiding over the trial of another plotter, Fabian von Schlabrendorff, on 
February 3, 1945, just before 9:00 A.M. the air-raid sirens began; everyone in the 
courtroom left for the shelter.  Schlabrendorff was near Freisler when the latter was 
killed, still clutching the defendant’s file in his arm, a file that would have for Freisler 
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certainly produced Schlabrendorff’s execution.  Schlabrendorff survived not only the air-
raid, but his subsequent retrial
297
 in February of 1945;
298
 Freisler died, along with 20,000 
others, in one of Berlin’s heaviest air-raids of the war. 
 Scarcely a person mourned the death of “The Hanging Judge,” “Raving Roland” 
Freisler.
299
  Luise Jodl, widow of General Alfred Jodl, recounted more than 25 years later 
that she had been working at the Luetzow Hospital when Freisler’s body was transported 
to the facility.  She related that a co-worker commented, “It is God’s verdict.”  According 
to Mrs. Jodl, “Not one person said a word in reply.”
300
 
 Without a memorial monument of his own, Freisler was buried anonymously in 
his wife’s family plot
301
 at Waldfriedhof Dahlen Cemetery in Berlin.
302
  After the war, 
Mrs. Freisler and her children changed their names to avoid possible association with 
their husband and father. 
 Roland Freisler’s legacy embodies and symbolizes crimes which were inflicted 
upon humanity under the pretext of justice during the Nazi regime.  The verdict of the 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg called him “the blackest, most brutal and bloodiest judge 
in the entire German administration of justice,” and listed him in conjunction with 
Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich as the men who were among the most 
“loathsome” individuals the world has ever seen.  However, it must be distinguished that 
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Freisler was a manifestation of, rather than the precipitating factor in, state-sponsored 
terrorism by the Nazi regime. 
 As late as the 1960s, the name Roland Freisler was continuing to appear in the 
press.  Marion Russegger, as Freisler’s widow then called herself, she having returned to 
using her maiden name, had initiated proceedings to receive pension payments emanating 
from her marriage to Freisler.  The Munich social service office granted her an allowance 
of DM 400 per month, in addition to her pension as a war victim.  The rationale for this 
allotment was that had Freisler not died as the result of an Allied bombing, he could have 
earned alimentation in postwar Germany as “a lawyer or a higher civil servant.”
303
 
 Freisler never succeeded in attaining the benevolence of his adored Führer, but 
Hitler did grant him consummate and limitless power over life and death for purposefully 
relinquishing and surrendering his individual judicial independence and autonomy.  In 
return, Hitler exploited Freisler as nothing more than a compliant lackey.  For the Führer, 
it was essential to have reticence on the home front and Freisler obliged by dispensing the 
stillness of the grave.  His tragedy was that he never received the praise and adulation 
from Hitler that he so fervently coveted, though he trampled over thousands of corpses of 
individuals in a floundering attempt for Hitler’s personal acclamation, forsaking his own 
integrity and probity in the wake. 
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The Sacrifice in Human Lives Extracted Through a Lack of Judicial 
Independence 
 
I will now begin a brief narration of some of those individuals who were 
annihilated by the People’s Court for actions commanded by their individual principles.  
A more recent historical event occurred on the morning of June 5, 1968, when an 
assassination attempt was perpetrated against the life of Robert F. Kennedy.  Senator 
Kennedy was shot at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, California, and had just 
completed delivering his victory speech, subsequent to his successful campaign in the 
1968 California Democratic presidential primary election.
304
  He subsequently died as a 
result thereof on June 6, 1968, and was eulogized by his brother, Edward M. Kennedy, on 
Saturday, June 8, 1968, at St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York City, with these words: 
My brother need not be idealized, or enlarged in 
death beyond what he was in life; to be remembered simply 
as a good and decent man, who saw wrong and tried to 
right it, saw suffering and tried to heal it, saw war and tried 
to stop it. 
Those of us who loved him and who take him to his 
rest today, pray that what he was to us and what he wished 
for others will some day come to pass for all the world. 
As he said many times, in many parts of this nation, 
to those he touched and who sought to touch him: 
‘Some men see things as they are and say why.  I 




 This locution of Edward M. Kennedy applies with equal and tantamount validity 
to the activities of Johannes Georg Klamroth, Helmuth Günther Hübener, Helmuth James 
von Moltke, Hans Fritz Scholl, Sophia Magdalena Scholl, Christoph Probst, Alexander 
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Schmorell, Wilhelm (Willi) Graf, and Professor Kurt Huber, as members of the German 
resistance to the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler during World War II.  All of these 
individuals were sentenced to death and annihilated by dependent and malevolent judges 
of Hitler’s specially conceived and contrived People’s Court, in particular, Judges Karl 
Engert and the President of the People’s Court, Hitler’s Blood Judge, Dr. “Raving” 
Roland Freisler.
306
   
Subsequently, Sir Winston Churchill eloquently stated the contribution these 
courageous and valiant individuals made to humankind: 
The political history of all nations has hardly ever produced 
anything greater and nobler than the opposition which 
existed in Germany.  These people fought without any help, 
whether from within or from without, driven only by the 
uneasiness of their consciences.  As long as they were 
alive, they were invisible to us, because they had to put on 




 Churchill would never have uttered those words had the German judiciary not 
voluntarily and purposefully relinquished its judicial independence and autonomy to 
despotic and corrupt political authorities.  By doing so, the rule of law was dismissed in 
accommodation to Nazi tyranny and totalitarianism.   
 Judges must continually embrace their roles as the primary advocates of judicial 
independence.  However, in World War II Germany, judicial independence was 
eradicated for both the individual judge and the judiciary as a whole.  Judicial members 
were required to follow the “general line” mandated by the Nazi regime and to obediently 
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implement its ideology when issuing their judgments and imposing sentences.  The 
doctrine of separation of powers was considered to be an obsolete principle, as Hitler was 
now the law.  Hence, no judicial attempt was expended to adjudicate cases in an impartial 
manner once Nazi will had been expressed.  Judges had intentionally surrendered their 
freedom to decide cases without control by the regime.  The judiciary’s role was not to 
control the executive, but to be a faithful follower of the leadership.
308
  Its task was to 
subordinate itself to the totalitarian will of National Socialism.
309
 
 Judicial elections were non-existent as Hitler had the power to appoint and 
remove judges as he deemed expedient.  Judicial terms of office were thus within his sole 
discretion and only those jurists who complied with the mandates of the regime were 
sanctioned to remain in office or be subsequently appointed thereto.  After 1934, a 
defendant was judged by a jurist who had been appointed expressly because of his loyalty 
to the National Socialist state.
310
 
 The German judiciary completely failed to protect themselves, and 
correspondingly, German society, by ensuring fidelity to the rule of law.  Ethically, they 
had fully succumbed to the power of corruption.  From April 1942 onwards, it was Hitler 
who controlled and administered what he considered to be justice.
311
 
 A very small portion of the catastrophic cost in human lives resulting from the 
ramifications of these derelictions is described in the following four case studies.  
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However, the consequences of the German judiciaries’ collapse will forever persist in 
ignominy and disgrace. 
 The reader is asked to keep these failures of the Germany judiciary in continual 
recollection as they study these succeeding four chapters detailing the actions of some of 
those individuals or groups who stood in resistance to Hitler.  They had their actions 
subsequently adjudicated by the wholly dependent People’s Court, a judiciary that had 
surrendered its independence and autonomy to Hitler and his unscrupulous minions. 
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Chapter XI:  Johannes “Hans” Georg Klamroth 
 This dissertation demonstrates the perplexing issues associated with the 
functioning of the German judiciary during the period of Nazi tyranny.  The following 
chapter discusses the trial of a resistance member to the regime, Johannes “Hans” Georg 
Klamroth, who was sentenced to death by the People’s Court for failing to disclose 
information of the contemplated assassination attempt of July 20, 1944, on the life of 
Adolf Hitler.  However, Hans Georg neither participated in the planning of the event nor 
took any concerted action in its consummation.  He was executed on August 26, 1944, 
subsequent to a “show trial” before a wholly dependent judiciary that had relinquished its 
independence and autonomy to despotic and corrupt political authorities and was utilized 
by them to advance the dictates of the Nazi reign of terror.  The guilt of Hans Georg and 
the manner of his death were determined by Hitler prior to his trial, it being a mere 
formality in the Nazi legal scheme which the regime proffered as “justice.” 
As I initiated the research for this enterprise, one of the very first video recordings 
that I discovered chronicled Roland Freisler, President of the People’s Court, verbally 
berating and embarrassing an apparent intelligent, ashamed, and defeated man, in an 
oversized civilian suit, his hands folded before him in visibly manifest resignation.  
Interspersed within this brief artifact were images of a much more joyous time, of a 
German officer holding the hand of a small girl as they walked and frolicked on the front 
lawn of a charming residence.  Although the material relative to Johannes Georg 
Klamroth is decidedly scant, that abridged film archive, lasting less than two minutes, 
drew my attention to the grievous annihilation of Johannes “Hans” Georg Klamroth by 
the Nazi regime through its operative instrumentality, Roland Freisler. 
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 Johannes Georg Klamroth was born in Halberstadt, Prussia, on October 12, 1898, 
and was murdered, at the age of 45, by the Nazis on August 26, 1944,
312
 at 12:44 P.M.
313
  
He was arrested by the Gestapo on July 21, 1944, and sentenced to death following a 
“show trial” before President Judge Roland Freisler of the People’s Court on August 15, 
1944.
314
  Klamroth’s execution was conducted by strangulation hanging from a meat 
hook in Plötzensee Prison, Berlin Charlottenburg.
315
  He was convicted of treason for his 
involvement in the July 20, 1944, plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler, pursued by Colonel 
Stauffenberg and the civilian-military conspiracy.  His implication in the cabal was that 
his son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard Klamroth,
316
 who had just five months prior 
married Hans Georg’s second eldest daughter, Ursula, informed him on July 10, 1944,
317
 
that he handled the explosives that were to be used in the attempt on Hitler’s life.  Hans 
Georg failed to divulge the conspirators’ intentions to the Nazi authorities and was thus 
executed as an accomplice in the connivance.
318
 
 Christened Johannes Georg, and called by the family Hans Georg,
319
 he was a 
company commander with the Twelfth Infantry Regiment along the Polish border at the 
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outbreak of war on September 1, 1939.  The campaign in Poland had barely begun when 
the SS Einsatzgruppen, in the wake of the troops, engaged in mass shootings of Jews and 
Polish teachers, lawyers, vicars, and landowners.  The Polish elite were liquidated.  Hans 
Georg was distraught over the suffering inflicted upon the Polish civilian population.  
When the German forces were near Warsaw, no food could be supplied to the city,
320
 
“they’re so hungry, and I’ve given orders that at least our hosts are allowed to eat with us 
in the field kitchen, but we can’t feed the whole of Warsaw.”  Also, the “shocking 
destruction of the city, the work of our artillery” was perplexing to him.  “If they had 
surrendered sooner, it wouldn’t have happened.  But the Poles are very proud, you can 




 On September 27, 1939, Warsaw capitulated, and from October 13, the fighting 
troops withdrew.  Six months after the Polish campaign, Hans Georg entered the Abwehr, 
the German counterintelligence department, and on February 5, 1940, he was ordered to 
the Wehrmacht Senior Command at its Berlin headquarters “on a special assignment.”  
They sent him to Copenhagen, as a civilian, arriving on March 21.  The preparations for 
Operation Weser Exercise, the occupation of Norway and Denmark by German troops, 
were ongoing since January of 1940.  On April 9, Denmark capitulated without a struggle 
and Norway was attacked, with the Operation being concluded on June 13.  He remained 
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 Prior to Hans Georg’s arrival in Russia, Bernhard Klamroth, Hans Georg’s second 
cousin, born in 1910, and the son of banker, Walter Klamroth, from Berlin-Grunewald, 
fell in love with Ursula, Hans Georg and his wife, Else’s, second daughter, born in 1924.  
The romance developed in June of 1941, when Ursula was sixteen and Bernhard was 
thirty, a Major on the General Staff of the Fourth Army, and who was stationed on the 
front line in the Russian offensive.  In November of 1941, Bernhard went to Berlin for a 
one-and-a-half-day visit.  On a park bench opposite his parents’ house on Paulsborner 
Strasse, he asked Ursula to marry him.  Until then they had seen each other for a total of 
four and a half days.  In barely two and half years, the lives of Hans Georg and Bernhard 
would be terminated in Plötzensee Prison. 
 Ursula and Bernhard were engaged on July 17, 1942, Ursula’s eighteenth 
birthday.  The wedding ensued on January 5, 1943, followed by a two week honeymoon 
at the Platterhof in Obersalzberg, Hitler’s hotel in the mountains surrounding 
Berchtesgaden.   
 Despite the Nonaggression Pact, on June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet 
Union with three million men.  Napoleon also invaded Russia in June of 1812; the years 
had changed, but not the eventual outcome.  Eight months later, Hans Georg was re-
posted as an officer with Military Intelligence Third Command in Pleskau, on the border 
with Estonia, the base of Army Group North.  This position was in recognition of Hans 
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Georg’s past achievements, as his predecessor was a lieutenant colonel, and as a mere 
captain, it was a great honor for which he was commended.  He was in charge of a 
military intelligence unit, which battled the enemy on both sides of the front.  In his 
combat against partisans,
323
 Hans Georg stated, “these people behind the front are 
extremely dangerous, and they’re breeding like cockroaches!”
324
  Hans Georg’s people 
attempted to infiltrate their organizations, to raid their command centers to capture them, 
and they were then interrogated at Hans Georg’s office if caught alive.  His job also 
involved the questioning of officers and defectors held as prisoners of war.
325
 
 Since the beginning of 1943, Bernhard was with the Oberkommando des Heeres 
(“OKH”) or Army High Command, in Mauerwald, East Prussia, near the “Wolf’s Lair,” 
the Führer’s headquarters.  Shortly after posting, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel at 
age 32.   
In March of 1943, Hans Georg was transferred back to Berlin to the Foreign 
Department/Intelligence III in the Wehrmacht High Command (“OKW”).  In this new 
assignment, Hans Georg’s department monitored staff and secret protection of the Army 




In December of 1943, Hans Georg was promoted to group leader
327
 and took 
command of the company responsible for the preventive nondisclosure protection of 
military research projects, including most preeminently, the army’s experimental rocket 
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center at Peenemünde, where the V-2 was being built.  It was the first midrange rocket, 
developed over a period of ten years primarily by Wernher von Braun.  According to 
Josef Goebbels, this was the secret miracle weapon that promised invincibility, a last-
minute salvation for the German war effort.  There was also the V-1, a jet-propelled 
“flying bomb,” an unmanned plane with a payload of one thousand kilograms of 
explosives that was susceptible to being shot down because of its lack of velocity.  The 
V-2, a liquid-fuel rocket flew at five thousand kilometers per hour, when it flew.  Fewer 
than half of the 6,000 completed rockets performed as they were designed.  Hans Georg’s 
mission was as difficult a task as that of Sisyphus.  Not only were the German long-range 
weapons a target for enemy spies and saboteurs, but there were thousands of technical 
and civilian staff who worked in the center itself, with its many suppliers, all within the 
surveillance accountability of Hans Georg. 
 In addition, the individual branches of the German military machine were not on 
the most hospitable of terms.  The Luftwaffe supported the V-1, while the army favored 
the V-2; both competed for Hitler’s priority, meaning funding, raw materials, and 
manpower.  Also involved was the personal competition for authority between 
Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler and armaments minister, Albert Speer.  Himmler 
wanted to bring the German arms industry under the control of the SS, including 
supervision of the rocket center at Peenemünde.  For this to transpire, Wernher von Braun 
and two of his colleagues had to be eliminated.  All three had previously expressed their 
preference for the army, calculating that they would be allowed greater freedom of action 
by the army in contrast to the SS.  Early in the morning of March 15, 1944, the three 
scientists were arrested by the Gestapo and accused of high treason.  “Before witnesses,” 
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they had expressed defeatist thoughts relative to the outcome of the war, and openly 
discussed their desire “to build a spaceship, rather than an instrument of murder.” 
 The commander of the experimental rocket center, General Walter Dornberger, 
was unable to persuade either Himmler or General Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head of 
the OKW, to free his three scientific staff members.  Hans Georg’s assistance as an army 
officer was requested.  He enlisted the support of Albert Speer who understood that this 
was yet another individual attack upon him by Himmler.  Speer appealed to Hitler, and 
together with Hans Georg, brought about the acquittal of the three prisoners after fourteen 
days confinement.
328
  Hans Georg’s diary entry for April 7, 1944, revealed, “I’ve even 
learned to become personally involved in the inevitable conspiracies that go on in 
different departments among the authorities, and recently played a downright virtuoso 
aria on this instrument, which won me the undivided applause of all participants.”
329
   
 The SS had been at Peenemünde since June of 1943, because there was a 
concentration camp there with prisoners from Buchenwald who were initially deployed to 
build the security fences around the assembly plant for the V-2 rocket.  On the night of 
August 17, 1943, the British bombed Peenemünde; more than seven hundred people died, 
most of them forced laborers.  Subsequently, the decision was made to transfer 
production below ground, to the southern Harz, near Nordhausen.  There was a limestone 
massif there inside which two tunnels had been formerly dug.  On August 28, 1943, the 
first 107 prisoners from Buchenwald arrived to begin work on a project designated, 
Mittelbau Dora. 
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 By day and night, the production sites for the V-2, Mittelwerk, were built by 




The tunnels were extended by means of heavy compressed 
air drills, and the removal of even massive chunks of stone 
had to be accomplished with hands and shovels.  Stone dust 
and gases were constantly being swirled up, and there were 
no ventilation systems.  In the tunnels there was no water 
for washing or drinking, out of desperation the men 
urinated in their hands so that they could at least wash the 




The sleeping tunnels were cramped and crowded, full of excrement, rodents, and 
decomposing corpses.  Many of the prisoners had no shoes and had to walk barefoot on 
the debris; they worked in freezing water, excavating with their hands due to a lack of 
digging implements, starving, and suffering from exhaustion.  Anyone who collapsed was 
beaten back to work.  The mortality rate was higher than in any other concentration camp 
in Germany.  Seriously ill inmates were deported in liquidation transports to Auschwitz, 
Majdanek, and Bergen-Belsen.
332
  Cautious estimates of fatalities ranged from 16,000 to 
20,000 between September 1943 and April 1945.
333
 
 Hans Georg was present at Nordhausen on several occasions, maintaining security 
for the development of the V-2 rocket was his responsibility.  He must have been 
cognizant of the conditions under which it was progressing, going underground into the 
building site to learn the requisite and appropriate safeguards that he was to furnish.  The 
Dora concentration camp was adjacent to the Mittelwerk project and impossible to 
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ignore, with its electric fence, wooden watchtowers, and inmates in their striped 




 In early February 1944, Hans Georg traveled on Abwehr business to Mauerwald 
in East Prussia, the base for the OKH, when Hitler was at the Wolf’s Lair.  There he met 
the four men with whom he would find himself before the People’s Court, six months 
later:  General Major Hellmuth Stieff, head of the organizational section of the Army 
General Staff; Bernhard Klamroth, Stieff’s group leader II, succeeding Claus von 
Stauffenberg in this post; Major Joachim Kuhn, Bernhard’s colleague; and, Senior 
Lieutenant Albrecht von Hagen, Bernhard’s friend.  These four men were jointly 
involved in the acquisition of the explosives for the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler’s 
life.  The verdict delivered by the People’s Court against Hans Georg stated that he was 
informed of the conspiracy on July 10, in Berchtesgaden, but he may have had 
knowledge much earlier.  The men executed in connection with the plot were all well 
known to him.  It was doubtful that Hans Georg was involved in any planning associated 
with the attempt.  He was a confidant, not a fellow perpetrator; however, the same cannot 
be said relative to the other four individuals, they were active participants. 
 In the summer of 1943, Hans Georg wrote about the “violent battle of ideologies, 
even within,” and about the “intellectual movements that will influence our time.”  
During Gestapo interrogation he mentioned Stalingrad as the cause for his revolution, 
high treason; however, it may have been a cumulative development. 
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On his last visit home to Halberstadt on July 21, 1944,
 335
 Hans Georg told Else 
that on July 10, he met Stauffenberg, Stieff, Bernhard, and General Erich Fellgiebel, head 
of the Signal Corps, in Berchtesgaden.  Fellgiebel was to block communications from the 
Führer’s headquarters to the leaders of the Wehrmacht after the attack.  They talked 
regarding the plans for the attempted assassination, after which he spent time discussing 
the matter with Bernhard.  The original interrogation records of the Gestapo have 
disappeared; the sole remaining files are those of Ernst Kaltenbrunner, successor to the 
murdered Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Security Police, the Security Service, and the 
Reich Security Main Office.  Historically, these reports are problematic because they 
were prepared for Reichsleiter Martin Bormann and Hitler, and contain subjective 
interpretations on the part of the Gestapo rather than statements from the parties being 
interrogated, but these are the only extant documentation. 
According to Kaltenbrunner’s reports, under interrogation both Hans Georg and 
Bernhard keep rigorously to the undeniable facts.
336
  Hans Georg spoke of his initial 
“doubts, first of all after the loss of Stalingrad, that the war would have a satisfactory 
outcome for us;” and described an “overall atmosphere that could almost be called 
fatalistic,” among the staff of the OKH, “Although I cannot quote individual sources, the 
general mood was more or less après nous le deluge.  I was and remain unable to judge 
where this fatalism comes from and what would be the remedy for it.”
337
  The report 
related a conversation between Hans Georg and Bernhard about the details and extent of 
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the conspiracy, stating, “If there is no other way, we will have to wait for an opportunity 
when all the ‘yes-men’ are in one big heap with the Führer, and then all of them will be 
obliterated at once.”
338
  The interrogators repeatedly expressed their astonishment that 
despite the openness with which the plans for the coup were discussed among the 
relevant officers, they were not uncovered.  Hans Georg was condemned because he did 
not report Bernhard to the appropriate authorities, to this he responded:
339
 
Connected to this is the lack of political direction in the 
officer corps, which I now recognize as corrupt.  The 
majority of officers—and I must count myself among that 
majority—are helpless to respond to problems that 
suddenly arise outside of our own field of duty, and 
inclined to suggest solutions only through the line of 
command.  The order from the next senior officer up will 





The accused all do the same, they incriminated dead people, where possible, or they 
charged themselves. 
 On August 7, 1944, the trials were commenced in Berlin, before the People’s 
Court and President Judge Roland Freisler.  Hans Georg, Bernhard, and four other 
defendants were tried on August 15, 1944.  It is unknown where Hans Georg was held 
from the time of his arrest until trial.  Bernhard was incarcerated after his arrest on July 
21, in a jail on Lehrter Strasse.  After the trial, no documentation existed for either 
individual other than their respective executions at Plötzensee Prison. 
                                                 
338





 Id. at 348-349. 
   168
   
 
 It states in the verdict for Hans Georg
341
 that his “betrayal of the Führer” cannot 
be excused because of his “difficult family conditions from which he was suffering at the 
time, nor because his own son-in-law had to be named.”
342
  On August 15, 1944, they 
were sentenced to death by hanging.  It was the third show trial of those involved in the 
July 20, conspiracy; the People’s Court was crowded with hand-selected spectators in 
assorted uniforms. 
 Before the trial, a military “Court of Honour” called by Hitler with Field Marshal 
Gerd von Rundstedt presiding, expelled the defendants from the Wehrmacht “in 
disgrace,” so that they could be tried in a civilian court.  Pursuant to Hitler’s 
instructions,
343
 “they must be brought to trial at lightning speed, they must not be allowed 
to get a word in edgewise.”
344
  Freisler behaved like a “madman, roaring and bellowing 
and interrupting the defendants as soon as they start to reply.”
345
  Minister of Justice, Otto 
Georg Thierack, complained to Martin Bormann regarding Freisler’s conduct, “He spoke 




 All defendants confirmed their confessions before the court, “although Hans 
Georg Klamroth repeated his only when he saw that his attempts to dismiss it were 
collapsing under their internal contradictions.”
347
  He was asked by Freisler if he was 
aware that “to do nothing is treason?”  Hans Georg responded, “No!”  Freisler then 
                                                 
341
 Bruhns, W. (2009).  My father’s country: The story of a German family.  (New York, NY:  Vintage 
Books), 349-350. 
342
 Id. at 350-351. 
343
 Id. at 351-352. 
344






 Id. at 353. 
   169
   
 
shouted “deviant” a few times, “hide and seek” and “national community.”
348
  Otherwise, 
his tirades were incomprehensible. 
 Bernhard was found guilty of acquiring explosives, Hans Georg because he did 
not betray Bernhard and the others.  The other defendants that day were Adam von Trott 
zu Solz and Hans-Bernd von Haeften, Count Wolf-Heinrich Helldorf, the prefect of 
police in Berlin and Major Egbert Hayessen, of the Army Headquarters in the OKH.  
Freisler’s verdict in the name of the German people applied to all defendants:
349
 
Treacherous, dishonorable, and arrogant, rather than 
following the Führer in a manly fashion, like the whole 
nation, to fight for victory as no one had ever done 
throughout the whole of our history, they betrayed the 
sacrifice of our warriors, people, Führer, and Reich.  They 
set in motion the assassination of our Führer.  In cowardly 
fashion they thought they could deliver our nation to the 
mercy and disfavor of the enemy, to enslave it to the dark 
forces of reaction.  Traitors to all that we live and fight for, 





 Shortly after July 20, Hitler established the manner of death:  “They are not to be 
given the honest bullet.  They are to hang like common traitors.  And it must be done 
within two hours of the delivery of the verdict.  They must hang immediately, without 
any mercy.”
351
  Hitler also directed Freisler and the executioners that there were to be no 
clerics present, and any suffering of the condemned men should not be alleviated in any 
matter:  “They are to hang like slaughtered cattle.”
352
  Bernhard’s death certificate gives 
the time of his death as 8:14 P.M. on August 15, 1944, cause of death, hanging.  Else 
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received a message dated September 29, 1944, from the senior Reich attorney with the 
People’s Court:
353
  “Former Major Hans Georg Klamroth has been convicted of high 
treason and condemned to death by the verdict of the People’s Court of the Great German 
Reich.  The sentence has been carried out . . .”
354
  No date of death was provided.  At the 
end of October, Hans Georg’s assigned counsel established that he died on August 26.  
Else received two letters that he wrote; one on the day of the sentence, the other 
immediately before his death.  She obtained the first shortly before Christmas, the second 
in February of 1945.  He wrote,
355
 “Teach the children to pray, now I know what it 
means.”
356
   
 Hans Georg was executed on August 26, 1944, along with Adam von Trott zu 
Solz, Baron Ludwig von Leonrod, and Otto Carl Kiep.  Hans Georg was second to die 
after Adam von Trott zu Solz.  Death by hanging did not mean a broken neck.  The 
regulation was to leave the men hanging for twenty minutes, to be sure that they were 
dead.  A further regulation stated that the men were to be slowly strangled.
357
  
Emotionally, out of the millions of Germans, a very small number of individuals, 
including Johannes “Hans” Georg Klamroth, put their conscience above their lives.  Had 
these individuals not done so, there would have been nothing for their survivors to 
psychologically embrace in the moral ruins of post-war Germany.  His resistance 
demonstrated personal conviction, and provided his scion with their foundation for 
ethical intemperateness in the face of Nazi depravity, iniquity, and injustice.    
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For allowing his individual principles to govern his actions, Hans Georg was 
culpably guilty of treasonous conduct pursuant to the dictates of Nazi “justice.”  As a 
consequence, his fate was determined by the wholly dependent People’s Court, a 
judiciary that had deliberately discarded its independence and autonomy to tyrannical and 
depraved political authorities and that was willfully exploited by them to advance the 
mandates of Nazi barbarism through sanctioned and endorsed judicial murder.
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Chapter XII:  Helmuth Guddat, Also Known as Kunkel, Subsequently Hübener
358
 
 This dissertation demonstrates the perplexing issues associated with the 
functioning of the German judiciary during the period of Nazi tyranny.  The following 
chapter discusses the trial of a resistance member to the regime, a juvenile Helmuth 
Guddat, also known as Kunkel, subsequently Hübener, who was sentenced to death by 
the People’s Court for listening to foreign radio broadcasts and attempting to exercise his 
freedoms of speech and press.  This was a judiciary that no longer protected these 
fundamental rights of the individual.  Helmuth, a 17 year-old boy, was executed on 
October 27, 1942, subsequent to a “show trial” before a wholly dependent judiciary that 
had relinquished its independence and autonomy to despotic and corrupt political 
authorities and was utilized by them to advance the dictates of the Nazi reign of terror.  
The guilt of Helmuth was determined prior to his trial, it being a mere formality in the 
Nazi legal scheme which the regime proffered as “justice.” 
Helmuth Hübener was born in Hamburg on January 8, 1925, and led in 1941 and 
1942, respectively, resistance activities against the Nazi regime that were decidedly 
influenced by the religious movement, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
the Mormons (LDS Church).
359
  Helmuth, then 16, accompanied by his friends, Karl-
Heinz Schnibbe, 17, Rudolph (“Rudi”) Wobbe, 15,
 360
 and joined somewhat later by 
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 distributed printed materials in Hamburg denouncing Adolf Hitler 
and his propaganda machine. 
 Helmuth was very intelligent, versed in the Mormon scriptures, and politically 
aware.  He had access to a typewriter, paper, and information gleaned from BBC radio 
broadcasts and heard on a shortwave radio during a time when the Nazi government had 
restricted listening to any radio transmissions other than those on the approved party 
station.  With the information he obtained from the BBC, Helmuth wrote anti-Nazi 
leaflets, which Karl-Heinz and Rudi then distributed.
362
  Karl-Heinz later stated, 
“Helmuth wasn’t so stupid and naïve to think we could bring German leaders to their 
knees.  No, Helmuth wanted people to think.”
363
 
 On August 11, 1942, Helmuth was condemned to death and the loss of his civil 
rights during his lifetime,
364





after being found guilty of “listening to a foreign radio station and distributing the news 
heard in connection with conspiracy to commit high treason and treasonable support of 
the enemy,”
367
 and murdered on October 27, 1942, in Berlin’s Plötzensee Prison,
368
 the 
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site of an estimated 2,400 executions between 1933 and 1945.
369
  Karl-Heinz was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment “for listening to a foreign radio station and 
distributing foreign news.”  Rudi had imposed upon him a ten year term of incarceration 
“for listening to a foreign radio station and distributing foreign radio news in connection 
with conspiracy to commit high treason,” while Gerhard was encumbered with a four 
year term of confinement “for distribution of foreign radio news.”
370
 
 These young men acted alone, their actions only vaguely rooted in the blue-collar 
sociocultural milieu of their families.  They were also among the youngest to become 
involved in a resistance effort in opposition to the Nazis.  Until 1941-1942, those 
involved in the movement were primarily older men and some women.  Even the White 




 Hübener’s ultimate execution is an example of the conundrum of the relationship 
between legality and morality that exists in all societies, but was particularly applicable to 
the Nazi state.  There was no doubt that he was guilty of having violated the “Decree 
about Extraordinary Radio Measures of 1 September 1939,” an extraordinary law for 
extraordinary times, in keeping with laws against the dissemination of enemy rhetoric.  
Propaganda was a weapon perhaps more deadly than soldiers.  Hübener’s justification for 
his actions was a moral response, believing it was a citizen’s duty to oppose an immoral 
regime, particularly in wartime, when that war had been commenced by the machinations 
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of a power-hungry madman and his cohorts.  Such considerations did not affect the 
illegality of what Hübener had done, and the wheels of “justice” ground to their 
inexorable conclusion.  This is also the reason that Hübener was to be disappointed in his 
prophecy, as stated to the Court that condemned him that their time would come.  It never 
did, as the Nazi judiciary escaped judgment because although what they had done may 
have been immoral, it was “legal.”  By executing Hübener, the Nazis acknowledged the 
danger he represented to the existence of their order.  Seen in this perspective, his actions 
were ineffectual only because the state, recognizing their seriousness, acted with its 
barbaric efficiency as leniency may have provided encouragement to others.
372
   
 Helmuth Hübener was the youngest German teenager to single-handedly organize 
a resistance movement against the Nazi tyranny.
 373
  He spoke English quite well, having 
learned it in school, was articulate, an avid reader, and very intelligent.  The first 
American missionaries from the LDS Church came from Salt Lake City, Utah, to 
Hamburg in 1923; Helmuth drew close to them speaking fluent English at age 14.  It was 
not only the missionaries’ friendships, but also their personal views that affected and 
prompted Helmuth.
374
  Rudi explained that when the missionaries were at Helmuth’s 
residence, “quite often” for Sunday dinner, “they always talked about freedom of speech, 
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free press, and the freedom they were enjoying in their country and what it meant to be an 
American, that you could do what you want to do…”
375
 
 Helmuth attended the basic school, Louisenweg, from ages 6 to 12, and because 
of his straight-A grades and “above average capabilities,” was placed in the “upper track” 
at Brackdamm, an all boys’ school.  He completed his final four years there, finishing in 
1941.  At Brackdamm, Helmuth excelled; his favorite subjects were geography and 
history, he was also proficient in English, typing, and stenography, but above all, 
distinguished himself in German and German composition.  He was allowed two more 
years of schooling than most other adolescents, graduating at age 16.  It was during this 
time that Helmuth transformed from pro-Nazi to anti-Nazi.  In 1938, at age 13, he joined 
the German Young Folk which he enjoyed “at first,” but by November of 1938, he would 
turn against the Nazis and its youth organizations.  On April 20, 1939, three months after 
his 14
th




 In late April 1941, Helmuth began listening to the BBC on a regular basis from 
his grandparents’ apartment.  At 10 o’clock every night came the first four notes of 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, played three times, then the words,
377
 “The BBC London 
sends news in German,” or “This is the BBC London, German news broadcast.”
378
  
Helmuth listened four to five times per week and since he knew shorthand, he took notes, 
and then transcribed his annotations. 
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 On June 22, 1941, the German army attacked Russia.  Helmuth knew from his 
previous readings that no European country had ever successfully attacked Russia.  He 
also conjectured that Germany had comparatively few natural resources for waging war.  
He believed that the operation of German tanks and airplanes would be thwarted by the 
Allies preventing Germany from having access to its oil supplies.  He saw the Reich 
collapsing and was convinced that Hitler had to be replaced before total destruction 
ensued.  He next learned Hitler would not retreat, even once he realized his armies were 
in a hopeless state; rather, he would attempt to continue the march into Russia, sacrificing 
hundreds of thousands of German soldiers. 
 German radio spewed its propaganda, claiming German victories, but Helmuth 
discerned who was being truthful, not only from the BBC, but from the increasing 
numbers of obituaries in the newspapers.  He confided to his friends, Rudi and Karl-
Heinz, about the German news media and its untruthfulness and his concern that the 
German people were now being called upon by the regime to enlarge their sacrifices.  
Many food and household items were no longer available because of the war, a war they 
were told, they would win. 
 Helmuth first undertook to recruit Karl-Heinz by showing him his radio and a 
flyer he had written grounded on the BBC newscasts.  Karl-Heinz was aware that 
listening to enemy broadcasts was forbidden and punished severely, but proceeded to 
hear, along with Helmuth, a newscast concerning the Russian campaign, code-named 
“Barbarossa.”  According to Karl-Heinz, the British reports provided greater detail than 
the German narration, and they gave their own casualties, not just the enemy’s.  The 
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German news accounts sounded of propaganda, while the British were more realistic.
379
  
Karl-Heinz stated tersely, “The German people were being duped.”
380
 
 Karl-Heinz attended Helmuth’s radio listening sessions once a week and asked 
Helmuth to transcribe the other broadcasts that he missed.  Helmuth then asked Karl-
Heinz to commence distributing flyers,
381
 telling him that “it was the moral duty of every 
truth-loving person to combat the regime.”
382
  On his way home that night from 
Helmuth’s apartment, Karl-Heinz distributed flyers in telephone booths and mailboxes in 
apartment houses.  Karl-Heinz recalls his resistance beginning in April of 1941.  The next 
time Karl-Heinz went to Helmuth’s apartment, Rudi was also present.  Neither he nor 
Rudi were aware that Helmuth had been sharing his radio broadcasts with the other.  It 
was then that Helmuth initiated his “group;” all three boys were now entangled.
383
  
 As time passed, Rudi and Karl-Heinz would listen “several times” even though 
fully aware of the dangers involved; newspapers reported that listeners were receiving up 
to three years imprisonment for those found guilty of this crime.  However, Rudi 
expressed the group’s reasoning,
384
 “We wanted the other people to know what was 
really going on . . . we thought we were doing the right thing.”
385
  Likewise, Helmuth was 
convinced that other people must hear the truth, “We can warn the people.  We can wake 
them up.  We can get them to start asking questions.  And when enough people hear the 
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truth . . . then who knows?”
386
  The boys decided that if anyone were caught, he should 
assume the entire blame, in order to exonerate the others. 
 Rudi states that he placed flyers in stairwells, mailboxes, and on bulletin boards.  




 In the beginning, Helmuth produced a new flyer every one to two weeks, then as 
Rudi and Karl-Heinz became more diligent, he wrote and prepared a new flyer every 
week, then two per week.  In the early autumn of 1941, Helmuth no longer composed 
small flyers, but full-page leaflets with detailed, accurate accounts of military and 
geopolitical issues.  Helmuth’s leaflets ranged from sarcastic exposés regarding Reich 




 As time progressed, the Gestapo came to surmise that numerous adults were 
involved, thinking that they were operatives of a British government operation.  At work, 
Helmuth fraternized with a fellow apprentice, Gerhard Düwer, and in early January of 
1942, he asked Gerhard if he wanted to join “a secret club.”  When Düwer inquired about 
the club, Helmuth told him it involved a spy ring to overthrow the regime and that he was 
receiving orders to produce flyers.  Later, Helmuth admitted that he had lied; he was not 
associated with any such organization, but found Düwer not only responsive to the flyers 
but desiring to become active in his movement.
 389
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 Helmuth was determined to get his leaflets to the French prisoners of war who 
labored in the Altona district of Hamburg, but this entailed someone who could translate 
the documents into French.  At his office he located a fellow employee, Werner Kranz, 
who could perform this function.  On January 17, 1942, while they shared a class in the 
administrative school, Helmuth noticed Kranz taking notes in a tablet for French 
vocabulary.  Helmuth inquired if he knew French and Kranz acknowledged in the 
affirmative.  Helmuth then asked if he would translate the documents.  Kranz replied that 
he would first need to know the contents, which Helmuth refused to disclose.  Three days 
later, Helmuth accompanied by Gerhard again approached Kranz.
390
  Kranz recalls that: 
Hübener shared with me quietly that ‘they’ were producing 
inflammatory brochures, which they wanted to give to the 
prisoners.  I told him that such a thing was out of the 
question for me and urgently advised him to cease his 
activity . . .  On the 20
th
 of [January], he tried secretly to 
press some folded papers into my hand.  I did not accept 
the writings and declared to him that I, under no condition, 
would accept or read them.  The administrative apprentice, 
Düwer, who had entered the room with Hübener, was 
present at this conversation.  They left the room together 




The deciding incident in Helmuth’s demise was the moment Kranz refused the folded 
papers, at that instant their supervisor saw the aberrant interaction. 
 Helmuth’s superior was Heinrich Mohns.
392
  He was the “overseer” of loyalty, 
“with political and social control” in their office.
393
  Mohns requested an explanation 
from Kranz.  Kranz then relayed to Mohns that Helmuth had requested that he translate 
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an inflammatory leaflet into French, as Helmuth claimed to have influence with French 
prisoners of war, but that he refused Helmuth’s solicitation.  Kranz was also able to 
determine that the material was anti-Nazi and reported this to Mohns. 
 At 5:00 P.M. on February 5, 1942, Gestapo agents entered his office and arrested 
Helmuth along with Gerhard Düwer.
394
  When Helmuth did break under the torture of 
Gestapo interrogation methods, he mentioned Rudi and Karl-Heinz only as curious 
acquaintances, not as co-conspirators.  He also stated that they were with him on only one 
occasion when he attempted to listen to the BBC, but the Germans had successfully 
jammed the transmission that evening.  The inevitable then happened to Rudi and Karl-
Heinz.  While at work on February 10, at approximately 12:00 P.M., Karl-Heinz, was 




 One of the first Gestapo queries was, “Who are the adults that put these kids up to 
this?”
396
  Hans Kunkel, Helmuth’s half-brother, relates that, “The Gestapo could not 
imagine that a 16 year-old alone, by himself, carried out this scheme and composed these 
clever flyers without adult help.  They believed he was a member of a large adult 
resistance organization.”
397
  Life for Helmuth, Rudi, and Karl-Heinz was now an ordeal 
and tormented suffering few teenagers have ever had to endure. 
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 The boys generally abided with their plan of not implicating others.
398
  Karl-
Heinz recounts, “I saw [Helmuth’s] face and . . . thought, ‘Oh my gosh, what have they 
put you through?’ . . . He looked like he had been in a meat grinder.”
399
  During his 
interrogations, Karl-Heinz admitted that he tried listening to the BBC, but claimed it was 
jammed.  He also acknowledged that Helmuth had earlier written broadcast notes for him 
at his request and that Helmuth displayed a flyer to him on one occasion, but nothing 
more.  He did not disclose that they listened repeatedly, but stated they tried to listen just 
one time.
400
  Gestapo Agent Müssener’s cryptic report was deciphered by Uli Sander, 
“Only after lengthy remonstrances (beatings) and emphatic admonishments (torture) was 
Hübener moved (forced) to make a confession about the extent of his destructive 
activity.”
401
  Rudi states that he was interrogated three times, each attended with severe 
beatings. 
 On May 28, 1942, the boys were presented with their indictments.  The charges 
against Helmuth and Rudi were conspiracy to commit high treason and listening to and 
distributing foreign radio broadcasts, while the charges against Karl-Heinz and Gerhard 
were similar, but less incriminating, listening to and/or distribution of foreign broadcasts.  
Their trial was scheduled for Tuesday, August 11, 1942, before the Second Senate of the 
People’s Court in Berlin.
402
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Neither Rudi nor Karl-Heinz trusted their court-appointed lawyers,
403
 Rudi 
analyzing, “all lawyers belonged to the National Socialistic law club.  So that was the 
pool the court would draw them from.  They were all Nazis.  And he treated me like he 
was a Gestapo agent and just kept interrogating me.  So I didn’t trust him.”
404
  All 
assigned defense lawyers were members of the NSRB, National Socialistic Justice 
Association, a coalition of lawyers that actively supported the Nazi Party.
405
 
 After a week in Moabit prison, the boys entered an overflowing courtroom on 
August 11, 1942, for their trial.
406
  Rudi stated, “I had a feeling the minute I entered the 
courtroom that we were already sentenced.  It was just a show they were putting on, just a 
big show.”
407
  Three judges entered the courtroom wearing “blood-red” robes with a 
“large golden eagle” embroidered with a swastika, they were:  Karl Engert, Vice 
President of the People’s Court; Chief Justice Fikeis; and Motorized SA Brigade Leader 
Heinsius.
408
  Other court personnel present were Senior District Leader Bodinus, Senior 
District Judicial President Hartmann, who represented the public prosecutor, First State 
Attorney Dr. Drullmann, and Secretary of Justice Wöhlke.
409
  Attending were Gestapo 
Officer Müssener, who had arrested and interrogated Helmuth; Heinrich Mohns, 
Helmuth’s supervisor at work; Werner Kranz, Helmuth’s co-worker, and Karl-Heinz’s 
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 who was the only parent, friend, or supporter granted 
permission to attend. 
 The trial began with opening statements, having each defendant stand when his 
name was called.  A small intelligence test was given to each of the accused, wherein a 
few general knowledge questions were posed regarding the Party program, the number of 
points therein, and the date of Hitler’s birthday.  Helmuth was asked his opinion of the 
Party, answering that he did not like it and held the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints in high esteem.
412
  In light of his response, the Court determined “that he should be 
judged as an adult.”
413
  Witnesses were then called, including Kranz,
414
 Mohns, who 
boasted that he “tried to keep his office free from impure political thinking,”
415
 and 
Müssener.  These witnesses were then followed by the interrogation of each defendant by 
the chief prosecuting attorney and the judges. 
 After a lunch recess, the judges had the spectators removed from the courtroom as 
the leaflets were to be read.  The judges read and discussed each handbill and leaflet,
416
 
and when asked, Helmuth always answered, “Oh yes, I remember this.”
417
  Helmuth 
admitting that he authored all the documents.  Judges Engert and Fickeis denounced one 
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of Helmuth’s leaflets relative to the Asian theatre of war
418
 stating, “The leaflet ‘WHO’S 
INCITING WHOM’ contains inflammatory statements about the entry of Japan into the 
war, which in a venomous manner is given for the outbreak of the war with America.”
419
  
Attacking Pearl Harbor meant nothing to the judges, but criticizing Japan was seen as 
poisonous and they blamed Helmuth for castigating Japan.
420
  Another flyer, “The Nazi 
Reichmarshal,” referred to “good old fat Hermann:  Oh yes, he has something on the ball, 
this little rogue with the saucer eyes.  A dazzling career, a pretty actress and a very ample 
salary that is not to be sneezed at, but no brains.  No, really not, as big as his head is.”
421
  
This particular handbill caught the judges’ sense of humor, and the grave occasion was 
broken with laughter from the bench.
422
 
 Karl-Heinz reminisces, “I was astonished how cool, clear, and clever Helmuth 
was.  The court went over every detail in the leaflets and he recalled everything.  He 
knew precisely when, how, and where he had conceived an idea and what he meant by 
it…”
423
  When asked, “Why did you do that?” Helmuth responded, “Because I wanted 
the people to know the truth.”
424
  At one point Fickeis queried, “Would you have us 
believe that the British are telling us the truth?”  To which Helmuth replied, “Yes, surely, 
don’t you?”
425
  The judges then asked, “You don’t doubt Germany’s ultimate victory, do 
you?”  Helmuth answered incredulously, “Do you actually believe that Germany can win 
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  When asked why he had passed flyers among the working class, Helmuth 
stated, “Hamburg will always stay in opposition to the Party . . . especially in the labor 
sections of Hamburg where the laborer, the common worker, cannot be fooled like the 
rich people.”  The judicial retort, “You snot-nosed kid, what do you know about it?”
427
 
 Both Rudi and Karl-Heinz believed that during the proceedings, Helmuth 
attempted to focus the attention for the conspiracy on himself, so as to shield them from 
culpability.  The court-appointed defense counsel spoke “about one minute each,” 
whereupon the prosecution recommended the death penalty for Helmuth, seven years 
incarceration for Rudi, and a minimum of two years imprisonment for Karl-Heinz and 
Gerhard, respectively. 
 When announcing their decision the judges opined that they considered 
Helmuth’s mental abilities far advanced for his years.  They claimed that his school thesis 




 years,” as well as his leaflets, his general 
knowledge, his political knowledge, and his appearance and behavior before the court,
428
 
“show without exception the picture of a precocious young man, intellectually long since 
having outgrown his youth.”
429
  Helmuth was the type of individual the Nazis were most 
afraid of; they extolled and glorified him in order to destroy him.  The judges’ 
commented on his thesis, stating that it was “so well written that it could have been the 
work of a 30-year-old assessor,” or which could have been written by a 30-year-old 
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  Thus, “For Helmuth Hübener, charged with preparation of high 
treason, aiding and abetting the enemy we sentence him to death.  And the forfeiture of 
his human civil rights for his lifetime,”
431
 which meant they could then physically 
mistreat him until his execution.
432
  The court sentencing document for Helmuth states, 
“The defendant was aware of the danger of his propaganda and of the reasons for it.  
Therefore the death penalty, which is compellingly prescribed, must be imposed on 
him…”
433
  Rudi received the maximum of ten years imprisonment for preparation of high 
treason and aiding and abetting the enemy, Karl-Heinz, for distributing broadcast news, 
five years imprisonment, and Gerhard, for distributing minor information, four years 
confinement.  Düwer’s sentence was less than the others because it was not proven that 
he ever listened to the radio.  When asked by the court if they had anything to say, all 
defendants with the exception of Helmuth declined.
434
  Helmuth stood and faced the 
judges saying, “Now I must die, even though I have committed no crime.  So now it’s my 
turn, but your turn will come.”
435
 
 Helmuth was the first juvenile defendant to be sentenced to death as punishment 
for violating the radio law of September 1, 1939; even hardened Nazis were astonished at 
the verdict.
436
  Legally, this was permitted by the decree of October 4, 1939, which 
transferred youths 16 years of age and older from the juvenile court system to the more 
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severe jurisdiction of the adult penal code, if
437
 “their mental or moral development put 
them on a par with adults,”
438
 which the court was very anxious to deem Helmuth as 
being so endowed.  Just seven years earlier, a group accused of similar offenses, to that of 
Helmuth, received sentences of only one to three years of incarceration.
439
   
 Rudi was fortunate that the court sentenced him to only ten years imprisonment.  
On March 21, 1943, Roland Freisler, President of the People’s Court, instructed lower 
jurisdictions that “too mild sentences” were a hindrance to the Gestapo.  He informed the 
Presidents of the higher regional courts to discontinue imposing sentences exceeding ten 
years incarceration, for cases in which more than ten years confinement was justified, the 
death penalty was to be applied instead of imprisonment.
440
 
 Three days after his trial, Helmuth’s mother wrote a note to the Attorney General 
at the People’s Court requesting that she and her mother be allowed to visit Helmuth, for 
his clemency, and that he be given an opportunity to ameliorate for his actions.  Six 
appeals for clemency were submitted, including:  one from his fellow employees; his 
Hitler Youth group; the public authorities in Hamburg; one from his attorney, Dr. Knie; 
from the Berlin office of the Gestapo; and, from his stepfather, Hugo Hübener, who had 
officially adopted Helmuth and given him his name. 
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 Gestapo Agent Müssener, who had caught and interrogated Helmuth, did 
something unexpected; he went before the Court and asked that Helmuth’s life be spared, 
but to no avail.  On October 15, 1942, the Minister of Justice signed the decree of 
execution.  Along with the death warrant, a letter was forwarded under date of October 
19, 1942, addressed to the Attorney General at the People’s Court requesting,
441
 “that you 
arrange with the greatest haste for all necessary subsequent actions.”
442
  At 1:05 P.M., on 
October 27, 1942, six men appeared at Helmuth’s cell, two officials from the Office of 
the Attorney of the People’s Court, Ranke and Renk; Mr. Rohde, a representative of the 
prison director; Dr. Schmitt, the prison doctor; and two prison guards.  They read to 
Helmuth the judgment of the People’s Court of August 11, 1942, along with the decree of 
the Minister of Justice of October 15, 1942, stating that he would not avail himself of his 
right of clemency, “but to let justice run its course.”  Helmuth was then told that the 
execution would occur that evening after 8:00 P.M.
 443
 
Helmuth was in the execution chamber less than 18 seconds before being 
murdered.  The Minister of Justice recommended that his body be delivered to the 
Anatomical Institute of the University of Berlin.  His family was given no information 
with respect to his execution or his grave.  Hans Kunkel states that the family never 
received any correspondence as to his burial site.  He further reiterates that Helmuth’s 
mother learned of his death in a most cruel manner. 
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The Nazis made an example of Helmuth by announcing his death on October 28, 
with thousands of blood-red posters throughout Germany.  His mother happened to see a 
placard on a cement wall; it was her birthday.  The local newspaper in which Helmuth’s 
execution was announced, the Hamburger Anzeiger und Nachrichten, consisted of one 
long paragraph, a quarter page in length.
444
 
Helmuth, Rudi, Karl-Heinz, Gerhard, and other members of the resistance, 
provided the moral foundation for the rebirth of Germany.  Helmuth’s story lay in 
relative obscurity for 20 years after his death, until 1962, when the group was 
rediscovered.  German novelist, Günter Grass, a Nobel Laureate in 1999, wrote a novel in 
the 1960s, Local Anesthetic, based upon Helmuth and his associates.  Grass’ work 
concerns informing younger people of the Nazis and the resistance efforts arising 
therefrom, despite the older generation’s not desiring to discuss the issues, and the 
resultant tension between the age groups. 
After the war, Helmuth’s legacy received some attention in Germany, while in the 
United States little has been reported of him.  In October 1976, the play Huebener was 
written by Thomas Rogers and produced by Brigham Young University (“BYU”).  It was 
restaged at BYU in 1992, and by Rogers in Bountiful, Utah, in May of 2003, while 
another play, Huebener Against the Reich, was written by David Anderson in Salt Lake 
City, where it ran from February to early March 1984.  Other books and plays have 
likewise been written about Helmuth.  In Germany, Helmuth played an important role not 
only in Grass’ novel, but a play, Davor (Up Tight), written by Alan Keele, has been seen 
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on television in several countries, and Paul Schalluck’s radio play, Helmuth Hübener, has 
been heard throughout Germany.  At Berlin’s Plötzensee Prison, visitors are provided a 
booklet that portrays a photo and short article relative to Helmuth’s life.  In December 
2002, Brigham Young University produced a documentary, Truth & Conviction, about 
the Hübener group, mainly from the perspective of Karl-Heinz that aired several times 
during 2003. 
For all that has been organized and accomplished to commemorate Helmuth and 
his fellow resistance members, Gerhard Kunkel, Helmuth’s half-brother, in his final 
commentary describes this lasting painful peculiarity:
445
 
 In 1994 we went to Hamburg to see my brother’s 
memorial building, the Helmuth Hübener House, which in 
1985 had been renamed from ‘Bieberhaus,’ the 
administrative building for the Hamburg government.  But 
the plaque was now gone, and the building has been 
renamed back to ‘Bieberhaus.’ 
 A street which had borne Helmuth’s name had also 
been renamed to something else, and the old street sign 
bearing Helmuth’s name had been removed.  I suppose the 





 In a final analysis, whenever one takes a stand against evil, they will initiate a 
controversy.  Helmuth felt that he had done nothing wrong, while others criticized his 
actions as imprudent, in a pragmatic sense, leaving those of his family and fellow church 
members subject to increased scrutiny.  What may have started with some measure of 
adventure acquired political, religious, and philosophical content and profoundness.  
Helmuth possessed not only perception, but courage.  By virtue of his intelligence, this 
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16 year-old man, was able to perceive and illuminate the fabrications of the entire Nazi 
regime.  By doing so, he became a threat to a government built upon lies; thus, all of the 
official German fears regarding the credibility of the Führer became fatally focused.  For 
the Nazis, Helmuth’s pen was mightier than their sword. 
His response to an unjustified regime was a sincere, if naïve, attempt to 
revolutionize by educating his fellow citizens.  Had the Nazis held sacred the freedom of 
conscience and protected the individual in their inherent and inalienable rights through its 
laws, not depriving its people of their privilege of free exercise of religious beliefs or 
proscribing them in their opinions, Helmuth would never have become a malefactor; his 
temperament and mentality were not of that character.  Members of a society would do 
better to err in the direction of being more concerned, as Helmuth’s actions demonstrate, 
rather than less, about the survival of those principles of freedom they hold dear, and to 
exhibit the courage to act here and now, in this and other free countries around the world, 
before the wicked rule and history once again repeats itself.  One should follow the 
sincerity, purity of heart, courage, and heroism exemplified in and through Helmuth 
Hübener’s behavior when confronted by the significant depravity in our ever-changing 
and modernizing world. 
For steadfastly enduring against Hitler’s corruption and perversion, Helmuth was 
culpably guilty of treasonous conduct pursuant to the dictates of Nazi “justice.”  As a 
consequence, his fate was determined by the wholly dependent People’s Court, a 
judiciary that had deliberately discarded its independence and autonomy to tyrannical and 
depraved political authorities and that was willfully exploited by them to advance the 
mandates of Nazi barbarism through sanctioned and endorsed judicial murder. 
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Chapter XIII:  Count Helmuth James von Moltke and the Kreisau Circle 
 This dissertation demonstrates the perplexing issues associated with the 
functioning of the German judiciary during the period of Nazi tyranny.  The following 
chapter discusses the trial of a resistance member to the regime, Count Helmut James von 
Moltke, and a group of individuals with whom he was affiliated, known as the Kreisau 
Circle.  Moltke was sentenced to death by the People’s Court for privately deliberating 
possible alternative forms of government in the post-Nazi era.  Moltke’s defense was that 
he had only “thought,” but his thoughts were sufficient for the Nazis to find him culpable 
of high treason.  He was executed on January 23, 1945, subsequent to a “show trial” 
before a wholly dependent judiciary that had relinquished its independence and autonomy 
to despotic and corrupt political authorities and was utilized by them to advance the 
dictates of the Nazi reign of terror.  The guilt of Moltke was determined prior to his trial, 
it being a mere formality in the Nazi legal scheme which the regime proffered as 
“justice.” 
Count Helmuth James von Moltke was an anti-Nazi lawyer, before and during the 
Third Reich, who challenged the regime and was ultimately murdered by it because he 




 On October 11, 1944, after nearly nine months in jail, Helmuth James von Moltke 
was served with his arrest warrant, accusing him of treason.  He wrote a farewell letter to 
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his two sons, aged 5 and 3, respectively, in which he explained the basis for his criminal 
condemnation that was to be carried out against him:
448
 
 Throughout my life from my schooldays onwards I 
have fought against a spirit of narrowness and 
subservience, of arrogance and intolerance, against the 
absolutely merciless consistency which is deeply engrained 
in the Germans and has found its expression in the National 
Socialist state.  I have made it my aim to get this spirit 
overcome with its evil accompaniments, such as excessive 
nationalism, racial persecution, lack of faith and 
materialism.  In this sense and seen from their own 





The Nazis were not justified in murdering him for committing or advocating acts of 
violence because he had always been opposed thereto, such as the attempted coup d’état 
of July 20, 1944.  He believed that such an act would not change the mentality behind the 
Third Reich.  
 
 Helmuth James von Moltke was born on March 11, 1907, in Silesia,
450
 the first 
child of Count Helmuth von Moltke (1876-1939), who was a great-nephew of General 
Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke, and Dorothy, née Rose Innes (1885-1935), she 
being the only child of Sir James Rose Innes (1855-1942) and his wife, Jessie, née 
Pringle.  Sir James had been Attorney General and retired as Chief Justice of South 
Africa.   
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 Kreisau, together with the neighboring estates of Nieder-Gräditz and Wierischau, 
comprised approximately 1000 acres.  General Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke 
had acquired the properties with monies granted him by his King after the Prussian war 
against Austria in 1866.  By prevailing standards it was a modest estate.  The Field 
Marshal became a widower in 1868, without children.  On his death in 1891, the estate 
passed to his nephew, Wilhelm, and upon his death in 1905, to his eldest son, Count 
Helmuth von Moltke. 
 Helmuth James von Moltke began his studies in law, politics, social history, the 
history of socialism, and journalism, receiving instruction at Breslau, Berlin, and Vienna 
with potential careers in either politics or law, possibly as a judge, to emulate his 
grandfather.  He started work in the statistical department of a Berlin company and in his 
non-working hours enjoyed discussions with his friends and Berlin’s cultural atmosphere.  
However, in October of 1929, the manager of Kreisau died, and the estate was discovered 
to be in total disorder and substantial debt.  Helmuth’s father called on his eldest son, 
Helmuth James, to alleviate the quandary and disorder.  He became his father’s 
plenipotentiary, analyzed the situation, and persuaded the creditors to permit him one 
year in which to establish that they would benefit from his management of the manor.    
He was also beginning at this time the practical phase of his law studies.  By October of 
1930, the worst had passed and he was able to enjoy the economic management of 
Kreisau.
451
  In addition, until Hitler’s assent to power in 1933, Helmuth worked in 
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different law offices, the second and third of which he specialized in international private 
law.  He had no desire to become a judge under the Nazi regime.
452
 
 After 1935, there were added political complications, not only whether there was 
any purpose to staying in Germany, but increasingly, if remaining there while keeping his 
distance from the Nazis, did this not also involve him in culpability, because it helped to 
maintain a façade behind which horrendous things were occurring.  However, he was 
able to help the persecuted by doing whatever possible.  Additionally, he was much 
attached to Kreisau, which despite the debt and the hostility of the Nazi farmers’ 
organization provided an economic base that permitted him relative independence, and 
also became his personal emotional retreat. 
 In the winter of 1933-34, he was required to spend some weeks in a camp at 
Jüterbog devoted to ideological indoctrination and pre-military training for young 
lawyers.  By the autumn of 1934, Himmler’s SS had begun its ascendancy, which 
brought the gradual change from authoritarian Gleichschaltung, or coordination, to 
totalitarian rule.  On August 2, 1934, President von Hindenburg died and Hitler assumed 
his office and merged it with the chancellorship, while maintaining the leadership of the 
Party.  The armed forces had to then take an oath swearing personal allegiance to Hitler, 
not to the defense of the Constitution.  For Helmuth, the question of his life’s direction 
became more demanding and momentous.  During a subsequent visit to England, he 
realized that the study of British law, with the aim of being called to the British bar, held 
the most promising prospect. 
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 He applied for admission to the Inner Temple and over the ensuing years not only 
read for the bar, but paid frequent visits to England for the required dinners.  His first 
visit to England had been in 1934, when he met Lionel Curtis, co-founder of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House and Fellow of All Souls College in 
Oxford.  Curtis introduced him to many people, and Helmuth used the opportunities to 
inform these individuals of the true character and objectives of the Third Reich.  He did 
not believe that the Nazis would ameliorate into a respectable government, or that a 
policy of concessions would promote this change.  He was deeply concerned that the 
principle of appeasement would gain popularity in England and lead the Nazis to believe 
that Britain would remain neutral in the event of war and thus only serve to embolden 
Hitler. 
 As Helmuth had foreseen, the policy of appeasement did indeed lead to further 
German threats and coercive actions and as he also predicted, the radicalization of Nazi 
domestic policy.  The exodus of refugees from the German sphere of influence increased, 
especially after the coordinated, nation-wide anti-Jewish excesses of November 1938.  
He became extremely industrious in assisting with emigration.  By the time the war 
began, Helmuth had passed his English bar exams and located an office in London.  He 
then made use of his experience in international and British law, joining the Foreign 
Division of the Abwehr, the German intelligence service, as legal adviser to the High 
Command of the Armed Services, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (“OKW”). 
 The Abwehr, under Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, was the center of concentration for 
much opposition to the regime.  Canaris and his assistant Colonel, later Major General, 
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Hans Oster, as well as other members of the Abwehr, were executed before the end of the 
war for their resistance activities. 
 In the early phase of the war, Helmuth was absorbed in the prevention of breaches 
of international law and the protection of neutrals.  It was very difficult to affect strategic 
planning, but he was involved in efforts to get Hitler to cancel or postpone plans for a 
campaign in the West after the defeat and partition of Poland.  There was little that could 
be done by the Wehrmacht to preclude the atrocities committed by the Schutzstaffel 
(“SS”) against the Polish leadership and citizens.  He did, however, contend for the 
recognition of Polish prisoners of war as such and for the Poles who fought with the 
French and British after escaping Poland as combatants.  Moltke continually endeavored 
to expand the protection of the Wehrmacht to people who would otherwise be subjected 
to the barbarity of the SS.  He was aware and somewhat involved in the efforts of 
opponents of the regime both within and outside of the Abwehr to contact Britain 
regarding a negotiated peace after the desired elimination of Hitler.  Josef Müller, also a 
member of the Abwehr, went to Rome, where Pope Pius XII was willing to act as the 
intermediary to the British Ambassador at the Holy See.  But nothing could halt Hitler’s 
course of aggression.  The Nazis occupied Denmark and Norway in April of 1940, and 
attacked Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France in May.  The rapid defeat of the 
French disarmed and disoriented the domestic opposition in Germany; Hitler stood at the 
zenith of his popularity and power.   
 In the summer of 1940, Moltke began a systematic contact with like-minded men 
to discuss the principles upon which Germany should be rebuilt in the time after Hitler 
and in a liberated Europe.  It was the Gestapo which would later designate the group as 
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the “Kreisau Circle,” when interrogators discovered its existence during the investigation 
surrounding the July 20, 1944, assassination plot on the life of Adolf Hitler.  Helmuth 
was conscientious to include Socialists and religious representatives, two groups he saw 
as fundamental to the reconstruction of Germany.  Likewise, he brought together 
emissaries of both the Protestant majority and Catholic minority.  Hitler’s electoral base 
had been predominantly Protestant; the Protestant churches were stridently nationalistic, 
and the “German Christians” had shown how German Protestantism could evolve into 
Nazi philosophical propaganda. 
 In addition to his official Abwehr position and the increasing resistance activities 
in connection with the “Kreisau Circle” discussions and propositions, Moltke maintained 
his private law practice.  He also kept a watchful though distant observation on the 
farming operations at Kreisau, always longing to be there, but rarely able to go for a 
weekend or working vacation.  Helmuth’s rank in the Abwehr corresponded to that of a 
major; he was not required to wear a uniform, though repeatedly urged to do so.  His 
surname assisted both in his work and in preserving his freedom, until his arrest on 
January 19, 1944.  The name of Bismarck’s general still maintained an aura in the Third 
Reich. 
 After the capitulation of France, Moltke struggled to maintain his own morale and 
confidence in an ultimate British victory, with the Bible assuming a predominant role in 
his life and affecting him as being very topical.  He also continued to attempt to influence 
Alexander Kirk, the American Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin, to counteract the United 
States tendency toward isolationism, which was being fostered by the American 
Ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy.  When Kirk left Berlin in October of 1940, he 
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 “most delicate and valuable of his clandestine ‘contacts’ among the 
German oppositionists”
454
 to George Kennan, who later wrote that:
455
 
. . . it was in fact, largely from Moltke that [Kirk] had 
derived his conviction that the war, all early German 
triumphs notwithstanding, would end badly for Germany.... 
Even at that time—in 1940 and 1941—he had looked 
beyond the whole sordid arrogance and the apparent 
triumphs of the Hitler regime; he had seen through to the 
ultimate catastrophe and had put himself to the anguish of 
accepting it and accommodating himself to it inwardly, 
preparing himself—as he would eventually have liked to 
prepare his people—for the necessity of starting all over 
again, albeit in defeat and humiliation, to erect a new 




Helmuth had read the Federalist Papers and envisaged a federal structure for Germany 
and Europe; he impressed Kennan by having risen above the pettiness and primitivism of 
latter-day German nationalism. 
 As a result of the German attack on the Soviet Union in June of 1941, Britain’s 
year of solitary opposition against Hitler ended.  The attack precipitated ideological and 
total war.  As long as the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939 was in force, the Nazis had 
fought the West, now came the struggle opposing “Jewish Bolshevism.”  It was then a 
fight not only for Lebensraum, the land, natural, and human resources of the Soviet 
Union, but for the destruction of communism and those who embodied it, partisans, 
civilians, and Jews.  The Jews were also left for cold-blooded murder by the 
Einsatzgruppen, forces of the Security Police and Sicherheitsdienst or SD.  Soon 
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however, in addition to the Jews in the Soviet Union, Jews from Germany and countries 
occupied by or allied with the Nazis were being exterminated.  Deportations from Berlin 
began in October of 1941; in January 1942, the “final solution of the Jewish question” 
was initiated for the whole of Europe.  Moltke had heard of SS men suffering nervous 
breakdowns, and in October of 1942, received reliable reports relative to the use of 
poisonous gas in an extermination camp.  In May 1943, on his only trip to occupied 
Poland, he witnessed the cloud of smoke above the Warsaw ghetto. 
 Helmuth contended for the lives of Soviet prisoners of war, who were dying in 
large numbers and remained the responsibility of the armed forces.  Although he pleaded 
for respect for international law and humanity, he knew that agreements for expediency 
and reciprocity were more effective.  German practices relative to Soviet prisoners of war 
were not modified until it could be proven that there were German prisoners in Russian 
captivity; here the assistance of the International Red Cross was required.  Another factor 
that advanced change in German practices was the manpower shortage; prisoners were 
needed as laborers and could not be left to starve, yet millions died.  Also, Moltke’s visit 
with Werner Best, the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark, coincided with the aborted 
seizure of Danish Jews; he contributed to the rescue of most of these individuals. 
 Trips to occupied or neutral countries always served more than one purpose.  He 
continually looked for people who were willing to work against the escalation of the war, 
Nazi atrocities, and oppression.  He found, particularly in Holland and Scandinavia, 
persons sympathetic to the endeavors of the Kreisau Circle and their post-war plans. 
 This secret working group had grown since summer 1940; the summer of 1941 
saw the beginning of Moltke’s regular exchange of news and opinions with Konrad von 
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Preysing, the Catholic Bishop of Berlin, who was also kept informed about the 
deliberations of the group.  The first members of the assemblage, Peter Count Yorck von 
Wartenburg, Horst von Einsiedel, Hans Peters, Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, and 
Adam von Trott zu Solz, were joined by the Socialists, Adolf Reichwein, Carlo 
Mierendorff, and Theodor Haubach.  Hans Bernd von Haeften, a member of the Foreign 
Service and a Protestant, joined in 1941, as did Theodor Steltzer, another Protestant, 
stationed in Norway.  Protestant prison chaplain Harald Poelchau also joined.  Karl 
Ludwig Guttenberg stabilized connections with the Munich Jesuits, their Provincial, 
Augustin Rösch, and Fathers Alfred Delp and Lothar König, the last two joining in 1942, 
as did Protestant Eugen Gerstenmaier, and the Protestant Bishop of Württemberg, 
Theophil Wurm, who since the summer of 1941, had become the acknowledged, though 
unofficial, head of the Confessing Church.  Another late addition, Catholic Paulus van 
Husen, assumed a dominant role in drafting the plans for punishing Nazi criminals. 
 The Kreisauers mostly met in Berlin in small groups of often two or three, in 
Moltke’s apartment at Derfflingerstrasse 10, which he shared with his usually absent 
brother-in-law, Carl Deichmann.  Meetings were also held, especially when a larger 
involvement was anticipated, at the residence of the Yorcks’ in Hortensienstrasse, Berlin 
Lichterfelde-West.  The first of three large meetings at Kreisau took place in May of 
1942, and dealt with questions of political structure, education, university reform, and 
church and state relations.  The second Kreisau meeting, in October 1942, was preceded 
by preliminary discussions between the Socialist, Carlo Mierendorff and the trade 
unionists, Wilhelm Leuschner and Hermann Maass as one faction, and the Jesuits, Rösch, 
Delp, and König, as the other, in order to achieve a consensus between Social Democrats 
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and Christian trade unionists and religious representatives.  Wilhelm Leuschner and 
Hermann Maass, as his surrogate at the Kreisau gathering, favored one large trade union; 
whereas, the others preferred work unions, to activate local initiative and avoid the 
centralization that the federalist constitutional plans were intended to counteract in the 
political area.  “Small communities” were to restore to the individual a sense of having 
some voice and responsibility. 
 Preparatory talks for the third and what proved to be the last Kreisau meeting, in 
June of 1943, overlapped with continuing discussions of the results of the second 
conference.  There were deliberations and documents relative to the punishment of Nazi 
criminals
457
 and on the “translation to the European plane”
458
 of the federal plans drafted 
for Germany.  In April 1941, Helmuth had written a paper regarding the design of a peace 
settlement after Germany’s defeat.
459
  He postulated “a unitary European sovereignty 
from Portugal to a point as far east as possible, with a division of the entire continent into 
smaller, non-sovereign political units,”
460
 along with an Anglo-Saxon Union. 
 By June 1943, the political atmosphere had shifted due to the German defeats at 
Stalingrad and Tunisia, the demand for a German unconditional surrender proclaimed by 
Roosevelt and Churchill at their Casablanca Conference in January of 1943, the conflict 
between the Soviet Union and the “London” Poles, and the tensions between Russia and 
the Western Allies.  In addition, Nazi policies in occupied Europe made any German 
planning for a united Europe after the war more difficult.  Moltke also saw a perplexing 
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danger in any coup d’état, the creation of a new stab-in-the-back myth, similar to the one 
that had perpetrated so much political harm and discord in Germany subsequent to 1918.  
It is for this reason that he held a clear military defeat to be necessary.  To prepare for this 
eventuality, the Kreisauers worked in the summer of 1943, looking for suitable men, 
“Regional Commissioners,” who would assume responsibility once the time had arrived 
for transition. 
 All these plans and personnel decisions necessitated travel, which as before, were 
connected with official missions or disguised as such, including two trips to Turkey in 
July and December of 1943, respectively, when Moltke tried in vain to meet with 
Alexander Kirk.  Earlier attempts to persuade the British to post an intermediary in 
Stockholm, for liaison with the German resistance, had proved equally unsuccessful.
461
 
 The last months before Moltke’s arrest on January 19, 1944, were also made more 
strenuous by the escalation of Allied air raids.  The central offices of the Abwehr moved 
to the new OKW headquarters at Zossen, outside Berlin; however, Helmuth continued to 
work in Berlin with a small group.  When his apartment on Derfflingerstrasse was 
bombed, he began residing with the Yorcks. 
 The immediate cause for his arrest was the detention of his colleague Otto Kiep, 
who he had warned was under surveillance.  The Gestapo learned of the apprisal and that 
afforded justification to apprehend Moltke; the true reason lay in the conflict of the SD 
against Canaris and the Abwehr.  It was unlikely, however, that Helmuth would have 
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been permitted to engage in his resistance controverting Nazi principles and practices 
indefinitely, despite the protection of his family name. 
 No charges were lodged initially, the confinement being classified as “protective 
custody.”  After a few days of interrogation at Gestapo headquarters on Prinz-Albrecht-
Strasse in Berlin, he was sent to a prison near the women’s concentration camp at 
Ravensbrück.  There he had a fairly comfortable captivity; his wife, Freya, was permitted 
to visit a few times; they discussed family and farm issues and, discreetly, his present 
quandary.  His Abwehr office was still allowed to forward some papers from work for his 
attention and by summer of 1944, it appeared as if he might be released, but the failed 
assassination conspiracy of July 20, 1944, altered any such thoughts and expectations. 
 Yorck and others associated with the Kreisau Circle had joined the coterie of 
plotters preparing a coup d’état under the leadership of Colonel Claus Schenk von 
Stauffenberg.  Yorck was in the initial group of defendants tried before the People’s 
Court, and was hanged on August 8, 1944.  In the course of the interrogations of possible 
people connected, or suspected of being involved, with the connivance, the Gestapo 
discovered additional names of individuals who had schemed against the regime in 
conjunction with Moltke.  Even though he had been in protective custody for six months 
before the attempt, and although his critical attitude toward the conspiracy was known, 
Moltke was seen as a principal and driving force in the July 20, 1944, assassination plot. 
 As these allegations escalated, in September, Moltke was returned to Berlin and 
placed in Tegel Prison; there finding all too many acquaintances, but because of his being 
shackled, he encountered difficulty when attempting to communicate with others.  
However, prison chaplain, Harald Poelchau, whose connection with the Kreisau Circle 
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was never discovered, was allowed to visit with all of them and help to harmonize their 
statements and defense strategies.  He also conveyed correspondences between Helmuth 
and Freya, who was permitted a few more visits.  She spent the last weeks in Berlin 
offering her assistance to help her husband, even calling upon Gestapo chief, Heinrich 
Müller, who stated to her that the Third Reich would not commit the same mistake as in 
1918, letting its internal enemies survive.  Moltke had to die, but the family would be 
unharmed.  Moltke’s trial before Roland Freisler and the People’s Court was convened 
from January 9 through 11, 1945, his execution being January 25, 1945.   
 He had prepared himself for his trial, both legally and psychologically.  The arrest 
warrant, for a man already in jail,
462
 was presented to him on October 11, 1944.
463
  It 
accused him of having tried, together with others, to change the constitution of the Reich 
by violence and thereby aiding and abetting foreign powers in wartime, thus high treason 
and the death penalty.  Five different violations of the Penal Code had been adduced as 
applicable; however, none of these alleged criminal transgressions appear in the Court’s 
judgment; instead, as a result of his astute defense, he was deemed guilty of failing to 
report treasonous activities and defeatism. 
 In all, there were only three long weekend meetings at Kreisau, and it was from 
these that the name was generated, even though the principal work was accomplished in 
Berlin.  Therefore, Berlin can more readily be described as the center of activity rather 
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 The first weekend at Kreisau took place on Pentecost 1942, from May 22 to 25.  It 
was disguised as Helmuth inviting his coworkers for a long weekend in the country; all 
travelled by rail but not on the same train.  There were definite topics for each of the 
three weekends at Kreisau, with each topic having a discussion leader.  Relatively 
harmless themes had been chosen for the first weekend; had information concerning the 
meeting gotten disclosed, it could have been justified without becoming treasonous.  The 
subject matter included school and universities, and the relationship between church and 
state.  The Nazi regime had a very destructive effect on education; thus, Adolf 
Reichwein, who had trained teachers until his dismissal, reported on this area.  Although 
the group was in favor of separation of church and state, many Catholics wanted to retain 
sectarian elementary schools.  Helmuth spoke on the reform of the universities, while 
Theodor Steltzer, a Landrat, or the head of an administrative district,
465
 in Schleswig-
Holstein before his dismissal in 1933, led the debate on church and state.  Hans Peters, a 
professor of public law in Berlin, but drafted into the service, spoke pertaining to the 
concordant Hitler had concluded with the Catholic Church in 1933; he and Rösch 
presenting the Catholic viewpoint, Steltzer and Poelchau as Protestants.  Questions of 
faith became vitally important for almost all members of the group, even if they were not 
church-going Christians because it gave them their foundation and courage.  Their faith 
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also imposed upon them the duty to act against the destruction of humanity by National 
Socialism because they believed in the future of Christianity, of it becoming alive once 
again. 
 That was the first of the Kreisau weekends.  Many discussions about the results of 
this weekend and preparatory work for the second took place mainly in Berlin, but also in 
Munich and Stuttgart, prior to the second Kreisau weekend on October 16 through 18, 
1942.  In addition to Yorck and Moltke, the economics expert Horst von Einsiedel, as 
well as Haubach, Steltzer, and Peters were all present at Kreisau.  New to the second 
meeting were the theologian Eugen Gerstenmaier and Jesuit Father Alfred Delp, sent by 
Father Rösch.  Labor unionist, Wilhelm Leuschner, had delegated Hermann Maass to join 
in for this weekend; however, he could not be called a Kreisauer as he was always 
distrustful of the group and of the motives of the participants from noble families. 
 The second Kreisau weekend was not as relaxed as the first with work extending 
late into the night, concerning planning for a new state and the economy.  For the 
reconstruction process of both entities, the ideas of decentralization and self-government 
were important to the Circle.  They intended to make better democrats out of the 
Germans by practicing self-government and avoiding the mistakes of the Weimar 
Republic.  They also wanted to install self-government into the economic sector in the 
form of company labor unions.  According to the Kreisauers, a company was described as 
a
466
 “community of people who work in it,”
467
 and all members of the company should 
participate in its decision-making process. 
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 Horst von Einsiedel and Carl Dietrich von Trotha had done the preliminary work 
on the question of economic planning and had provided a basis for discussion.  Their 
preparatory output stated that the European economy
468
 “should be freed from the 
inherited limitations of a nation-state” in order to “bring about the joining of the separate 
national economies of Europe into an organic and structured unity.”
469
  The Kreisauers 
thought in terms of Europe and were convinced that the sovereign European nation-state 
was coming to its conclusion; securing world peace required
470
 “the creation of an order 
that comprised the individual states.”
471
  Although they were not completely finished, at 
the culmination of the weekend, Helmuth was satisfied with what had been achieved and 
the contribution of the new members.   
 The third and final weekend at Kreisau, Pentecost, June 12 through 14, 1943, was 
influenced by both the participants and the existing conditions.  There was more pressure 
because of the continuing war and the available information relative to the acts of the 
Nazis.  Besides Yorck and Moltke, Reichwein, Gerstenmaier, Delp, Einsiedel, and Adam 
von Trott zu Solz attended this meeting.  Paulus van Husen, a state-employed lawyer, 
also attended as a new member.  The topics were foreign relations questions and how to 
treat the Nazis and war crimes after the collapse of the dictatorship. 
 Adam von Trott zu Solz spoke relative to foreign policy because the Circle had 
always desired to attempt to contact anti-Nazi resistance groups in the occupied 
countries.  The Kreisauers believed that would be useful for the time after the war, as 
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representatives of the resistance against the Nazis in Europe, with whom they could work 
together, would then come to power.  They were successful in making contact with the 
resistance in Holland and Norway, but not in France. 
 Several times Adam von Trott zu Solz had brought information of the existence 
and composition of the German opposition to the Nazis in Germany to Switzerland and 
Sweden, both neutral countries.  Moltke had done the same, going also to Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, and neutral Turkey.  It was in this way that leaflets of the White Rose 
went through Helmuth to Sweden and from there to England, but there was never a 
response from either England or the United States.   
 Paulus van Husen brought a draft concerning the “Punishment of the Violators of 
the Law,” which was discussed.  The Kreisauers wanted the Germans to participate in the 
prosecution and sentencing of war and Nazi crimes, suggesting proceeding before an 
international court, on which the victors, neutral countries, and Germany would sit 
together. 
 In August, after another larger meeting in Berlin, everything was finalized, with 
the documents being dated August 9, 1943, and entitled, “Principles for the New Order” 
combined with “Directions to the Regional Commissioners.”  Regional commissioners 
were to be people who were ready to maintain inner unity based upon Kreisau resolutions 
in the various parts of Germany in the event of a collapse, and to prevent disintegration.  
Included in the Directions was the abolition of all discrimination on the basis of race or 
religion.  Regional commissioners were sought for all of Germany; some people were 
ascertained ready to assume this responsibility on “Day X,” the day on which defeated 
from either the inside or the outside, the Third Reich would collapse. 
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 Nothing was ever realized of the plans, some later resolutions were related to 
corresponding Kreisau suggestions, but there was no direct connection; all decisions were 
made by the victorious allies.  However, one must credit the Kreisauers for asking the 
right questions for the post-war future Germany, and acknowledge that behind the plans 
stood the participant’s principled protest against a tyrannical criminal dictatorship that 
despised honorable and righteous people to the extent of annihilation.
 472
 
 Almost all members of the Kreisau Circle who had taken part or became 
implicated in the events of July 20, 1944, were arrested. Yorck, Gerstenmaier, 
Lukaschek, Adam von Trott zu Solz, von Haeften, Steltzer, van Husen, Haubach, Delp, 
and Rösch were all taken into custody, in addition to the prior detention of Moltke.  
Besides König, only von der Gablentz, Peters, von Einsiedel, von Trotha and Poelchau 
among the members of the “inner circle” were not arrested. 
 Moltke knew after the failure of the July 20, 1944, plot that several members of 
the Circle had been incriminated and thus lost to reconstruction; another consequence 
was the thwarting of his own release.  He had always been skeptical about the feasibility 
of an assassination attempt,
473
 saying, “Don’t you see that we are not conspirators?  We 
can’t do it, we haven’t learned how, and we ought not now to try it for the first time; it 
will go awry and we will do it in a dilettante manner.”
474
  Endeavors to obtain Allied 
military support for the coup had all been in vain.  Moltke was therefore negative about 
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what was done on July 20, 1944, although realizing its conceivable importance when 
viewed from the perspective of the world outside Germany.
475
 
 Moltke’s personal internal conflict associated with the proposed assassination of 
Hitler is revealed and expressed by the private papers of the late Bishop Berggrav of 
Oslo.  The Bishop’s memoranda describing his conversations with members of the 
German resistance include notes on meetings with Steltzer and Moltke on January 8 and 
March 18, 1943, respectively.  Their discussion included the composition and plans of the 
various groups and the possibility of influencing Allied propaganda.  At their second 
meeting, Moltke raised the question of the ethical and theological justification for an 
attempt on Hitler’s life.  Berggrav, who later described it as the most difficult matter on 
which he had ever been asked to give his advice, replied that in certain circumstances the 
murder of a tyrant was justified, but that in his opinion it was already too late to murder 
Hitler.  Those who were contemplating removing the despot needed not only the means 
to assassinate him, but also, and more importantly, the ability to form a new government 
which could secure the peace.  However, by this stage of the war, Berggrav did not 
believe that any new German government could accomplish this undertaking.  
Nevertheless, the existence of these notes demonstrates that Moltke had ruminated upon 
the issue and sought divine judgment and intervention with respect thereto.
476
 
 After interrogation, all of the participants in the attempt, including the insiders of 
the Kreisau Circle, were sentenced to death by Roland Freisler of the People’s Court.  He 
described the death sentences as, “God’s judgment,” in trials recounted as, “a caricature 
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  In the course of his trial, Yorck had the courage to say that the 
treatment of the Jews and National Socialist legal practice had been decisive in 
determining his attitude toward the Nazi regime.
478
  “What is fundamental, what links all 
these problems together, is the state’s totalitarian claim upon the citizen which excludes 
his religious and moral obligations to God.”
479
 
 On August 15, 1944, von Haeften and Adam von Trott zu Solz stood before the 
People’s Court.  When asked by Freisler whether he saw that he had committed treason, 
von Haeften responded in the negative and declared that he viewed Hitler as the 
instrument of evil in history.  It was not until October 20, 1944, that Julius Leber and 
Adolf Reichwein came before Freisler.  When Reichwein began in a feeble voice to give 
a defense of himself, mistreatment in prison had affected his modulation, Freisler 
perceived that he was still able to enthrall people; he interrupted and attempted to drown 
everything Reichwein said by bellowing at him in order to prevent him from making an 
impression on the spectators.  Leber was never given a chance to speak, he was dubbed 
the “German Lenin” by Freisler.  He had been one of Stauffenberg’s closest colleagues 
and was not executed until January 5, 1945.  From his prison cell, Leber greeted his 
friends who were still free with the words,
480
 “For such a good and just cause the 
sacrifice of one’s life is the proper price.”
481
 
 The importance of the Kreisau Circle in the resistance movement against National 
Socialism came to prominence and was highlighted by Freisler in the January 9 and 10, 
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1945, trial of Moltke, Haubach, Gerstenmaier, Delp, and Steltzer.  As previously 
indicated, the accused were in regular contact with each other during their incarcerations 
and had coordinated their defense.  The case against them was that
482
 “they had together 
undertaken to change the constitution of the Reich by force, and to deprive the Führer of 
his constitutional power and thereby, at the same time, to give assistance at home to the 
enemy power during a war against the Reich.”
483
  As these were the charges, the accused 
had agreed to put their non-participation at the center of their defense. 
 While the others were being tried, their relations with Moltke and the “Moltke 
Circle” were consistently accentuated.  Moltke rejected the charges against him and 
insisted upon his own non-involvement, maintaining that he had only “thought.”  As the 
Nazis could not prove anything else against him, this defense was maintained throughout 
the trial.  His plea was rejected and the notes on his sentence stated,
484
 “He did not only 
think.”
485
  For the Nazis, his thoughts were sufficient for being culpable of high treason.  
During trial discourse Moltke and Freisler succeeded in establishing,
486
 “the 
incompatibility between Christianity and National Socialism.”
487
   Freisler admitted this 
incompatibility; a discordance the regime had always concealed or denied, even though 
its actions spoke inhumanity and savagery.
488
  The two had only one thing in common 
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and that was that they each demanded “the whole man.”
489
  Freisler recognized the 
fundamental character of Moltke’s resistance, as Moltke was able to say, “We shall be 
hanged as disciples of Christ.”
490
  Moltke’s letters regarding his trial disclose relief, 
gratitude, and elation.  He found himself standing,
491
 “before Freisler not as a Protestant, 
not as a big landowner, not as a nobleman, not as a Prussian, not as a German . . . but as a 
Christian and nothing else.”
492
   
 On January 23, 1945, Moltke, Haubach, and others were executed.  Theodor 
Haubach, was seriously ill, and had to be carried to the gallows on a stretcher.  Steltzer 
was saved through the assistance of his Scandinavian friends who persuaded Himmler’s 
Finnish masseur to intervene on his behalf.  As Himmler attached great importance to the 
goodwill of the Swedes, he gave orders on February 4, 1945, that the execution should 
not be conducted the day before it was scheduled to occur.  Hans Lukaschek and Paulus 
van Husen were brought to trial after Freisler’s death; van Husen was given a light 
sentence, and Lukaschek was acquitted, as he emphasized the torture that he had endured 
and retracted all admissions that he had made during his interrogations.  Augustin Rösch 
was not brought to trial before the end of the war and was thus saved.
493
 
 The German resistance was the response of a minority, who, in their rejection of 
National Socialism, were one; the ideas of the various groups of which the resistance was 
composed were many.  Typical for most of them was the internal renewal that they had 
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undergone through the course of the Nazi years.  The Kreisau Circle was acutely aware 
that a transformation would be necessary, and they therefore rejected any idea of a 
restoration and formulated their resistance on the demands of the future.  The Kreisauers’ 
plans were described by one of its leading members, sociologist and Catholic, Alfred 
Delp, in the following words:
494
 
We must endeavour so to organize the external life of men, 
their social, their economic, their technical relations, that 
they are assured of relatively secure access to everything 
that they need to make life, in all its forms, livable.  Men 
themselves are to be the measure of their own objective, 
and the implementation of our plan must always be judged 
in the light of what it is reasonable to believe possible.  Is 
this going to lead men to God?  That is the basic 
presupposition.  We must first strive to order and shape the 
conditions of life in such a way that the vision of God is no 




 The Kreisau Circle had always considered an occupation of Germany after the 
collapse of the regime to be necessary; they believed that Germans would only be ready 
for an inward renewal if they were compelled to understand that the National Socialist 
leaders were alone responsible for the defeat and chaos.  Moltke also had hoped that the 
victors would by their example further the renewal.  Hans Lukaschek commented that the 
debt to the Americans for the aid that they, as victors, had granted to the vanquished 
should never be forgotten; nor should Germany’s economic recovery be attributed solely 
to their nation’s own virtues.  With regard to the attitude of many of his fellow German 
countrymen, he remarked,
496
 “I do not believe in collective guilt, but unlike the majority 
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of my compatriots, I believe just as little in collective innocence.”
497
  The resistance 
movement of Count Helmuth James von Moltke and the Kreisau Circle exemplified their 
contempt and disdain for the concept and presumption of “collective innocence,”
 498
 
believing that individuals must act when confronted by a tyrannical authority. 
 Count Helmuth James von Moltke was a man of integrity and who through his 
own initiative, set an example in his official activities and in the work of the Kreisau 
Circle.  He planned, coordinated, allocated tasks, prodded when necessary, and 
maintained impetus, focus, and momentum, never failing to acknowledge that the mode 
of application was through a pooling of individual experiences and discourse to arrive at 
mutually agreed upon positions and stratagems.  His continuity of intent was to mitigate 
the horrors of Nazism by all means at his disposal and to prepare for a transcended future 
for Germany and its citizens.
499
 
 It should be noted that pursuant to the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement of 
1945, the greater part of German Silesia came under Polish administration,
500
and Kreisau, 
now known as Krzyzowa, is presently located in Poland.  Friends of the resistance against 
dictatorships in Germany and Poland have assembled and founded the “Kreisau 
Foundation for European Understanding,” which presently owns the farm complex and 
Berghaus.  These two governments have provided the financial resources for building 
renovations.  Kreisau is once again designated as a place for meetings, speaking, 
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listening, and above all, as a place where young and old can meet.  Kreisau will now, 




 For being an individual of integrity and goodness, who would not rebuke his 
Christian faith and avow fidelity to Hitler and his morally corrupt legal system, Helmuth 
James von Moltke was culpably guilty of treasonous conduct pursuant to the dictates of 
Nazi “justice.”  As a consequence, his fate was determined by the wholly dependent 
People’s Court, a judiciary that had deliberately discarded its independence and 
autonomy to tyrannical and depraved political authorities and that was willfully exploited 
by them to advance the mandates of Nazi barbarism through sanctioned and endorsed 
judicial murder. 
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Chapter XIV:  The White Rose 
 This dissertation demonstrates the perplexing issues associated with the 
functioning of the German judiciary during the period of Nazi tyranny.  The following 
chapter discusses the trials of resistance members to the regime known as the White 
Rose.  Six friends and immediate constituents of this group were sentenced to death by 
the People’s Court for exercising their freedoms of speech and press.  This was a 
judiciary that no longer protected these fundamental rights of the individual.  These 
executions were carried out subsequent to “show trials” before a wholly dependent 
judiciary that had relinquished its independence and autonomy to despotic and corrupt 
political authorities and was utilized by them to advance the dictates of the Nazi reign of 
terror.  The guilt of these six individuals was determined prior to their trials; they were 
mere formalities in the Nazi legal scheme which the regime proffered as “justice.” 
The White Rose was primarily a young adult resistance movement whose 
members recognized the injustices of the dictatorial Nazi regime and who had the 
determination to act against its tyranny.  Their undertaking was not an endeavor to assert 
their own individuality, but an enterprise on behalf of humanity, affirming a collective 
right to purge itself of despotism and terror.  They were nonconformists with a will and 
judgment of their own, accompanied by an integrated conscience refusing to 
imperceptively obey totalitarian domination.  Hans Scholl, Sophie Scholl, Christoph 
Probst, Alexander Schmorell, Willi Graf, and Professor Kurt Huber were murdered by 
the Nazi government for attempting to dismantle Hitler’s Germany by fomenting an 
internal revolt of the German populace, and by appealing to their virtuous and social 
convictions.  In the middle of Europe’s darkest night, they chose to confront this evil, not 
   220
   
 
with weapons, but with words, desiring to stir their fellow citizens from their 
accumulated fear and inactivity by awakening their sense of accountability and obligation 
to mankind.  Against the physical puissance and prerogative of the Nazi regime, these 
efforts could be considered hopeless and imprudent, if one only focuses on the 
overwhelming physical capability of the Nazis, and disregards the spiritual element of the 
human essence.  The White Rose sought to convince their fellow Germans that they, in 
fact, bore moral responsibility for the atrocities of Nazism and invoke this essential 
character of the humanitarian soul, so they may rightfully regain their dignity and 
comportment as vindicated members of the world community. 
 To comprehend and acknowledge one’s own guilt was the significance of the 




The German people slumber on in their dull, stupid sleep 
and thereby encourage these fascist criminals; they give 
them the opportunity to carry on their depredations; and of 
course they do so.  Is this a sign that the German people 
have become brutalized in their most basic human feelings, 
that the sight of such deeds does not strike a chord within 
them, that they have sunk into a terminal sleep from which 
there is no awakening, ever, ever again?  It seems that way, 
and will certainly be so, if the German does not arouse 
himself from this lethargy at last, if he does not protest 
whenever he can against this gang of criminals, if he 
doesn’t feel compassion for the hundreds of thousands of 
victims—not only compassion, no, much more: guilt.  For 
his apathy allows these evil men to act as they do; he 
tolerates this “government” that has taken upon itself such 
an enormous burden of guilt; indeed, he himself is to blame 
for the fact that it came about at all!  Everyone shrugs off 
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this guilt, falling asleep with his conscience at peace.  But 




 In the early 1940s, several students and a professor at the University of 
Munich,
504
 also known as, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München,
505
 comprehended 
that anyone in Germany, under Adolf Hitler’s dictatorship, who said or did something 
against the Führer or his regime could atone for that criticism with their life.  
Nevertheless, they came to believe that Hitler’s war was wrong and that the racist reign 
of terror had to be removed.  Cooperating as a small and secret resistance, they decided to 
act in order to realize their goals, eventually being executed for acting on their beliefs.  
The deeds of the White Rose continue to have influence even after the war.  The main 
square of the University is named Geschwister-Scholl-Platz, in honor of brother and 
sister, Hans and Sophie Scholl, who were among the group known as the White Rose.  
Every year on February 22, the anniversary of the first executions,
506
 a public 
commemoration is held in the atrium of the Lichthof building on the campus of the 
University.
507
  There is also a museum and archive located there.  All over Germany, high 
schools and streets are designated for the courageous participants in the White Rose.
508
 
 In 1999, the German women’s magazine Brigitte voted Sophie Scholl “Woman of 
the Twentieth Century.”  A German TV series in 2003, called Greatest Germans, found 
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Sophie Scholl to be the highest-ranking German woman of all time.  In 2005, a German 
film by the name of Sophie Scholl: The Final Days became a box-office success,
509
 and 
also in 2005, the German television station ZDF invited viewers to nominate the greatest 
Germans of all time.  Hans and Sophie Scholl came in fourth place, ahead of Goethe, 
Bach, and Einstein.  Among young viewers, the White Rose placed first.
510
 
 Today’s atmosphere is much different from that which surrounded these activists.  
Then, they kept their thoughts and efforts to themselves, not even telling their parents or 
spouses what they were doing, it was too dangerous; the state considered them traitors 
and their movement treasonous.  Today, they are esteemed as heroes, having one attribute 




 It is not possible to declare that those who were executed were greater in stature 
than those who served only prison terms or were exonerated.  Likewise, it is impossible 
to know how those who were murdered would have lived out the remaining years of their 
respective lives if they had had the opportunity.  But those who died for their resistance 
have become symbolic of a spirit and courage that was not overwhelmed by fear.  
Together they sought to awaken their fellow citizens and ventured with their very lives.  
They felt the need to do something against a regime that they believed was wrong.  Some 
took inane chances; they had attributes and vulnerabilities, some that ultimately proved 
fatal.  They did not all agree with each other on political issues.   
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 The White Rose was a resistance by a small group of students and a professor in 
Munich, the city that was the center of the Nazi movement.
512
  In 1920, the Nazi Party 
had been founded in Munich and on August 2, 1935, Hitler bestowed the title “Capital of 
the Movement” on the city.
513
 
 With Munich as their locus of operation, the members wrote and distributed anti-
Nazi leaflets throughout Germany and painted graffiti critical of the regime within the 
city during 1942 and early 1943.  Their desire was to awaken the conscience of German 
citizens relative to crimes that were being committed by their government and to 
encourage additional resistance against the Nazis.  They hoped to hasten the end of the 
war, entirely cognizant that they could be sentenced to death for their treasonous activity.  
It was the first, if not only, resistance group within Germany to explicitly castigate the 
Nazi government for its heinous crimes against the Jews.  In addition to this inhumanity, 
the senselessness of World War II prompted them to action in the summer of 1942. 
 University of Munich medical students,
514
 Hans Fritz Scholl, Christoph Hermann 
Probst,
515
 Alexander (Shurik) Schmorell,
516
 and Wilhelm (Willi) Graf,
517
 joined by Hans’ 
younger sister, Sophia (Sophie) Magdalena Scholl
518
 and inspired by Professor of 
philosophy and musicology, Kurt Huber, were the individuals directly associated with the 
White Rose and executed by the Nazis for their resistance.  From the spring of 1942, until 
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their capture on February 18, 1943, the White Rose printed six leaflets and distributed 
them covertly.  They were initially called “Leaflets of the White Rose,” then 
subsequently, “Leaflets of the Resistance Movement in Germany.”  Typed on a 
typewriter and reprinted on a hand operated mimeograph machine, the members mailed 
them from various cities to addresses in Germany and Austria, some of which were 
randomly selected from telephone books.  The sixth leaflet ultimately was transported to 
England and copies dropped from British airplanes flying over Germany. 
 Hans began to study medicine at the University of Munich in the spring of 1939.  
Much the same as the other medical students, he was a member of the Student Corps 
which was a part of the army.  Its members studied like other students, but during their 
vacations, they were compelled to perform military service.  Hans became acquainted 
with fellow students who, like himself, were critical of the regime.  He began to study 
religion and philosophy, and his feelings with respect to National Socialism began to 
intensify, as he and his companions found common ideas in individual freedom and 
responsibility.  Shortly after the war began on September 1, 1939, Hans, as a member of 
the Student Corps, was posted to France as a medic.  Upon fulfilling his service duty, he 
returned to Munich, where he continued his medical education and proceeded to develop 
private contacts with fellow students and sympathetic educators. 
Sophie followed Hans’ erudite pursuits in philosophy and theology and through 
her family’s liberal contacts, met artists whose work had been deemed degenerate by the 
Nazis.  She began to develop her own ideas of a resistance to Nazi totalitarianism.  On 
her twenty-first birthday, May 9, 1942, Sophie went to Munich to embark on her 
   225
   
 
university studies in biology and philosophy.  It would be the last birthday she would 
commemorate. 
 Sophie Scholl celebrated her twenty-first birthday with her brother Hans and 
some of his friends, including fellow medical students Alexander Schmorell, Christoph 
Probst, who was married and the father of two children, and Willi Graf.  All were 
opposed to Hitler and the Nazi Regime and angry about the abuses occurring in 
Germany.  They would subsequently witness greater crimes being committed in the name 
of their country. 
 Alexander Schmorell was born in Russia in 1917.  His father was of German 
ancestry, and a physician.  His mother was a Russian who died soon after Alexander’s 
birth.  The family then relocated to Germany accompanied by their Russian maid, who 
continued the traditions of Russian culture and language in their new homeland.  
Alexander developed an aversion to the Nazi regime, which defined persons of Slavic 
descent, including Russians and Poles, as inferior to Aryans.  He was ambivalent relative 
to his German and Russian heritage. 
 Christoph Probst’s parents had divorced when he was young, his father then 
remarrying a woman of Jewish derivation.  Christoph’s father committed suicide in 1936, 
and Christoph married Herta Dohrn in 1941; they had three children, the last of which 
was born just before Christoph’s execution for his treasonous White Rose involvement. 
 Willi Graf came from a devout Catholic family; his religious values led him to 
reject Nazism.  Willi never joined the Hitler Youth, but was active in Catholic youth 
organizations, such as the Gray Order, which he joined in 1934. 
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 Hans, Alexander, Christoph, and Willi met as medical students in Munich, all 
with reservations concerning the regime.  In the spring of 1941, Schmorell invited Hans 
to join in some evenings of literary readings that he had organized with Christoph.  
Initially, there was limited discussion of politics at these gatherings; instead they 
conversed appropriately regarding literature, philosophy, religion, music, and drank wine 
together until late in the night.  Together they also attended concerts and went hiking and 
swimming.  They were young adults and behaved accordingly. 
 By May 1942, Hans and Alexander had decided that some action had to be taken 
with respect to the Nazi regime, as they had heard rumors of mass deportations and 
shootings.  Additionally, the war was not progressing well for Germany, a year had 
passed since Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, and the effortless victories that the 
German armed forces had first achieved now ceased.  Some public dissent had also 
arisen.   
 The Munich students organized their resistance in June 1942, when they decided 
to express their beliefs in leaflets, with the idea of expanding their view that there were 
Germans who were opposed to Hitler.  They were aware that they could not overthrow 
the government and did not encourage revolution, but could disseminate information and 
stimulate other Germans to challenge the dictatorship. 
 Hans and Alexander prepared the first leaflet, distributed on June 6, 1942, under 
the title, “Leaflets of the White Rose.”  It criticized Germans who indifferently accepted 
Hitler’s regime and urged them to passively resist the Nazis.
519
  The leaflet begins: 
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Nothing is so unworthy of a civilized nation as to allow 
itself to be “governed” without any opposition by an 
irresponsible clique that has yielded to basest instincts.  It is 
certainly the case today that every honest German is 
ashamed of his government.  Who among us has any 
conception of the enormous shame that we and our children 
will feel when eventually the veil drops from our eyes and 
the most horrible of crimes—crimes that eclipse all 





 This first leaflet was distributed shortly after Sophie began her university studies 
in Munich.  Initially, Sophie was uncertain who was involved, but when she learned the 
truth, she wanted to be included.  At first, Hans did not feel it proper because of the risk, 
but eventually Sophie helped prepare and distribute the subsequent leaflets; she also 
managed the group’s finances.  A copy of a leaflet was sent to the family of the landlord 
where Traute LaFrenz was residing.  Traute was also unsure who was accountable, but 
upon reading the various quotes from the philosophers mentioned in the leaflet, she felt it 
must have been written by her friends.
521
  In an ensuing leaflet Traute recognized “a verse 
from Ecclesiastes that I had once given to Hans.  Now I knew.  I asked Hans about it.  He 
said it was wrong to ask the author, that the number of immediate co-workers must be 
kept to a minimum, and that the less I knew the better for me.”
522
  Traute would help in 
the preparation and dispersal of future leaflets. 
 In the summer of 1942, prior to assuming their Student Corps duty station near 
the Russian front, the friends prepared three more leaflets manifesting the title, “Leaflets 
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of the White Rose.”  Christoph added to what Hans and Alex had written.  The leaflets 
were all mailed between mid-June and mid-July 1942. 
 The leaflets were duplicated on a hand-operated mimeograph machine, the paper 
and stamps having to be procured discreetly, as anyone buying quantities of these items 
may be suspected of a treasonous pursuit.  Alexander had bought the typewriter, 
duplicating machine, stencils, and paper with his allowance.  Manfred Eickemeyer, an 
architect, permitted the students to use his studio as their printery.  Leaflets were sent to 
addresses of individuals who may possibly be in accord; some were mailed to addresses 
taken from telephone books; recipients also included specific persons at various 




 The second leaflet was even more explicit than the first, referring to the murder of 
“three hundred thousand Jews”
524
 in occupied Poland, forcing readers to confront 
information the Nazis did not want disseminated.  The third leaflet induced Germans to 
commit sabotage against the German armament industries and proposed an alternative to 
the Nazi regime, a government that would place the protection of the individual and 
community above all else.  The fourth leaflet, which Hans composed himself, focused on 
an explanation of the war as an expression of evil.  All leaflets attacked the Nazi regime 
and enumerated its crimes, from the mass extermination of Jews and the murder of Polish 
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nobility to the dictatorship and the elimination of the personal freedoms of the German 
citizens.  They contained quotes for Goethe, Aristotle, Lao-tzu, and the Bible. 
 People were fearful of being caught with the leaflets; many recipients submitted 
them to the Gestapo, which then began to investigate their origin.  In July of 1942, after 
the first four leaflets had been produced and distributed, Hans, Alexander, and Willi were 
sent to the eastern front to work as medics; they left Munich on July 23, remaining at 
their stations until October. 
 Upon returning to Munich in October of 1942, the friends were convinced that 
their resistance was necessary.  Hans and Sophie were now living in an apartment on 
Franz Josef Strasse, while Christoph had been transferred to Innsbruck, Austria, thereby 
limiting his contact with the group.  In January 1943, the members discussed with their 
philosophy professor, Kurt Huber, their resistance activity.  They were aware of his anti-
Nazi sentiments as he artfully managed to disparage the Nazis during his class lectures 
without actually saying anything explicitly against the government.  He composed the 
sixth and final leaflet. 
 The final two leaflets of the White Rose were printed in January and February of 
1943, under the designation, “Leaflets of the Resistance Movement in Germany.”  These 
leaflets were produced in greater quantities than the first four.  Sophie and Traute 
purchased paper, envelopes, and stamps in different shops around Munich to avoid 
arousing suspicion.  The fifth leaflet was a collaborative effort between Hans and 
Alexander.  It was brief and offered a plan for Germany’s future:
525
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A Call to All Germans! 
 The war is nearing its inevitable end.  As in the year 
1918, the German government is trying to focus attention 
exclusively on the growing threat of submarine warfare, 
while in the East the armies are constantly in retreat and 
invasion is imminent in the West.  Mobilization in the 
United States has not yet reached its peak, but already it 
exceeds anything that the world has ever seen.  It has 
become a mathematical certainty that Hitler is leading the 
German people into an abyss.  Hitler cannot win the war, 
only prolong it.  The guilt of Hitler and his minions exceeds 
all measures.  Retribution draws closer and closer . . . 
 Germans!  Do you and your children want to suffer 
the same fate that befell the Jews?. . . 
 Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the 
protection of individual citizens from the arbitrary will of 
criminal regimes of violence—these will be the bases of the 
New Europe. 




 The conspirators carried the leaflets to different areas of the country in suitcases 
and mailed them from different locations in an effort to make it appear as if the White 
Rose was larger than in reality.  Some leaflets were left in public places during the night, 
while others were left on parked vehicles.  Sophie’s sister, Elisabeth, would recall Sophie 
saying that,
527
 “the night is a friend of the free.”
528
 
 In early February 1943, the German military suffered defeat at Stalingrad; this 
was the turning point in the war.  The sixth leaflet, written by Professor Kurt Huber was 
in response to this defeat.  Aimed at students, Huber urged for resistance against the 
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Fellow Students! 
 Our people are deeply shaken by the fall of our men 
at Stalingrad.  Three hundred and thirty thousand German 
men were senselessly and irresponsibly driven to their 
deaths by the brilliant strategy of our World War I corporal.  
Führer, we thank you! . . .  
 There is only one slogan for us: fight against the 
Party!  Get out of all Party organizations, which are used to 
keep our mouths shut and hold us in political bondage!  Get 
out of the lecture halls run by SS corporals and sergeants 
and Party sycophants!  We want genuine learning and real 
freedom of expression . . .  
 The name of Germany will remain forever stained 
with shame if German youth do not finally arise, fight back, 
and atone, smash our tormentors, and set up a new Europe 
of the spirit.  Women students!  Men students!  The 
German people look to us!  Just as in 1813 when the people 
expected us to shake off the Napoleonic yoke, so in 1943 
they look to us to overthrow the National Socialist terror 
through the power of the spirit.  Beresina and Stalingrad are 




 Within a few days of the German defeat at Stalingrad, and over a three night 
period, Hans, Alexander, and Willi, painted graffiti on buildings and walls in Munich.  
They used tar-based paint, writing slogans such as, “Down with Hitler! Freedom! and 
Hitler Mass Murderer,” along with crossed-out swastikas.
 531
  
 The Gestapo had begun an investigation after the first leaflets appeared in the 
summer of 1942, becoming more intense after the mailing of the fifth leaflet on January 
28, 1943.  They reasoned that the resistance was travelling by train to distribute the 
leaflets around the country and started searching the railway system at the beginning of 
February, even placing a notice in newspapers within southern Germany, seeking 
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information from people and offering a reward for assistance in apprehending the 
offending parties. 
 Hans Hirzel from Ulm was the first to be arrested.  After his interrogation had 
concluded, he went to the Scholls’ to warn them, talking with Inge Scholl.  Otl Aicher, 
Inge’s boyfriend, telephoned Hans Scholl on February 17, 1943, telling him that he had 
important information, with the two arranging to meet at 11:00 A.M., the next morning; 
however, it would prove to be too late.   
 On the morning of February 18, 1943, Hans and Sophie had carried a suitcase full 
of leaflets to the University.  While students were in class, they placed quantities of the 
sixth leaflet in the halls of the Lichthof, finishing before the students were released from 
their classes and leaving the edifice.  Once outside, they realized there were still leaflets 
remaining in the suitcase and returned inside the building.  From an upper balcony, 
Sophie threw the remaining leaflets into the atrium, as university custodian, Jakob 
Schmidt, observed these actions.  The doors of the building were locked, Hans and 
Sophie were escorted to the office of the President, Dr. Walther Wüst, and were there 
interrogated by Robert Mohr of the Gestapo.  Mohr had his agents gather all the leaflets 
found and collected within the building; they fit exactly into the empty suitcase that Hans 
and Sophie were carrying.  They were arrested and taken to Gestapo Headquarters in 
Wittelsbach Palace. 
Their rooms at Franz Josef Strasse were searched with other incriminating 
evidence being discovered.  When he was arrested, Hans had Christoph Probst’s 
handwritten draft of the proposed seventh leaflet in his possession.  Although Hans 
attempted to destroy the document, the police were able to identify Christoph’s 
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handwriting through papers found in Hans’ apartment.  Christoph, who was in Innsbruck 
and unaware of these developments, was arrested the next day; his wife had just given 
birth to their third child.  Willi was also arrested the next day, while Alexander was not 
arrested until a few days later. 
 At Wittelsbach Palace, Hans and Sophie were interrogated separately; however, 
they could no longer deny their involvement in light of the documentary evidence found 
in their rooms.  Each stated that they were the only two responsible for the resistance of 
the White Rose. 
 Hans, Sophie, and Christoph each received court-appointed lawyers, with their 
trial set for Monday, February 22, 1943, before President Judge Roland Freisler, of the 
People’s Court, who expressly came to Munich from Berlin for the proceedings.  
Freisler’s presence in Munich was designed as a message to the German public; any 
resistance would not be tolerated.
 532
 
The gravity of the situation was made known to Sophie on Sunday afternoon, 
when she received a copy of her indictment.  It was dated February 21, 1943, and issued 
by the Office of the Chief Prosecutor of the People’s Court, Berlin.  Defendants named in 
the document were Hans Fritz Scholl, Sophia Magdalena Scholl, and Christoph Hermann 
Probst.  They were jointly accused of committing acts of High Treason with intent to:
533
 
. . . alter the Constitution of the Reich by force; to render 
the Wehrmacht incapable of fulfilling its duty to protect the 
German Reich from its enemies; 
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to influence the masses through the production and 
dissemination of subversive literature; 
to aid and abet foreign powers in time of war while 
damaging the fighting potential of the Reich; and, 
to paralyze the will of the German people in their 





In a more rational time it would have been inconceivable for one of the great 
nations of the world to seriously believe that three young citizens were capable of doing 
such damage to its institutions, armed forces, and morale through the distribution of 
sheets of paper produced by a hand-cranked mimeograph machine.  They had not realized 
that they were as dangerous to the Third Reich as the regime considered them. 
 The indictment traced the background of the accused, the history of the leaflet 
operation beginning with the White Rose phase, and the particular offenses of Hans, 
Sophie, and Christoph.  That Christoph had not participated in the production and 
distribution of any of the leaflets, and had only written an outline for one which was 
never circulated, was not taken into account; the charges against him were as grave as for 
Hans and Sophie. 
On the morning of February 22, 1943, Roland Freisler, President Judge of the 
People’s Court, called the proceeding to order at approximately 10:00 A.M.  He was 
accompanied by lay judges SS Major General Breitbart and a Group Leader of the Storm 
Troopers named Köglmaier.  Freisler denounced the Defendants as if he were the 
prosecutor instead of the judge.  There was no trial in any acceptable meaning of the 
term.  Evidence was produced:  the leaflets, the duplicating machine, stencils, and the 
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brushes and paint from the graffiti escapades.  Jakob Schmidt was present as a witness, if 
needed, as were Gestapo agents, Robert Mohr and Anton Mahler, but no witnesses were 
called since the Defendants had made full admissions.  One of their defense counsel did 
manage to say in his summation,
535
 “I can only say fiat justita.  Let justice be done.”
536
  
Sophie’s retort to Freisler has been remembered and repeated,
537
 “Somebody, after all, 
had to make a start.  What we wrote and said is also believed by many others.  They just 
don’t dare to express themselves as we did.”
538
  At another point, she said, “You know 
the war is lost.  Why don’t you have the courage to face it?”
539
 
 Subsequently, each of the three Defendants was permitted to make a statement on 
their own behalf.  Sophie stood silent, while Christoph explained that he had acted in the 
best interest of his country by trying to bring the war to an end in an effort to save 
Germany from further Stalingrads.  He was shouted down by the bench and audience and 
was unable to continue.  He then pleaded that his life should be spared for the benefit of 
his three children and wife, who was currently ill in a hospital subsequent to the birth of 
their third child.  Hans attempted to support his friend, emphasizing that Christoph had 
contributed virtually nothing to the leaflet operation.  Freisler interrupted saying,
540
 “If 
you have nothing to bring forward for yourself, be so good as to keep quiet.”
541
  Like his 
sister, Hans declined to plead on his own behalf. 
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 Robert and Magdalene Scholl, Hans and Sophie’s parents, ventured to force their 
way into the courtroom.  They had been informed of the arrests on Friday, but were also 
told that visits to the jail were not allowed on weekends.  Their youngest son, Werner, 
was home on leave from the Russian front, and they were all on an early train to Munich 
Monday morning.  Otl Aicher met them at the railroad station and hastened them to the 
Palace of Justice. 
 Robert Scholl wanted to speak in an effort to defend his children, but Freisler 
denied this request.  As he was being escorted from the courtroom he said,
542
 “One day 
there will be another kind of justice!  They will go down in history!”
543
 
For Hans, Sophie, and Christoph, the verdicts rendered on February 22, 1943, 
were never in doubt.  The words of Roland Freisler were as expected,
544
 “for the 
protection of the German people, and of the Reich, in this time of mortal struggle, the 
Court has only one just verdict open to it on the basis of the evidence:  the death penalty.  
With this sentence the People’s Court demonstrates its solidarity with the fighting 
troops!”
545
  They did not for a moment imagine that they could, by their own efforts, 
demolish the National Socialist state.  They could not know what effect their travail 
would have on the course of events or if any results would ensue.  What they did know 
was that they could not remain silent any longer, and by their silence, acquiesce in the 
brutal, corrupt, and immoral system.
 546
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 In tacit recognition of their strength of souls and physical courage, and as an 
unspoken tribute to them, the prison administration at Stadelheim Prison took the risk of 
breaching the rules of procedure and allowed the three of them out of their cells to smoke 
a last cigarette together and exchange farewells.  Sophie was the first to be taken to the 
executioner, Johann Reichhart, with his tall hat and bowtie; it was 5:00 P.M., on February 
22, 1943.  Christoph was next, with Hans last.  Before Hans passed into the execution 
building, he called out,
547
 “Long live freedom!”
548
 
 Alexander had been evading capture since being informed of the arrest of Hans 
and Sophie.  The night of February 24, 1943, was to be his last in freedom.   
 With the help of a friend, he altered the identification papers of a Russian worker 
and substituted his own.  He then proceeded to Innsbruck where he telephoned a woman 
and asked that she meet him there.  She was close to the man in charge of a camp for 
foreign workers, and it was Alexander’s idea to get into the compound and vanish among 
the other Russians, but the friend failed to appear. 
 At a sanatorium in the mountains, a Russian coachman, with whom Alexander 
was acquainted, took him in for several days until someone reported a suspicious stranger 
at the facility.  The driver gave him a blanket and supplies, but snowstorms forced him to 
return to Munich. 
 For days the citizens of Munich had been aware that he was a fugitive from the 
police.  There were “Man Wanted” posters all over town, and the newspapers were 
carrying his picture, stories on the manhunt, and the offer of a reward.  A female friend 
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reported Alexander to the building superintendent who then called the Gestapo at 
Wittelsbach Palace. 
 When the interrogation began, Alexander was unaware that Hans and Sophie were 
dead.  In accordance with their agreement, he freely admitted everything the Gestapo had 
charged; his intent being to assume sole responsibility and divert attention from his 
comrades to himself.  He did not realize that whatever he now stated would fail to benefit 
Hans and Sophie.  His role in the White Rose and the Resistance Movement in Germany 
was established second only to that of Hans. 
 The Gestapo investigation was now resulting in the arrest of numerous suspects, 
including, Hans Hirzel, Gisela Schertling, Traute LaFrenz, Katharina Schüddekopf, and 
Kurt Huber.  Huber’s wife and sister were also arrested although he was not informed of 
their detentions.  His status as a university professor was immediately taken from him, 
terminating his salary and cancelling his pension.  When he was not being interrogated, 
he worked in his cell on articles involving his expertise, folk music and folk songs, and 
on his book relative to the philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.  He was employing 
the time left him in an effort to provide for his family. 
 On the morning of April 19, 1943, fourteen additional men and women were to be 
tried before Roland Freisler and the People’s Court for their White Rose resistance 
activities.  Freisler stated in his opening remarks,
549
 “This trial stands in the closest 
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 When the texts of the leaflets were read out, murmurs of indignation and outrage 
were audible in the courtroom.  The lawyer representing Kurt Huber then expressed to 
the court,
551
 “Heil Hitler!  This is the first time I have heard the contents of these leaflets.  
As a German and a protector of the law of the German Reich I cannot tolerate such 
vilification of the Führer.  I cannot defend such a monstrous crime.  I respectfully ask this 
court to be relieved of the obligation to defend my client.”
552
  Freisler granted the request 
and appointed another lawyer who had no opportunity to prepare a case for Professor 
Huber, yet was appointed by Freisler to assume Huber’s defense.  When the attorney 
protested that he could not prepare in time, Freisler responded,
553
 “I’ll tell you anything 
you need to know about the case.”
554
  This was a second setback for Huber, a friend and 
respected historian on whom he was relying as a character witness, had sent word that he 
was unable to attend the trial, being “engaged out of town.” 
 The court then turned to the case of Alexander Schmorell.  In his interrogation, he 
had tried to explain his attitude relative to the war by describing how he was affected by 
his birth in Russia, his Russian mother, and his ties to that country.  To this Freisler’s 
reply was, “Twaddle.”  He was particularly upset by Alexander’s statement that he would 
shoot at no one, Russian or German.  Freisler asked,
555
 “Then what did you do when you 
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were at the front?  “I took care of the wounded as a medical corpsman is expected to 
do.”
556
  Alexander replied and reminded the court that, as a recruit, he had declined to 
take the oath of loyalty to the Führer and did not feel bound thereto.  Freisler then 
addressed the spectators saying,
557
 “Look at this traitor!  He stabs the Fatherland in the 
back at a time of great danger.  And he’s supposed to be a sergeant in the German 
army.”
558
  Freisler then dismissed Alexander. 
 Willi Graf’s indictment linked him beyond denial to Hans and the Resistance 
Movement in Germany phase of the White Rose.  Willi had been able to deflect the 
Gestapo’s interrogations with carefully phrased answers that were not lies but misled his 
interlocutors.  Freisler commented,
559
 “You had the Gestapo running in circles for a 
while, didn’t you?  But in the end we were too smart for you, weren’t we?”
560
 
 Kurt Huber provided the clearest and most resolute justification for the resistance 
of the Munich students when presented with the opportunity to address the court.  For 
weeks in his jail cell, he had been preparing his defense.  His purpose was to vindicate 
not only his actions in opposition to the National Socialist regime but also to defend those 
accused with him, making no denials or retractions.  Freisler interrupted him, saying,
561
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Undaunted, Huber traced his relationship with Hans from their first meeting to the 
last Resistance Movement in Germany leaflet in which he appealed to university students 
to rise up against the Nazis.  The corruption of German education while teachers and 
academicians stood by and did nothing was one of his most passionate concerns.  Of his 
own opposition to the established authority he said:
563
 
There is an ultimate limit to formal legality beyond 
which it becomes invalid and immoral.  That is when it 
becomes a cover for the cowardice that does not dare to 
stand up against the injustices of the state . . .  
I demand that freedom be given back to us Germans.  
We do not want to fritter away our short lives in chains, 




He made it apparent that he had not acted as a revolutionary; his whole intent was 
striving to retain ideals and values which were being destroyed or eroded.  Throughout he 




The return to clear moral fundamentals, to the rule of 
law, to the mutual trust of one person for another—that is 





In order to sustain the fiction, that the proceedings were lawful, each of the 
Defendants was examined in turn and allowed to offer a defense.  It was nearly 10:00 
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Alexander Schmorell, Kurt Huber, and Wilhelm Graf 
have, in time of war, produced leaflets urging sabotage of 
the armaments industry and the overthrow of the National 
Socialist way of life; they have also spread defeatist ideas 
and vilified the Führer in the grossest manner; all of which 
aided and abetted the enemies of the Reich and undermined 





The court asserted that these sentences, along with those imposed at the previous 
trial, would eradicate the “core group” of the subversive White Rose operation.  As stated 
in the judgment,
569
 “Had such activity been punished otherwise than by death, it would 
have meant the start of a chain reaction of the kind whose end once was 1918.”
570
  The 
document condemned Kurt Huber as an educator who had betrayed his mission by failing 
to imbue his students with absolute faith in the Führer and by not molding them into iron-
hearted warriors of the Third Reich.
571




The sentences of Traute LaFrenz, Gisela Schertling, and Katharina Schüddekopf 
were to incarceration for a year each, less than they had feared.  Susanne Hirzel, a pretty 
Nordic blond, had impressed Freisler, who called her
573
 “quite a decent girl.”
574
  She was 
sentenced to only six months. 
For Alex, Willi, and Kurt Huber, there was no swift dispatch, the weeks and 
months of waiting that lay ahead for the second trio of the White Rose were an ordeal 
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that was spared the first.  Kurt Huber was concerned that he may not be able to complete 
his book on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, as he was depending upon the royalties from the 
published document to support his family.  As the day of execution neared, it was still 
two chapters from completion.  He petitioned the People’s Court to grant him time to 
finish his work, pointing out that this would not lessen the sentence that had been 
inflicted; however, his petition was denied. 
The prolongation of the executions, which lasted almost three months, was owing 
to Berlin’s delay in responding to the appeals for pardon or leniency of the three 
condemned men filed by their counsel.  Alexander and Will had been noncommissioned 
officers; their cases were advanced through the echelons of military justice to the very 
pinnacle, to the Führer himself.  Toward the end of June came the decision,
575
 “I reject 
these appeals for leniency.  A. Hitler.”
576
  Efforts through civilian channels on behalf of 
Kurt Huber were similarly fruitless. 
The official order of execution, when issued, contained only the names of 
Alexander Schmorell and Kurt Huber, the date was set as July 13, 1943.
577
  The order 
directed that Alexander should be first, and then Kurt Huber, the time was set for 5:00 
P.M.  However, there was a delay, three SS officers arrived at Stadelheim Prison and 
produced Gestapo papers authorizing them to witness the execution.  The officers wished 
to ascertain exactly how long it took for a man to strangle to death when hung and 
whether the length of time could be extended or shortened at will.  They were annoyed to 
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learn that this was not to be a hanging but a beheading.  In order that some benefit might 
nevertheless be derived from their visit, they delayed the execution in order to examine 
the guillotine and to have its operation explained to them in detail. 
Willi Graf was now the last of the six who had joined together under the symbol 
of the White Rose to be murdered.  Willi had entered the resistance not out of political 
passion or in support of any particular dogma, but because he could not reconcile himself 
to a system that was forcing him to live his life in violation of his convictions.  For seven 
months he was held in his cell at Stadelheim Prison while the Gestapo attempted to 
extract additional information from him.  They tempted him with a possible commutation 
of his death sentence if he would provide the names of the other White Rose members 
still at large.  They also threatened reprisals against Willi’s family if he failed to provide 
the information they desired.  Not one new arrest was made by the Gestapo’s 
investigation of the White Rose during this time.  Willi’s end came on the afternoon of 
October 12, 1943.  It was officially recorded that only eleven seconds elapsed between 
the time “the above-named” was delivered into the hands of the executioner and the fall 
of the blade.  “No untoward incidents occurred,” stated the routine document that was 
sent from Stadelheim Prison to the Ministry of Justice in Berlin.  Willi’s family was not 
notified, they learned of his death only when a letter mailed to him was returned with 
“DECEASED” stamped across his name on the envelope.
 578
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 In all, a total of twenty-nine individuals were placed on trial before the People’s 
Court for their White Rose related activities,
579
 with seven death sentences resulting.
580
  
Additional proceedings occurred on July 13, 1943, in Munich, April 3, 1944, at 
Saarbrücken, and October 13, 1944, in Donauwörth.
581
 
 At the fifth trial, chemistry student Hans Leipelt and his girlfriend, Marie-Luise 
Jahn, were convicted of continuing to disseminate the sixth leaflet, although they had not 
had personal contact with those who were previously executed.  They also had collected 
money for the widow of Professor Huber, who had no income.  Leipelt was sentenced to 
death; Jahn received a twelve-year prison term. 
Like her brother Hans, Sophie and the other members of the White Rose, were 
confident that the impact of their actions would not end upon their deaths, but would 
continue beyond.  Shortly after the deaths of Hans, Sophie, and Christoph, a new version 
of their sixth leaflet began to circulate with an addition:
582
  “DESPITE EVERYTHING, 
THEIR SPIRIT LIVES ON!”
583
  Before a year had passed, planes of the Royal Air Force 
were dropping millions of the leaflets across Germany.  The British gave this sixth leaflet 
a new title:
584
  “A GERMAN LEAFLET – MANIFESTO OF THE MUNICH 
STUDENTS.”
585
  News of the leaflets even extended into the concentration camps.  In 
addition, information of the White Rose reached the Soviet Union where a “National 
                                                 
579
 Dumbach, A.E. & Newborn, J. (2006).  Sophie Scholl and the White Rose.  (New York, NY:  Oneworld 
Publications), 206. 
580
 Axelrod, T. (2001).  Holocaust biographies; Hans and Sophie Scholl: German resisters of the White 
Rose.  (New York, NY:  The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc.), 98. 
581
 Dumbach, A.E. & Newborn, J. (2006).  Sophie Scholl and the White Rose.  (New York, NY:  Oneworld 
Publications), 206. 
582
 Hanser, R. (1979).  A noble treason: The revolt of the Munich students against Hitler.  (New York, NY:  






 Id. at 305-306. 
   246
   
 
Committee for a Free Germany” had been established by captured German officers and 
soldiers.  On the “Free German Radio,” which could be heard in Germany, Hans, Sophie, 
and their comrades were eulogized as heroes of freedom.  In the United States, over “The 
Voice of America,” the words of Thomas Mann were heard stating that the White Rose 
members had redeemed the name of Germany before the world.  Newspaper articles also 
appeared in The New York Times on Sunday, April 18, 1943, and Monday, August 2, 
1943, respectively. 
However, not everyone was exalting the actions of the group.  On the evening of 
February 22, 1943, an assemblage of several thousand students in Munich condemned the 
White Rose and those connected with it, while Jakob Schmidt was applauded when he 
appeared before the crowd.  The next day, the account of the gathering reported that,
586
 
“the Munich student body stands as before, and will continue to stand, solidly behind the 
Führer and his National Socialist movement.”
587
  Not a professor or university official 
had protested the executions.   
The entire Scholl family was arrested by the Gestapo, with the exception of 
Werner, the youngest Scholl sibling, under the Sippenhaft principle and given jail 
sentences of varying duration, with Robert receiving the longest term of two years 
incarceration, but he was released before the expiration of his sentence. 
Werner Scholl, the youngest Scholl sibling, was not arrested, as he was due to 
return to his unit on the Russian front; unfortunately, he was not spared as he was 
subsequently reported missing in action.  In somewhat of a quirk of fate, Johann 
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Reichhart, who had served the National Socialist regime so efficiently as executioner, 
continued to practice his specialty under the Allied Military Government, which availed 
itself of his expertise in the execution of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. 
Schools, streets, squares, and foundations have been named for the people of the 
White Rose, but there were also those who questioned the purpose and value of their 
resistance, expressing the view that the students were only impractical idealists with no 
organized cadres behind them and no clearly defined political objectives.  The most 
convincing testimony to the impact of the White Rose came from the Nazis themselves.  
By their reaction, they acknowledged that they feared the leaflets and perceived them as a 
clear and present danger.  The leaflets presented the case against National Socialism as 
powerfully as it had ever been accomplished, the members of the White Rose acting upon 
individual and collective integrity, without regard for their personal vulnerability and 
peril, asserted their resistance to Hitler and his regime of tyranny.
588
 
For being people of personal and unified rectitude, Hans Scholl, Sophie Scholl, 
Christoph Probst, Alexander Schmorell, Willi Graf, and Professor Kurt Huber were 
culpably guilty of treasonous conduct pursuant to the dictates of Nazi “justice.”  As a 
consequence, their fates were determined by the wholly dependent People’s Court, a 
judiciary that had deliberately discarded its independence and autonomy to tyrannical and 
depraved political authorities and that was willfully exploited by them to advance the 
mandates of Nazi barbarism through sanctioned and endorsed judicial murder. 
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A Personal Experience before a Tribunal That Lacked Judicial 
Independence 
 
On August 25, 2012, I personally interviewed Dr. Traute LaFrenz-Page, a 
member of the White Rose, at her residence in South Carolina.   
As related to the lack of judicial independence existing in Nazi Germany at that 
time, Traute explained that because of her activities in the White Rose, she was arrested 
and placed on trial before Roland Freisler and the People’s Court.  Traute LaFrenz-Page 
was tried on April 19, 1943, and upon being found guilty, was sentenced to a period of 
imprisonment for one year at Rodenfelds, a previous youth center that had been 
converted into a prison for adolescent criminal offenders.   
When I questioned Dr. LaFrenz-Page relative to her trial before Freisler, she 
stated, “That was a joke.  He came in, Freisler, with two guys and a book, and he said, 
‘We don’t need this book, we don’t need laws, we judge for the Germans.’”  Traute 
believed that Freisler merely conducted a show trial, “yelling and talking like a clown.”  
Traute LaFrenz-Page confirmed that she was not sentenced to death because Freisler had 
not been informed that she had sent and transported leaflets from Munich to Hamburg.   
After completing her one-year sentence of incarceration, Traute was informed that 
additional arrests were being effectuated, and she was rearrested and held in custody 
awaiting her second trial, but was transferred several times because of Allied bombings.  
She was detained in Fuhlsbuttel, Cottbus, Leipzig, and finally, Bayreuth, from which she 
was liberated on April 15, 1945, by Patton’s Third Army.  In all, Traute LaFrenz-Page 
was incarcerated from March 1943, until her liberation by United States forces, with the 
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exception of approximately two weeks between her initial discharge and subsequent re-
apprehension.   
She was outside working in the fields on April 15, 1945, when she first saw the 
Allied soldiers.  She stated, “I thought the Americans were the best things that could 
happen!” 
Traute queried as to how the German justice system could fall to such a level.  
“They (the judges) were all bright guys, you didn’t become a judge by being totally 
stupid, and they all cowed down.  It’s just amazing.”  She believes, and personally 
experienced firsthand, that the Nazi judges abandoned their conscience and thus, their 
judicial independence. 
Dr. LaFrenz-Page asked rhetorically, “The judges, what happened to the judges?  
How they crumbled one after the other.  They were nobodies, they were the ones that 




Traute LaFrenz was able to thwart her Gestapo inquisitors, thus, there was little 
evidence of her connection to the White Rose for use at her first trial.  Still she was 
sentenced to one year of imprisonment.  Shortly after her release she was arrested once 
again.  On this occasion having abundant evidence against her, the outcome would have, 
in all likelihood, been judicial murder committed by a wholly dependent tribunal, the 
People’s Court.   
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Chapter XV:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Judges entangled between considerations of law and morality have only four 
possible choices of decision alternatives available.  They may apply the law against their 
conscience; apply conscience and be faithless to the law; resign; or, circumvent the issue 
by stating that the law is not what they believe it to be and, thus preserve an appearance 
to others of conformity between law and morality.
590
  For those individuals functioning as 
Nazi jurists these options were without significance and irrelevant as they had willfully 
relinquished their judicial independence to National Socialist ideology far in advance of 
such a conundrum.  The far more consequential question was not, “‘How should a judge 




Taking as true that the Nazi legal scheme did not deserve respect, one must then 
query when an individual owes fidelity to the rule of law.  Natural law theory posits the 
existence of a law that is separate from positive or man-made law.  If an extrinsic law or 
reason exists, then one has a definitive measure with which to judge not only an 
individual’s actions, but also the law itself.  If you presuppose the existence of this 
natural law, then human cogitation can differentiate between a legal system, the 
pronouncements of a state backed by force, and the law to which individuals owe their 
respect and allegiance. 
Some legal theorists assert that natural law exists independently of mankind’s 
law, and insofar as human law orders itself according to this natural law, these human 
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legal enactments take on part of this natural law.  As such, human law would then 
deserve individual respect and adherence.  If a law harmonizes with natural law, it may 
be morally wrong to disobey that law; this then being classic natural legal theory.  With 
its immoral laws, the connivance purported by the Nazis to be a legal system did not 
deserve individual regard.  Law does not necessarily deserve reverence merely because it 
is enacted.  A relationship between positive law and reason must exist in order to confer 




The rule of law is viewed as the safeguard against the excesses of extremism.  In 
the totalitarianism of the Nazi dictatorship, the courts and the judiciary became 
subordinate to the political interests of Hitler and his regime.  Judges and the judicial 
process were deployed to discourage dissent, eliminate critics, and insure social stability.  
Nazi Germany exemplified the subordination of law and judges to the dictates of 
unbridled political power.  In the Third Reich, the judiciary and the judicial process 
became a central component in the regime’s political repression and terror.
593
 
The German Federation of Judges issued a declaration on March 19, 1933, which 
endorsed the new Nazi government’s plan for putting “an end to the immense suffering of 
the German people” and pledged to cooperate in the “task of national reconstruction.”  
The statement noted that judges had been traditionally loyal to Germany and that they 
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“place(d) their full confidence in the new government.”
594
  However, Hitler remained 
distrustful of the judiciary, leading him to announce in an April 26, 1942, address to the 
Reichstag that he would henceforth directly intervene in the judicial process.  He 
expressed his intent to remove from office judges who “do not understand the demands of 
the hour.”  He stressed that the German legal profession must understand that “the nation 
is not here for them; but that they are here for the nation . . . the world which includes 
Germany must not decline in order that formal law may live, but Germany must live 
irrespective of the contradictions of formal justice.”
595
  The Führer concluded by 
requesting authorization to unilaterally intervene and correct decisions of jurists that he 
determined to be erroneous.  The Reichstag immediately adopted a resolution recognizing 
Hitler’s authority to “enforce, with all means which he may consider suitable . . . (i)n case 
of violations of duties . . . he may remove anyone from his office, rank and his position, 
without resort to the established procedures.”
596
  As a result, not only had judicial 
independence been abolished, but tenure in office was also vitiated.  Judges were now 
appointed by the Führer on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice.
597
 
In an address to the People’s Court on July 22, 1942, Josef Goebbels reiterated 
Hitler’s criticisms of the judiciary.  Goebbels proclaimed that judicial decisions should be 
based on expediency, rather than law in order to eliminate internal adversaries from the 
community.  He admonished that this required jurists to discard the doctrine that they 
were required to be convinced of an offender’s guilt.  The security of the State, rather 
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than retribution or rehabilitation, was to be their consideration.  Goebbels also noted that 
many otherwise trivial offenses took on an increased seriousness during wartime and 
therefore merited the death penalty.
598
  There could not be any misunderstanding; the 




Goebbels built upon Hitler’s threat to remove nonconformist judges, scolding 
those who persisted in “old ways of thinking.”  Just as generals can be replaced, warned 
Goebbels, so can judges.  Judicial officers were to proceed not from statutes, but from the 
fundamental idea that criminals must be excluded from society.  Implicit in this notion 
was the abstraction of criminality from any antecedent statutory definition.  A judge 
would know illegal conduct “when he saw it.”
600
 
Nazi jurists also became subject to pressure from the Party itself.  Judges who 
failed to join the National Socialist Party were threatened with dismissal.  Once having 
enlisted, they were subject to Party discipline and direction.  Party officials and security 
personnel also submitted political evaluations of defendants which they expected judges 
to heed when sentencing.
601
Karl Engert, Vice-President of the People’s Court, and 
presiding jurist in the trial of Helmut Hübener, declared that the Court must be guided by 
politics rather than law.
602
  The Court’s objective, in the words of senior prosecutor 
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Hitler became the law for the German people and the judiciary swore an oath of 
loyalty to him rather than to the maintenance of the rule of law.  This oath mandated 
judges, as Hitler’s surrogates, to adhere to the Führer’s will.  His commands were 
incontestable and those who failed to fulfill his dictates were subject to removal.  Law 
became a matter of politics and judges were to coordinate their activities with the aims of 
the political leadership, interpreting statutes in light of Nazi ideology.  Lay Judge, Hans 
Peterson of the People’s Court observed that a defendant’s guilt was secondary; the 




The methodology by which the regime and the legal system in particular, operated 
may best be summarized in one word:  Führerprinzip.  It was a statement of 
constitutional principle. 
In its application to the judiciary, the Führerprinzip was articulated in the 
“Rothenberger Memorandum” of March 31, 1942, written by Curt Rothenberger, a lower 
court judge who aspired to the position of State Secretary of the Ministry of Justice.  The 
Memorandum contained three statements which constituted a summary of the Führer 
Principle, as applied to the judiciary:
605
 1) “Law must serve the political leadership; 2) 
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The Führer is the supreme judge; theoretically, the authority to pass judgment is only his; 




The message was very explicit, the concept of judicial independence was 
renounced, the role of judges was to be no more than execution of the political will, 
specifically, to judge as the Führer would want them to judge.  Courts were thus anchored 
in politics.  There was no longer any allowance for individual judicial responsibility.  All 
the basic decisions were formulated at the pinnacle, where governmental policy was 




The Nazi regime had eviscerated the independence and autonomy of the judiciary, 
creating courts and jurists who willingly implemented a series of draconian decrees.  The 
establishment of this tyrannical regime, and the abrogation of the separation of powers, 
resulted in the creation of a lawless legal system that was utilized to repress minorities 
and opponents of Hitler, as well as to insulate members of the Nazi Party from criminal 
liability.  The legal system became an accomplice to Nazi despotism by not prosecuting 
these individuals and their actions, therefore, permitting them to occur and continue 
unimpeded.  The Nazis’ extermination and annihilation of racial minorities, social 
undesirables, and political opponents, such as Johannes Georg Klamroth, Helmuth 
Hübener, and members of the Kreisau Circle and the White Rose, respectively, was not 
confined to concentration camps and killing squads.  The wholly dependent judiciary was 
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also utilized by the regime, between 1934 and 1945,
608
 to further these atrocities through 
judicial murder. 
The corruption of the Nazi justice system is commonly attributed to legal 
positivism.  However, David A.J. Richards ascribes the rise of legal totalitarianism to 
“the corruption of responsible persons who surrender(ed) their moral independence, who 
support(ed) rather than check(ed) the claims of arbitrary power, and most inexcusably, 
who support(ed) forms of indiscriminate violence aimed at undermining confidence and 
reducing citizens in [sic] abject and terrified subjects.”
609
  Christopher R. Browning 
asserts that it was a combination of ideological and situational factors that allowed a 
popular, dogmatically driven, dictatorial regime and its loyal adherents to mobilize and 
harness the vast majority of German society to its purposes.
610
  He would explicate this 
depraved judicial conduct and compliance with Nazi exhortations as:  “the importance of 
conformity, peer pressure, deference to authority, and the legitimizing capacities of 
government.”
611 612
  Regardless of the theoretical assumptions, it is manifestly apparent 
that Nazi judges willingly and voluntarily perverted legal principles by ceding their 
conscience to the regime, preferring money and power to morals, principles, and judicial 
independence and autonomy. 
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 Judges in Nazi Germany rendered their judgments on existing valid law at the 
time.  However, a distinction must be drawn between a normal legal order and a system 
based upon injustice and corruption, the foundation from which the Nazi justice structure 
arose.  The Nazis were capable of promulgating rules through decrees.  They established 
themselves by virtue of prevailing domestically and winning recognition internationally 
as the legal Reich government.  The sovereign acts of the regime were at that time valid 
law.  Other countries and the majority of the German people recognized and abided by 
this legal order, irrespective of the obvious moral and political objections to the regime.  
It is imperative to emphasize how typical the combination of normality and terror was for 
the Nazi regime, with terror emerging as a necessary occurrence.  Law that was 
considered normal and law that was regarded as terroristic buttressed each other; to 
separate them is to distort reality. 
 Members of the resistance violated valid law.  They broke the terroristic legal 
rules set in place by the Nazi regime being fully aware of their criminal conduct, and 
were condemned by the People’s Court, an institution of the system calling itself a court 
but in actuality,
613
 “the death machine of the Nazi party.”
614
 
On the basis of the Enabling Act, the Nazi State was in a position to enact valid 
law and as a result, the People’s Court was officially established.  However, it was not an 
independent court.  The purpose of the Court was to destroy or intimidate political 
opposition to the Third Reich.  Through the disintegration of procedural safeguards, the 
elimination of all constitutional guarantees, and Freisler’s unpredictability and bellowing, 
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this goal was obtained.  For someone who desired to create fear and terror, Freisler could 
not be troubled by the Code of Criminal Procedure; he had to liberate himself of what 
Thierack called,
615
 “the crutches of the law.”
616
  The People’s Court was a dependent 
court engendered from Nazi ideology, an occurrence that was natural in a state that also 
rejected judicial independence and the rule of law.  As Josef Goebbels noted in his diary 
on September 23, 1943, “Freisler, as president of the People’s Court, (has) become a bird 
of an altogether different feather.  He is once again the radical National Socialist he used 
to be in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies.  Just as he did too little as undersecretary in 
the Ministry of Justice, today as president of the People’s Court he is doing too much.”
617
 
Roland Freisler has been described as “perhaps the most sinister and bloodthirsty 
Nazi in the Third Reich after Heydrich.”
618
  His readiness to pervert the German system 
of justice for ideological and political ends was “extreme even by the standards of the 
Third Reich.”
619
  Although the autonomy of the German judiciary had been steadily 
deteriorating since 1933, Freisler’s appointment as President of the People’s Court 
eliminated any remaining pretense of judicial independence in the administration of 
justice, particularly as it pertained to politically infused acts. 
As a result of the widening war, the Nazi regime intensifieid the severity with 
which it reacted to cases of dissent and resistance.  Freisler dispensed with any
620
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“outward insignia of impartiality and procedural regularity,” and the People’s Court 
became a “naked instrument of Hitler’s single-minded aim of mobilizing all institutions 
of German life, including the judiciary, for the promotion of war aims.”
621
 
The judicial philosophy applied by Freisler on the People’s Court was premised 
upon two principles:  first, the legal system was subordinate to the will of the Führer, and 
second, the traditional dictum of nulla crimen sine lege, no crime without a law, should 
not apply in Germany.  Thus, defendants could be tried for actions that had not been 
determined in advance to have been illegal.  Taken together, these two principles resulted 
in a repudiation of the positivist legal tradition in Germany whereby legal norms were 
defined by specific, clear enactments.  Freisler denounced the notion that judges should 
be bound by written criminal law as un-German.  The law, he argued, is what the Führer 
said it was.  His approach to the law was one that rejected the norms and traditions of the 




In his proceedings, Freisler not only abandoned all pretense of judicial 
impartiality, but also dispersed with any veneer of judicial dignity, and remorselessly 
hectored his hapless defendants with a ferocity that embarrassed some of the Nazi 
leadership.  Under Freisler, the People’s Court spread terror throughout the German 
population by inflicting extreme penalties for acts that would pass unremarked in a non-
totalitarian society.  The court’s procedures were calculated to afford the accused no 
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realistic opportunity of defense.  Its decisions were little more than vigilante justice,
623
 
perpetrated under the direction and instruction of Hitler and his henchmen who had 
destroyed law with power, and thereby manifested that power unrestrained by law 
proceeds to individual and societal destruction.
624
 
The sentences passed by the People’s Court, on the bases of laws that were 
morally repugnant but valid at the time, were lawful sentences, which the German 
legislature was subsequently correct in annulling.  Likewise, Freisler and all the other 
judges of the People’s Court knew what they were perpetrating and were thus fully aware 
of the possible personal criminal consequences should the Nazi State fail.
625
 
 Members of the resistance represented the “other Germany,” the land of poets and 
thinkers, in contrast to the Germany that had reverted to barbarism and was striving to 
take the world along.  Their actions made them enduring symbols of the struggle, 
universal and timeless, for the freedom of the human spirit wherever and whenever it is 
threatened, and are therefore of vital importance in the present and for the future.  They 
each chose the path of resistance, when they could have acquiesced and conformed, 
refusing to be silenced by a criminal regime or to betray their individual principles.  
 One must query whether the behavior of German judges’ during the Third Reich 
represented their failure to fulfill a prescribed role in state and society, or if judges under 
any circumstances can succeed as bulwarks against radically unjust political regimes.  In 
any event, the world community must never allow the consequences resulting from a lack 
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of judicial independence and autonomy, as exemplified by the tyranny of the Nazi 
regime, to diminish from its collective recollection.  Alexander Hamilton’s designation of 
the judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch must always be remembered by the 
citizenry.  It is imperative that the public remain vigilant to any threatened action to its 
democratic structure.  As the German experience demonstrates, once the Nazis were in 
power, the judiciary was without the ability to overcome such totalitarianism.  A 
tyrannical government is something which must be prevented rather than cured  because 
ousting such a reign of terror, once it has gained power, is profoundly catastrophic in 
terms of both human lives and material resources, and these sacrifices will affect future 
generations of humankind in perpetuity.  The distressing reality is that the judicial branch 
lacks potency to act once such an impetus has achieved momentum.  The admonition 
proffered by this dissertation is that preventing the potential for despotic activity is thus 
the combined responsibility of a vibrant public sphere and the judiciary, while continuing 
to maintain its judicial independence and autonomy prior to any attempted usurpation 
thereof by a dictatorial administration that can then demand of its compliant and tractable 
judges that they, “Do whatever is necessary.”
626
 
 In closing, certainly the pressures placed on American judges pale in comparison 
to those thrust upon the Nazi judiciary.  However, the German experience offers a 
profound message for all jurists relative to judicial independence and judicial 
accountability, and the importance of judicial disciplinary commissions in monitoring 
judges’ behavior. 
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 Judicial accountability imposes constraints on judges by holding them legally or 
politically responsible for their behavior.
627
  Accountability “implies that some actors 
have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have 
fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they 
determine that these responsibilities have not been met.”
628
  Judicial accountability fits 
within the broader spectrum of American government by holding public officials 
responsible in order to prevent corruption, usurpations of power, or other abuses, and in 
order to ensure that governmental policy reflects the values and interests of the populace.  
The ability to require to account and sanction behavior is as necessary in the case of 
judges, as it is for other civic officials because jurists also may be tempted to abuse their 
authority or evade their responsibilities.  Nevertheless, the form that this accountability 
demands must respect the distinctive functions that judges perform.  Judicial 
accountability should therefore address itself to instances of wrong-doing but not 
interfere with the impartial resolution of disputes or impose influence to depart from 
adherence to the law. 
 Individual judges should be held accountable for their behavior, whether on or off 
the bench, unrelated to the merits of their decisions that
629
 “is prejudicial to the effective 
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.”
630
  In the courtroom, 
inappropriate behavior might include exhibiting racial or gender bias, failing to treat 
attorneys, defendants, litigants, and witnesses with appropriate respect, engaging in ex 
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parte communications, or otherwise acting in an arbitrary manner.
631
  These were all 
actions in which Roland Freisler routinely participated as President of the People’s Court.  
It may also include failures to act, such as neglecting cases or dereliction in conducting 
court proceedings in a timely fashion.  Off the bench, judicial misbehavior might involve 
improper activity or conduct, be they violations of the law, excessive drinking or 
gambling, sexual improprieties, or other comportment that could undermine societal 
respect for the courts.
632
 
 The responsibility for ensuring behavioral accountability of judges is delegated to 
the judicial branch through the creation of judicial disciplinary commissions to proctor 
judges’ nondecisional conduct.  These disciplinary commissions investigate, prosecute, 
and adjudicate allegations of judicial misconduct.  It has been stated that,
633
 “It is striking 
to note how little threat to independence is implicit in most instances that seem to call for 
accountability.”
634
  Judicial disciplinary commissions can take account of misconduct 
that does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense, but they assure due process for 
the accused judge, requiring a specification of charges and an opportunity for the judge to 
respond.  These commissions also employ a range of sanctions for enforcing 
accountability beyond mere removal from office, such as private reprimands, public 
reprimands, and suspension from office.  This enables them to address a wider domain of 
behavioral misconduct, with punishments proportionate to the offense.  Also, the body 
that is implementing the behavioral norms is situated within the judicial branch rather 
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than in a coordinate branch, thereby obviating concerns relative to institutional 
independence of the judiciary.
635
 
 Through the performance of these judicial disciplinary commissions, American 
judges should comprehend the increased judicial independence that is provided to them 
by guaranteeing to the public that only those jurists truly deserving, are permitted to 
remain in office.  Thus, it is for the advancement and benefit of both society and the 
judiciary that such commissions subject judicial conduct to continual scrutiny and 
oversee behavior for compliance with ethical standards.  These standards demand nothing 
less than deportment that concurs with the dignity entrusted by the public to the function 
and prescribed obligations of the office. 
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Coda 
Evading Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity 
 The most comprehensive investigation of Nazi judges ever undertaken was at the 
Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, known as the “Justice Case,” “Case 3,” or the “Altstoetter 
Trial.”  This proceeding was devoted to the jurists of the Third Reich.
636
  Acting under 
international law and by agreement with the other allied victors in the Second World 
War, the United States conducted this litigation as one of a series of twelve trials in the 
U.S. zone of occupation. 
 The Justice Case was the third in the progression of trials and commenced on 
February 17, 1947,
637
 with the charges alleged against the jurists being war crimes, 
organized crime, and crimes against humanity.
638
  The sixteen defendants before the 
Court were “the embodiment of what passed for justice in the Third Reich,”
639
 according 
to the prosecutors; they stood as representatives of the entire Nazi justice system.  Its 
highest leaders could no longer be prosecuted.  Reich Minister of Justice Gürtner had 
died in 1941.  His successor, Otto Thierack, had committed suicide in 1946 in a British 
prison camp.  Erwin Bumke, President of the Reichgericht, had also taken his own life as 
the United States Army was entering the city of Leipzig, and Roland Freisler, President 
of the People’s Court, was killed in an Allied bombing raid on February 3, 1945.  The 
highest official on trial was thus Franz Schlegelberger, former Undersecretary in the 
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Reich Ministry of Justice and Acting Minister; along with Thierack’s two 
Undersecretaries, Curt Rothenberger and Ernst Klemm.  Other defendants included 
several additional high-ranking officials from the Ministry of Justice:  Ernst Lautz, 
Prosecutor General at the People’s Court; the Senior Public Prosecutors of the People’s 
Court, Paul Barnickel and Oswald Rothaug, formerly the Presiding Judge of the 
Nuremberg Special Court; the former Vice-President of the Nuremberg Special Court and 
subsequently of the People’s Court, Karl Engert; the Presiding Judge of one of the panels 
of the Nuremberg Special Court, Günther Nebelung; and two Presiding Judges of other 
Special Courts,
640
 Rudolf Oeschey and Hermann Cuhorst.  Also indicted were Josef 
Altstoetter, Chief of the Civil Law and Procedure Division of the Reich Ministry of 
Justice; Wilhelm Von Ammon, Ministerial Counsellor of the Criminal Legislation and 
Administration Division of the Reich Ministry of Justice; Guenther Joel, Legal Adviser to 
the Reich Minister of Justice; Wolfgang Mettgenberg, Representative of the Chief of the 
Criminal Legislation and Administration Division of the Reich Ministry of Justice; Hans 
Petersen, Lay Judge of the First Senate of the People’s Court; and Carl Westphal, 
Ministerial Counsellor of the Criminal Legislation and Administration Division.
641
 
 Because these men were not fanatic National Socialists, the ordinary workings of 
the judicial system during the Third Reich were exposed to scrutiny, and it became clear 
to what extent the largely conservative legal profession had been profoundly involved in 
the Nazi reign of terror.  The main charges against them were “judicial murder and other 
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atrocities which they committed by destroying law and justice in Germany, and by then 
utilizing the empty forms of legal process for persecution, enslavement, and 
extermination on a vast scale.”
642
  The essence of the charges were that the accused 
perverted the legal system, emptying it of all content and meaning, and then used the 
remaining façade to bring about barbarity.
643
 
 Schlegelberger based his defense on the claim that he had remained at his post to 
prevent the worst from happening, and that only for this reason had he committed all the 
acts of which he stood accused.  However, this argument could be used not only by him 
and all the other jurists on trial to exonerate themselves, but also by every other 
individual who had any responsibility in the crimes of the Third Reich.  This line of 
defense would in the end have found Hitler to be solely culpable.  After careful and 
thorough consideration, the Court stated:
644
 
Schlegelberger presented an interesting defense . . . 
He feared that if he were to resign, a worse man would take 
his place.  As the event proved, there is much truth in this 
also.  Under Thierack the police did usurp the functions of 
the administration of justice and murdered untold 
thousands of Jews and political prisoners.  Upon analysis 
this plausible claim of the defense squares neither with the 
truth, logic, or the circumstances. 
 The evidence conclusively shows that in order to 
maintain the Ministry of Justice in the good graces of Hitler 
and to prevent its utter defeat by Himmler’s police, 
Schlegelberger and the other defendants who joined in this 
claim of justification took over the dirty work which the 
leaders of the State demanded, and employed the Ministry 
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of Justice as a means for destroying the Jewish and Polish 
populations, terrorizing the inhabitants of occupied 
countries, and wiping out political opposition at home.  
That their program of racial extermination under the guise 
of law failed to attain the proportions which were reached 
by the pogroms, deportations, and mass murders by the 
police is cold comfort to the survivors of the “judicial” 
process, and constitutes a poor excuse before this Tribunal.  
The prostitution of a judicial system for the 
accomplishment of criminal aims involves an element of 
evil to the State which is not found in frank atrocities which 




 A broad range of additional justifications and rationalizations were also placed 
before the Court in support of pleas of innocence.  Among them was the proffered 
“central defense”
646
 of legal positivism:  “I was following the law, and the law required 
me to do it.”  The implication being:  “I was required to do what I did; I had no choice 
and, therefore, I had no responsibility.”
647
 
 During the trial, 138 witnesses were heard and 2,093 pieces of evidence admitted.  
From this overwhelming amount of information, the Court drew this conclusion:
648
 
 “Defendants are charged with crimes of such 
immensity that mere specific instances of criminality 
appear insignificant by comparison.  The charge, in brief, is 
that of conscious participation in a nationwide government-
organized system of cruelty and injustice, in violation of 
the laws of war and of humanity, and perpetrated in the 
name of law by the authority of the Ministry of Justice, and 
through the instrumentality of the courts.  The dagger of the 
assassin was concealed beneath the robe of the jurist.”
649
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Most shocking to the conscience of the Court was not the various appalling crimes 
themselves, but that they had been committed under the pretense of legality.
650
 
 Of the sixteen defendants in the case, ten were convicted and four acquitted.  One 
had since died, and the proceedings against another were declared a mistrial.
651
  
Schlegelberger, Klemm, Rothaug, and Oeschey were each sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment for life, while the other six defendants received prison sentences of 
between five
652
 and ten years.
653
 
 Although the Nuremberg trial could prosecute only a limited number of examples, 
it has remained the most concerted effort to illuminate the role of the judiciary under the 
National Socialist dictatorship.  However, it had little effect on the German legal 
profession, which tended to dismiss the Nuremberg trials as “retribution” on the part of 
the Allies.  The American and West German authorities themselves soon began 
rescinding the results of the proceeding.  The life sentences were commuted to twenty 
years, and by 1951 all of the defendants were released except for Rothaug, who was not 
discharged until 1956.  Even Schlegelberger, who had been provisionally liberated for 
health reasons in 1950, was freed permanently by January 1951.
654
  Both Rothaug and 
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Schlegelberger died of natural causes, Rothaug in 1967, at the age of 80, and 
Schlegelberger in 1970, at age 94.
655
 
 Some would assert that an unmistakable message was sent by the main trial at 
Nuremberg, that individuals live, simultaneously, in two legal systems, the national and 
the international.  It is not enough for actors to look to only the national juristic scheme to 
determine what is permissible or required under national law.  Rather, the inquiry must 
encompass essentials of international law also and consider holding defendants to that 
standard, as the accused were in the main trial at Nuremberg.
656
 
 In light of the allegations contained in the indictments against the jurists in the 
Justice Case, and with reflection upon the express words contained in the opinion of the 
Court; I will allow the reader to contemplate the severity of the sentences initially 
imposed by the Tribunal, to ruminate upon the subsequent reductions thereof, and then to 
query if justice truly was effectuated.  Conversely, had the defendants justifiably asserted 
that they “applied the laws of (Germany) in the manner in which they were intended?”
657
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